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Abstract
Description Logic is a formalism that is widely used in the framework of
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning in Artificial Intelligence. They are
based on Classical Logic in order to guarantee the correctness of the inferences
on the required reasoning tasks. It is indeed a fragment of First Order Predi-
cate Logic whose language is strictly related to the one of Modal Logic. Fuzzy
Description Logic is the generalization of the classical Description Logic frame-
work thought for reasoning with vague concepts that often arise in practical
applications.
Fuzzy Description Logic has been investigated since the last decade of the 20th
century. During the first fifteen years of investigation their semantics has been
based on Fuzzy Set Theory. A semantics based on Fuzzy Set Theory, however,
has been shown to have some counter-intuitive behavior, due to the fact that the
truth function for the implication used is not the residuum of the truth function
for the conjunction. In the meanwhile, Fuzzy Logic has been given a formal
framework based on Many-valued Logic. This framework, called Mathematical
Fuzzy Logic, has been proposed has the kernel of a well mathematically founded
Fuzzy Logic.
In this dissertation we propose a Fuzzy Description Logic whose semantics is
based on Mathematical Fuzzy Logic as its mathematically well settled kernel.
To this end we provide a novel notation that is strictly related to the notation
that is used in Mathematical Fuzzy Logic. After having settled the notation, we
investigate the hierarchies of description languages over different t-norm based
semantics and the reductions that can be performed between reasoning tasks.
The new framework that we establish gives us the possibility to systematically
investigate the relation of Fuzzy Description Logic to Fuzzy First Order Logic
and Fuzzy Modal Logic. Next we provide some (un)decidability results for the
case of infinite t-norm based semantics with or without knowledge bases. Finally
we investigate the complexity bounds of reasoning tasks without knowledge bases
for basic Fuzzy Description Logics over finite t-norms.
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Preface
Fuzzy Description Logic (FDL) is a topic that has been studied since the be-
ginning of the last decade of the 20th century. In its earlier papers FDLs were
defined as in the classical DLs but substituting the semantic of concepts and
roles, that are crisp sets and crisp relations in DLs, by fuzzy sets and fuzzy
relations valued on the real unit interval. Notice that during the first period of
research on FDLs, no formal fuzzy logic was defined, simply some operations
on the real unit interval were used to define functional operations on fuzzy sets
(see, for instance [ATV83]). Nevertheless the first papers on FDLs use as truth
functions the so-called Zadeh’s operations on [0, 1], that are min,max and the
negation n(x) = 1−x and the so called S-implication (also called Kleene-Dienes
implication in many fuzzy papers), defined by x → y = ¬x ∨ y. From the sem-
inal papers [Yen91] and [TM98], several papers on this topic, [Str98], [Str01],
[SSP+05a], [Str05b] [BS07] among others, have been published. They define
quite rich languages (very similar to the ones studied and used in the classical
DLs), study them and provide satisfiability algorithms.
In those first works, Fuzzy Logic is usually understood in the sense of Zadeh’s
fuzzy logic, both in the wide sense and in the narrow sense. We quote:
“In a narrow sense, fuzzy logic, FLn, is a logical system which aims at a
formalization of approximate reasoning. In this sense, FLn is an extension of
multivalued logic. However, the agenda of FLn is quite different from that
of traditional multivalued logics. In particular, such key concepts in FLn as
the concept of a linguistic variable, canonical form, fuzzy if-then rule, fuzzy
quantification and defuzzification, predicate modification, truth qualification,
the extension principle, the compositional rule of inference and interpolative
reasoning, among others, are not addressed in traditional systems. In its wide
sense, fuzzy logic, FLw, is fuzzily synonymous with the fuzzy set theory, FST,
which is the theory of classes with unsharp boundaries. FST is much broader
than FLn and includes the latter as one of its branches.” ([Zad94])
Fuzzy logic underlying early works on FDL was understood in Zadeh’s both
narrow and wide sense. In a narrow sense because it was distinct from multi-
valued logic, both in its formalization and in its agenda. In fact, among the key
concepts proposed in Zadeh’s agenda of fuzzy logic, there are linguistic modifiers
and fuzzy quantifiers that are of particular interest from the FDLs point of view.
In a wide sense because, since the beginning, a semantics based on fuzzy set
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theory has been proposed for fuzzy concepts and roles.
In the last years of the 20th century a group of researchers leaded by P. Ha´jek
defined a formal framework called Mathematical Fuzzy Logic (MFL), based on
residuated many-valued logics, unifying different research streams on fuzzy and
many-valued logic. Taking into account some counter-intuitive behavior of the
Kleene-Dienes implication (see page 3 for an explanation of this fact and Section
2.8 for the same argument in the case of FDL), P. Ha´jek proposes a multiple-
valued logic having a t-norm as semantics for conjunction and its residuum as
semantics for implication. As a motivation for this new framework, Ha´jek con-
sidered that despite the agenda of many-valued logic was narrower than that of
fuzzy logic in the sense of Zadeh, it could be considered as a mathematically rig-
orous kernel around which building a fuzzy logic with a wider agenda. Moreover,
that agenda can take great advantage from having a mathematically well-settled
base. We quote:
“[. . . ] even if I agree with Zadeh’s distinction between many-valued logic and
fuzzy logic in the narrow sense, I consider formal calculi of many-valued logic
(including non-“traditional” ones, of course) to be the kernel or base of fuzzy
logic in the narrow sense and the task of explaining things Zadeh mentions by
means of these calculi to be a very promising task (not yet finished).” ([Ha´j98c])
In fact half of his book [Ha´j98c] deals with many-valued residuated systems
(propositional and first order) and its properties and formal study, but the other
half part deals with the task of explaining things Zadeh mention by means of
these calculi, a task that is far from being finished. Nowadays Mathematical
Fuzzy Logic is a well established field with quite nice and interesting results
(See [CHN11] for a state of the art on the topic).
Mathematical Fuzzy logic, being a well formalized residuated many-valued
system, allows us to define FDLs from first order fuzzy logics using the same
relations existing between classical Logic and classical DLs. This is the proposal
of P. Ha´jek in [Ha´j05]. In fact, this new way of seeing fuzzy logic allowed to
think of a Fuzzy Description Logic based on many-valued logic as the logical and
mathematical background behind it. The first step has been done in [Ha´j05],
where this new framework for FDL has been proposed. This idea has been
followed in [GCAE10], where FDLs based on different continuous t-norms and
their residua have been considered. Since then, some papers on FDL based on a
t-norm have been published and some important results on (un)decidability of
FDL languages based on t-norms have been obtained.
From what we have said it becomes clear that we consider FDLs based on
Mathematical Fuzzy Logic1 (the only ones studied in this dissertation) as the
kernel of the real FDLs in the same sense than MFL is considered the kernel of
Fuzzy Logic by Ha´jek in the introduction of his book (the text quoted above).
As a consequence, the agenda of FDLs has two different goals. On the one hand
1What some researchers like to call Many-valued Description Logics.
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it is important to follow the study of the FDLs based on residuated many-valued
logics in the sense proposed in this dissertation and to explore applications. On
the other hand, it will be very interesting to incorporate new notions like the
ones of fuzzy modifiers and fuzzy quantifiers, as well as to deal with uncertainty
in this framework taking into account the work done in these subjects2. The aim
of this dissertation is to settle down the theoretical foundations of the program,
sketched by Ha´jek, of an FDL based on MFL. In this sense we do not strictly
follow the tradition on FDL previous to [Ha´j05] and this fact becomes clear
from the notation we propose for concept constructors, that is thought as a
compromise between the notation used in classical DL and the one used in MFL.
0.1 Overview and structure of the dissertation
This dissertation is structured in five chapters and two appendixes:
Chapter 1 In the first chapter we introduce the preliminaries of the work
presented in this dissertation and it has two parts. The first part is devoted to
introduce the framework of Mathematical Fuzzy Logic. We begin with a little bit
of history about the process that brought to the general framework of MFL from
the fields of many-valued logics and fuzzy set theory. Then we formally define
what fuzzy propositional logic, fuzzy modal logic and fuzzy first order logic are.
Our definitions of these formalisms are made from a semantical point of view.
This is due to the fact that the semantic approach is more suited to be then used
in FDL. Finally, we mention some properties, for each of the three formalisms,
that are useful in the overall development of the dissertation. The second part
of this chapter is devoted to introduce classical Description Logic. Also in this
case we report a little bit of history. Subsequently we define the formalism as
is usually done in the literature and report those results on complexity that are
generalized in the dissertation to the many-valued case.
Chapter 2 In the second chapter we introduce our proposal of Fuzzy Descrip-
tion Logic. The syntax of this proposal is based, as usual, on concept con-
structors. Nevertheless, the reader aware of the literature in FDL will find the
syntactical notation for concept constructors rather non-standard. This is due to
the fact that, in order to generalize the framework of DL to the fuzzy case, novel
symbols are needed. Throughout the chapter the reasons of these changes with
respect to the literature are deeply explained. Then a t-norm based semantics
is introduced. Once introduced the semantics, various kinds of consequences are
explained. Among them let us point out: (i) the changes in the hierarchy of in-
clusions between languages, (ii) the simplifications that can be performed on the
kinds of axioms that have been introduced in the literature, (iii) the reduction
between reasoning tasks that can be considered in a many-valued framework. In
2See for example [DRSV] for a state of the art about evaluation of fuzzy quantifiers, [H0´1]
and [EGN11] for a treatment of fuzzy modifiers (hedges) in the setting of MFL and finally
[LS08] for a proposal to cope with uncertainty in FDLs.
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this chapter relations to other formalisms are also considered. The formalisms
considered are fuzzy first order logic and fuzzy multi-modal logic. For both a
translation from FDL concepts to formulas is provided. The translation is then
proved to be meaningful through a corresponding translation between the re-
spective semantics. In the case of multi modal logic a translation from formulas
to FDL concepts is provided as well. In the last section on related work, be-
sides a brief (and rather non-exhaustive) history of FDL there are also deeply
motivated the practical reasons for which we prefer a residuated t-norm based
semantics, than the semantics that was adopted before [Ha´j05].
Chapter 3 The third chapter deals with decidability issues. First, a definition
of the reduction to fuzzy propositional logic used in [Ha´j05] to prove decidabil-
ity of concept witnessed satisfiability for language ALC is reported. We report
this reduction in this chapter because it is analyzed under several points of view
throughout the dissertation. Second, the decidability of concept quasi-witnessed
satisfiability with respect to empty knowledge bases for language IALE over
infinite-valued product semantics is proved. The proof uses a generalization to
quasi-witnessed interpretations of the previous defined reduction to fuzzy propo-
sitional logic with respect to witnessed interpretations. Third, the undecidabil-
ity of knowledge base satisfiability with respect to general knowledge bases for
language ALC over infinite-valued  Lukasiewicz semantics is proved. The proof
uses a recursive reduction to Post Correspondence Problem that was inspired
by [BP11f]. In the last section the related work on decidability of FDLs over
residuated semantics is reported.
Chapter 4 The fourth chapter deals with computational complexity issues.
First, it is showed that the reduction from [Ha´j05] reported at the beginning of
Chapter 4 is not polynomial. Second, the PSPACE-completeness of the satisfi-
ability and validity problems of formulas in the minimal modal logic of Kripke
frames over finite  Lukasiewicz chains is proved. The upper bound argument
uses a generalization of a procedure based on Hintikka sets. The procedure that
has been generalized is used in [BdRV01] to prove a PSPACE upper bound for
the same problem in classical Modal Logic. The lower bound argument is just
sketched, since it is the same proof provided in [Lad77]. Third, the PSPACE-
completeness of the concept satisfiability problem in language IALCEDT lan-
guage over a finite MTL-chain is proved. This time the upper bound argument
uses a PSPACE procedure based on the reduction reported at the beginning of
Chapter 4. The lower bound argument is the same as for the minimal modal
logic of Kripke frames over finite  Lukasiewicz chains and so the details are not ex-
plicitly given. In the last section the related work on computational complexity
of FDLs over residuated semantics is reported.
Chapter 5 In the fifth chapter we make an overview on the contributions of
this dissertation, resume the problems that have been left open and provide some
future research lines.
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Appendix A The results of this appendix, even though they are on first order
product logic with standard semantics, are crucial for the result about decidabil-
ity of some FDLs over product logic given in the first part of Chapter 4. In this
appendix it is proved that tautologies and positive satisfiable formulas of first
order Product logic coincide with tautologies and positive satisfiable formulas
over the one-generated subalgebra and thus they coincide with tautologies and
positive satisfiable formulas with respect to quasi-witnessed models. Finally a
remark explains that the problem of whether the formulas that are 1-satisfiable
for all models over [0, 1]Π and those that are 1-satisfiable over quasi-witnessed
models coincide is an open problem.
Appendix B This appendix contains the paper Strict core fuzzy logics and
quasi-witnessed models by M. Cerami and F. Esteva published in Archive of
Mathematical Logic [CE11]. This paper deals with the relation between first
order strict core fuzzy logics and quasi-witnessed models with general seman-
tics. It provides two axioms that added to the axiomatic definition of any strict
core fuzzy logic define a logic complete with respect to quasi-witnessed mod-
els. Finally it is proved that the only first order fuzzy logics of a continuous
t-norm where these new axioms are already provable are  Lukasiewicz and Prod-
uct logics. The paper deals with general semantics and thus, if the reader is
only interested on FDLs (related to standard semantics), this appendix can be
skipped. However, we have decided to include it since we think its content could
help the interested reader to better understand quasi-witnessed models. Notice
that we report the contents of the published version despite the notation does
not coincide with the one used in this dissertation, nevertheless the notation is
explained in the same appendix.
0.2 Publications related to the dissertation
The redaction of this dissertation is based, although not only, on the work devel-
oped in the following publications of the author. Note that the list of publications
follows the order of the topics as developed in this dissertation, rather than a
chronologic order.
1. M. Cerami, A. Garc´ıa-Cerdan˜a, F. Esteva. From classical description logic
to n-graded fuzzy description logics. In P. Sobrevilla, editor, Proceedings
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Chapter 1
Preliminaries
In this dissertation we apply results of Mathematical Fuzzy Logic (MFL) in order
to generalize the framework of Classical Description Logics (DL) to the fuzzy
and many-valued cases. This chapter on preliminaries contains basic results on
MFL and DL that will be needed for the overall development and understanding
of the work presented in the rest of the chapters of this document. In Section
1.1 we provide an overview on Mathematical Fuzzy Logic and, in Section 1.2,
an overview on Classical Description Logics.
1.1 Mathematical Fuzzy Logic
What we call Mathematical Fuzzy Logic (MFL) is a recent paradigm that aims
at treating vague reasoning by means of formally defined many-valued and fuzzy
logic systems. This nowadays paradigm is the result of a process that began in
ancient times with the discovery of fuzzy predicates.
The suspicion that vague sentences and predicates can lead to an unusual
behavior of the reasoning process has been already present since the IV century
b.C. when, according to the tradition, the greek philosopher Eubulides from
Mileto proposed what is known as the sorites paradox (or, in modern english,
the heap paradox ). There exist several formulations of such paradox, we report
here a version that is quite close to the original one:
10.000 sand grains are a heap.
If we take a sand grain away from a sand heap,
the result keeps being a heap.
0 sand grain is a heap.
At first sight it can seem a linguistic trick. Nevertheless, this paradox can be
easily formalized. If we consider, for every natural n such that 0 ≤ n ≤ 10.000,
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the proposition:
pn= “n sand grains are a heap”,
we can formalize the paradox in the following form:
p10.000
p10.000 → p9.999
p9.999 → p9.998
...
p1 → p0
p0
As we can easily see, when we try to express it formally, if we remain in the
classical framework, it keeps being a paradox. As happened with other ancient
paradoxes, also for sorites paradox one had to wait a long time before a solution
could be found and this solution needed a widening of the classical two-valued
framework.1
In modern times, the first who thought in terms of three-valued logic has been
C. S. Peirce in a manuscript of 1909, but he did not make it public. The birth of
many-valued logics is, indeed, attributed to J.  Lukasiewicz, who, in 1920 starting
from philosophical considerations about the problem of contingent future events,
defined the first three-valued logic and published it in [ Luk20]. Subsequently
and jointly with A. Tarski, in [ LT30] he defined a logic whose propositions are
valued in the real unit interval [0, 1]. A couple of years later, in order to prove
that Intuitionistic Propositional Logic is not complete with respect to any finite
linear model, K. Go¨del defined in [Go¨d32] a class of finite linear algebras one
for every finite cardinality. Considering the class of algebras defined by Go¨del,
M. Dummet in [Dum59] defined axiomatically a logical calculus and proved its
completeness with respect to that class of semantics. Another relevant many-
valued logic has been introduced 1996 to be defined. In that year, in fact, P.
Ha´jek, L. Godo and F. Esteva proposed in [HGE96] an axiomatic system where
the truth function for the conjunction is the product between real numbers in
the real unit interval [0, 1] and called it Product Logic.
Beyond the context of many-valued logics, L. A. Zadeh defined, in [Zad65],
the notion of fuzzy set. Zadeh’s definition of fuzzy set is based on a generalization
of the range of the set characteristic function to the real unit interval [0, 1]. Set
operations are also generalized to the operations of min{x, y}, max{x, y} and
1−x for intersection, union and complementation respectively, where x, y ∈ [0, 1]
are the images of the generalized characteristic functions of two different sets over
the same object element. Following the intuition, the subset relation has been
defined as true between two fuzzy sets when the instantiation of the subset by
means of every domain element is less or equal than the instantiation of the
superset by means of the same element.
1See, for example, the solution given in [Gog69] or the one stated in Section 1.1.4.
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In the logical system behind Zadeh’s fuzzy set theory the truth function
chosen for the implication operator was the so-called Kleene-Dienes implication.
This operation is a straightforward generalization of the semantics of the classical
material implication, i.e.
x⇒ y := max{1− x, y}, (1.1)
where x, y ∈ [0, 1] are thought as the truth values of the antecedent and the
consequent of the implication respectively. Nevertheless, this semantics for the
implication gives rise to the lack of the classical correspondence between im-
plication and subset/superset relationship. Indeed, given two fuzzy sets C and
D, with such semantics, the fact that C ⊆ D is no more equivalent to the fact
that, for every object x belonging to the domain, C(x)⇒ D(x) = 1, as it would
be desirable. A way to overcome this shortcoming is, as it began to become
clear during the 80’s (see, for example [TV85]), the use of the residuum of a
class of operations over the real unit interval [0,1] coming from the theory of
probabilistic metric spaces, called t-norms. The use a t-norm, as a semantics for
the conjunction, and its residuum, as a semantics for the implication, in fact,
solves the above mentioned problem and provides a mathematically well-founded
background for fuzzy set theory.
At the end of the 90’s P. Ha´jek, considering all these results, in [Ha´j98c],
defined what nowadays is known as Mathematical Fuzzy Logic. Thanks to this
new framework, great advances on the subject have been done until the present
day. The interested reader can find in [CHN11] an exhaustive survey on the
subject.
In the rest of this Section we will provide the definitions of fuzzy logics under
the propositional, modal and first-order points of view as well as the results that
we need in order to easily develop the central subject of this dissertation.
Despite the fact that sometimes logics are defined by means of a set of axioms
and inference rules, here we will not follow this pattern. We are, indeed, rather
interested in the semantical definition of a logic in terms of validity and logical
consequence that, in the case of the logics here considered, can be either a variety
or a single algebra.
1.1.1 Propositional logic
In this section we introduce the fuzzy propositional logics we are going to use
from their underlying semantics. Even though propositional logics are not a
central matter in this dissertation it is important to introduce them for three
reasons. The first is that the language of multi-modal logic, which we will intro-
duce in Section 1.1.2 and which is a notational variant of ALC-like languages,
is defined as an expansion of the language of propositional logic. The second
reason is that the algebraic semantics of the fuzzy propositional logics here con-
sidered, called MTL-chains and specially the standard ones (defined on the real
unit interval), are the algebras of truth values of the FDLs considered in our
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framework and, therefore, they deserve special attention in order to understand
the central part of this dissertation. The third reason is that many decidability
and complexity results presented in this dissertation are based on a reduction to
propositional logic.
Language
A propositional language l = {?1, . . . ?i} is a finite set of propositional connec-
tives. The arity a(?) ∈ N of the propositional connective ? is the number of
formulas that ? takes as arguments. The type t(l) ∈ N|l| of language l is the
tuple given by the arities of the propositional connectives in l.
Given a language l = {?1, . . . ?i} and a denumerable set of propositional vari-
ables At = {p1, p2, . . .}, the set of l-formulas, denoted by Fml is built inductively
in the following way:
1. each propositional variable is a formula,
2. each 0-ary connective is a formula,
3. if ϕ1, . . . , ϕj are formulas and ? ∈ l is a j-ary connective, then ?(ϕ1, . . . , ϕj)
is a formula.
Notice that, since in our context we will make use of propositional connectives
that are at most binary, we will, in general, use the notation ϕ?ψ, instead of the
above prenex notation, in which the same formula should be denoted by ?(ϕ,ψ).
Given two formulas ϕ,ψ and a propositional variable p (not necessarily oc-
curring in ϕ) the substitution of p by ψ in ϕ, denoted by ϕ[ψ/p] is the formula
obtained by replacing every occurrence of p in ϕ by the formula ψ.
Throughout this dissertation we will use the propositional language that
contains the symbols ⊗, ⊕, ∧, ∨, →, ⊥ and > standing for the connectives
of strong conjunction, strong disjunction, weak conjunction, weak disjunction,
implication, bottom constant and top constant respectively.
Semantics
Within the framework of propositional fuzzy logic two kinds of semantics have
been considered, namely the general and the standard semantics. Considering
the general semantics means working with an equational class of algebras, while
considering the standard semantics means working either with a chain (or a class
of isomorphic algebras) or with a class of chains whose domain is the real unit
interval [0, 1].
In this section we introduce the classes of algebras that we need in order to
define the logics we work with and to report some interesting results. As we
will see later on, the structures that we are going to define are fundamental for
the understanding of the present dissertation because they turn out to be the
algebras of truth values in which description concepts will take their values.
4
General semantics: the variety of MTL-algebras and its subvarieties
An algebra T is a structure composed by a nonempty set T , called the domain
or universe of T and a set of operations lT called (as in the case of propositional
logic) language, such that, for every a1, . . . , aj ∈ T and each j-ary operation
?ˆ ∈ lT, it holds that ?ˆ(a1, . . . , aj) ∈ T . Equational classes of algebras K are
usually defined through a finite set of equations that are supposed to be true
in every algebra belonging to K and only in them. Definitional equations are
expressions of the form:
(∀~x)(∀~y)(t1(~x) = t2(~y)) (1.2)
where t1 and t2 are terms. Following the tradition in MFL, we will use the
expression:
t1(~x) ≈ t2(~x)
in order to abbreviate expression (1.2). Being all these classes of algebras equa-
tionally defined, each one form a variety.
Equational classes K satisfy that, for every two algebras T,T′ ∈ K, it holds
that t(lT) = t(lT′). So, it makes sense to speak about the type tK of a variety
K.
A lattice is an algebra2 T = 〈T,∨,∧〉 with two binary operations ∨ and ∧,
called join and meet, which satisfies the following equations:
(E1) x ∨ y ≈ y ∨ x
(E2) x ∧ y ≈ y ∧ x (commutativity)
(E3) x ∨ (y ∨ z) ≈ (x ∨ y) ∨ z
(E4) x ∧ (y ∧ z) ≈ (x ∧ y) ∧ z (associativity)
(E5) x ∨ x ≈ x
(E6) x ∧ x ≈ x (idempotence)
(E7) x ≈ x ∨ (x ∧ y)
(E8) x ≈ x ∧ (x ∨ y) (absorption)
In a lattice T an order relation can be defined between every two elements
a, b ∈ T , in the following way:
a ≤ b ⇐⇒ a ∧ b = a ⇐⇒ a ∨ b = b.
For every subset X ⊆ T , we have that
• an upper bound of X is an element a ∈ T such that, for every element
b ∈ X, it holds that b ≤ a,
2For further information about lattices, the interested reader can look at [BS81].
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• a lower bound of X is an element a ∈ T such that, for every element b ∈ X,
it holds that a ≤ b,
• the least upper bound or supremum of X (denoted sup(X)) is an upper
bound a ∈ T of X such that a ≤ b for every upper bound b of X. If,
moreover, sup(X) ∈ X, we call it the maximum of X (denoted max(X)),
• the greatest lower bound or infimum of X (denoted inf(X)) is a lower
bound a ∈ T of X such that a ≥ b for every lower bound b of X. If,
moreover, inf(X) ∈ X, we call it the minimum of X (denoted min(X)).
A lattice T is bounded if min(T ) and max(T ) always exist; it is complete if,
for every subset X ⊆ T , inf(X) and sup(X) always exist. Clearly, if a lattice is
complete, it is bounded as well.
A monoid is an algebra T = 〈T, ∗, 1〉, where:
• ∗ is an associative binary operation,
• 1 ∈ T is the neutral element of operation ∗, in the sense that,
x ∗ 1 ≈ 1 ∗ x ≈ x.
A monoid T is commutative if the operation ∗ is so.
We say that an algebra T = 〈T,∧,∨, ∗,⇒, 0, 1〉 is a bounded commutative
integral residuated lattice if:
• 〈T,∧,∨, 0, 1〉 is a bounded lattice where 0 = inf(T ) and 1 = sup(T ),
• 〈T, ∗, 1〉 is a commutative monoid,
• there exists a unique binary operation ⇒ satisfying for all a, b, c ∈ T the
following condition (called residuation):
a ∗ b ≤ c ⇐⇒ a ≤ b⇒ c. (1.3)
The operation⇒ is called the residuum of the operation ∗ and it is defined
as:
a⇒ b := max{c ∈ T : a ∗ c ≤ b}. (1.4)
Further operations that can be defined are:
¬a := a⇒ 0 (1.5)
a⇔ b := (a⇒ b) ∗ (a⇒ b) (1.6)
an :=
n times︷ ︸︸ ︷
a ∗ . . . ∗ a (1.7)
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called residuated negation, biconditional and n-ary conjunction respectively.
An MTL-algebra T = 〈T,∧, ∗,⇒, 0, 1〉 is a bounded commutative integral
residuated lattice which satisfies the equation:
(PL) (x⇒ y) ∨ (y ⇒ x) ≈ 1 (pre-linearity)
Notice that, in residuated lattices where equation (PL) is valid, the operation
∨ does not need to be present in the algebraic language, since it is definable as:
a ∨ b := ((a⇒ b)⇒ b) ∧ ((b⇒ a)⇒ a) (1.8)
so, in what follows, we will omit it from the languages of the algebras where it
is a definable operation.
An IMTL-algebra T = 〈T,∧, ∗,⇒, 0, 1〉 is a MTL-algebra which satisfies the
equation:
(Inv) x ≈ (x⇒ 0)⇒ 0 (involutive negation)
An SMTL-algebra T = 〈T,∧, ∗,⇒, 0, 1〉 is a MTL-algebra which satisfies the
equation:
(S) x ∧ (x⇒ 0) ≈ 0 (strictness)
A ΠMTL-algebra T = 〈T,∧, ∗,⇒, 0, 1〉 is an SMTL-algebra which satisfies
the equation:
(Π) ((z ⇒ 0)⇒ 0)⇒ (((x ∗ z)⇒ (y ∗ z))⇒ (x⇒ y)) ≈ 1 (simplification)
or, equivalently, an MTL-algebra that satisfies (Π) and (S).
A BL-algebra T = 〈T,∧, ∗,⇒, 0, 1〉 is an MTL-algebra which satisfies the
equation:
(D) x ∧ y ≈ x ∗ (x⇒ y) (divisibility)
Notice that, in presence of divisibility, ∧ becomes a definable operation. In
subvarieties of BL, it can, in fact be defined by the divisibility equation and,
therefore, we will omit it from the algebraic language of subvarieties of BL.
A Π-algebra T = 〈T, ∗,⇒, 0, 1〉 is an SMTL-algebra which satisfies the equa-
tions (D) and (Π).
A Go¨del-algebra T = 〈T, ∗,⇒, 0, 1〉 is a BL-algebra (or an MTL algebra)
which satisfies the equation:
(Id) x ≈ x ∗ x (idempotence)
An MV-algebra T = 〈T, ∗,⇒, 0, 1〉 is a BL-algebra which satisfies (Inv) or,
equivalently, an IMTL-algebra which satisfies (D).
If any of these algebras is linearly ordered, we say that it is a chain. If the
domain T is a finite set, we will speak about finite algebras and finite chains.
In Figure 1.1 we show the lattice of inclusions between these varieties, where
a variety A is included in A′ if they are connected by a sequence of upward
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Figure 1.1: The hierarchy of subvarieties of MTL
edges. Note that in Figure 1.1 B and H denote the variety of Boolean algebras
and Heyting algebras, respectively and (EM) denotes the excluded middle law :
(EM) x ∨ (x⇒ 0) ≈ 1 (excluded middle)
Standard semantics Particular attention has been paid in the literature to
the MTL-chains whose lattice reduct is [0, 1] with the usual order. These chains,
called “standard chains”, are related to a special kind of operation called “t-
norms”.
Definition 1.1.1. A t-norm is a binary operation ∗ on the real unit interval
[0, 1] that is associative, commutative, non-decreasing in both arguments and
having 1 as neutral (unit) element.
Left continuity of ∗, i.e.
a ∗∨X = ∨b∈X{a ∗ b}
is a sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of the residuum of the t-
norm ∗. Using this residuum, the following result characterizes standard chains.
Proposition 1.1.2. A structure 〈[0, 1],∧, ∗,⇒, 0, 1〉 is a standard MTL-chain if
and only if ∗ is a left-continuous t-norm and ⇒ is its residuum. This structure
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will be denoted from now on by [0, 1]∗. Moreover a standard chain satisfies
divisibility (hence it is a BL-chain) if and only if the t-norm is continuous.
The most used representative of the standard chains (unique up to isomor-
phisms), are the ones defined by the so-called  Lukasiewicz, product and minimum
t-norms and their residua (collected in Table 1.1).
?ˆ Minimum (Go¨del) Product (of real numbers)  Lukasiewicz
x ∗ y min(x, y) x · y max(0, x+ y − 1)
x⇒ y
{
1, if x ≤ y
y, otherwise
{
1, if x ≤ y
y/x, otherwise
min(1, 1− x+ y)
x⇒ 0
{
1, if x = 0
0, otherwise
{
1, if x = 0
0, otherwise
1− x
Table 1.1: The three main continuous t-norms.
In the case of  Lukasiewicz and Go¨del t-norms ∗, the operations in Table 1.1
can be defined on the domain of a finite subalgebra of [0, 1]∗. In these cases,
we can talk about finite t-norms. So, for every natural number n,  Ln and Gn
will denote the restriction of  Luksiewicz and Go¨del t-norms, respectively, on the
subalgebra of cardinality n + 1 over the domain T = {0, 1n , . . . , n−1n , 1} in the
n + 1-valued case. Notice that, there not exist finite product subalgebras of
[0, 1]Π (of cardinality > 2), so a finite product t-norm can not be defined.
Ordinal sums Let I be a bounded countable set and, for every i ∈ I, let
∗i : [0, 1]2 −→ [0, 1] be a (continuous) t-norm. Let [li, ui] be a family of non-
empty, pairwise disjoint closed intervals of [0,1] and let fi : [0, 1] −→ [li, ui] be
a family of bijections which respects operation ∗i. Then the ordinal sum of the
family {∗i : i ∈ I} of t-norms is the operation ∗ : [0, 1]2 −→ [0, 1] defined as
x ∗ y =
{
fi(f
−1
i (x) ∗i f−1i (y)), if x, y ∈ [li, ui]
min{x, y}, otherwise
Once defined what an ordinal sum of t-norm is, we can report an important
result about continuous t-norms from [Lin65]. It is the corresponding result
for t-norms of the one that in [MS57] has been proved for families of abelian
semi-groups.
Theorem 1.1.3. Every continuous t-norm is an ordinal sum of isomorphic
copies of  Lukasiewicz, product and Go¨del t-norms.
This result has been generalized to BL-chains in [Ha´j98a]. We report an
useful consequence of that result:
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Theorem 1.1.4. Every standard BL-chain is an ordinal sum of isomorphic
copies of  Lukasiewicz, product and Go¨del chains.
As a consequence we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1.1.5. Every finite standard BL-chain is an ordinal sum of isomor-
phic copies of  Lukasiewicz and Go¨del finite chains.
Defining logics from varieties Given an algebra T and a propositional lan-
guage l such that t(l) = t(lT), a propositional T-evaluation (we will say propo-
sitional evaluation, when the algebra T is clear from the context) is a mapping
e : At −→ T .
The propositional evaluation e can be inductively extended to the set of
formulas Fml in such a way that for every pair of formulas ϕ,ψ ∈ Fml, every
logical connective ? ∈ l and its respective algebraic operation ?ˆ ∈ lT, it holds
that:
• e(⊥) = 0,
• e(>) = 1,
• e(ϕ ? ψ) = e(ϕ)?ˆe(ψ)
It is possible to define, over the set Fml of formulas on the language l, the
following notions based on the general semantics given by a class K of algebras.
Given a set of formulas Γ and a formula ϕ, we say that:
• ϕ is 1-satisfiable if there exists an algebra T ∈ K and a propositional T-
evaluation such that e(ϕ) = 1. In this case we say that T satisfies ϕ, in
symbols T, e |= ϕ.
• ϕ is positively satisfiable if there exists an algebra T ∈ K and a propo-
sitional T-evaluation such that e(ϕ) > 0. In this case we say that T
positively satisfies ϕ, in symbols T, e |=pos ϕ.
• ϕ is a K-tautology (denoted K ϕ) if, for every T ∈ K and every proposi-
tional T-evaluation, it holds that e(ϕ) = 1.
• ϕ is a logical consequence of Γ (denoted Γ K ϕ) if, for every T ∈ K and
every propositional T-evaluation such that e(ψ) = 1, for every ψ ∈ Γ, it
holds that e(ϕ) = 1.
Once defined these notions it makes sense the notion of logic associated with
a variety K.
Definition 1.1.6. Let K be a variety and l a propositional language such that
t(l) = t(lK). We define the logic of K (called L(K)) as the set of its tautologies.
Some basic results in the literature are the following:
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• For every subclassK ofMTL, let V(K) be the minimal variety that contains
K, then the tautologies of L(K) are the same as the tautologies of L(V(K)).
• For every subvariety K of MTL, the logic L(K) is chain complete, that is:
L(K) = L(KC)
where KC is the class of K-chains.
Defining logics from standard algebras Given a standard algebra [0, 1]∗ it
is possible to define, over the set Fml of formulas on the language l, the notions
of 1-satisfiability, positive satisfiability, tautologicity and logical consequence
based on the standard semantics. Given a t-norm ∗, by setting K = {[0, 1]∗} in
the definitions at page 10, we obtain what is called the logic of the t-norm ∗,
denoted L(∗).
Note that it is well known that, for each continuous t-norm ∗, the logic of a
t-norm L(∗) enjoys the so-called Finite strong standard completeness. That is,
if V([0, 1]∗) is the minimal variety that contains [0, 1]∗, then, for every finite set
of formulas Γ ∪ ϕ ⊆ Fml, it holds that
Γ |=V([0,1]∗) ϕ ⇐⇒ Γ |=[0,1]∗ ϕ
The same is not true for infinite sets of formulas Γ, except when [0, 1]∗ = [0, 1]G.
It is also well known (see [Ha´j98c]) that, if there is an evaluation e from the
set of propositional formulas to either [0, 1]G or [0, 1]Π such that, for a formula
ϕ, it holds that e(ϕ) = r ∈ (0, 1), then, for any r′ ∈ (0, 1) it can be found
an evaluation e′ such that e′(ϕ) = r′. So, in what follows, we will speak only
about 1-satisfiability and positive satisfiability in the case of Go¨del and product
standard chains.
If T is either [0, 1] L or  Ln it is possible to define the notion of r-satisfiability,
for r ∈ T, as well. Indeed, ϕ is r-satisfiable if there exists a propositional T-
evaluation e such that e(ϕ) = r. In this case we say that T r-satisfies ϕ, in
symbols T, e |=r ϕ.
Expanding the language In this dissertation we are going to consider some
language expansions of the logic of a t-norm. Language expansions of the lan-
guage of a given logic L(∗) are obtained by adding new propositional connectives
to its language lL(∗).
Truth constants Defining the logic of a t-norm gives the possibility to
consider a language expansion that is particularly interesting in relation with
Fuzzy Description Logics: the one obtained by adding truth constants to the
language of a given logic L(∗). Given a subalgebra S of [0, 1]∗ we consider the
logic LS(∗), defined on the language lS := lL(∗) ∪ {r : r ∈ S}. The evaluations
of LS(∗) are obtained by adding the conditions for truth constants:
• e(r) = r, for any r ∈ S.
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Involutive negation In the case that the residuated negation is not in-
volutive, that is, when the t-norm ∗ considered is not the  Lukasiewicz one, an
interesting expansion is the one obtained by adding an involutive negation ∼ as
an extra unary connective. An involutive negation of L(∗) is any unary connec-
tive ∼ such that
if e(ϕ) ≤ e(ψ) then e(∼ ψ) ≤ e(∼ ϕ) (1.9)
e(ϕ) = e(∼∼ ϕ) (1.10)
for every propositional evaluation e and formula ϕ, that is, the truth function
associated to ∼, is an order reversing involution on [0, 1]. In this dissertation we
will only consider evaluations e such that:
e(∼ ϕ) := 1− e(ϕ) (1.11)
for every formula ϕ.
The logic obtained, which we will denote by L∼(∗), is defined on the language
l∼ := lL(∗) ∪ {∼}.
Strong disjunction A binary connective that we will often use in the
context of FDL, is the one of strong disjunction ⊕. Its truth function defined in
a standard algebra is:
a Y b := 1− ((1− a) ∗ (1− b)) (1.12)
where a, b ∈ T , with either T = [0, 1] or the domain of a finite standard algebra.
Once defined the strong disjunction, we define the following abbreviation of the
n-ary strong disjunction (for n ∈ N):
n · ϕ :=
n times︷ ︸︸ ︷
ϕ⊕ . . .⊕ ϕ (1.13)
where ϕ ∈ Fml. Notice that, having the involutive negation defined as in (1.11),
the connective of strong disjunction can be define in the language of the logic
L∼(∗) as:
ϕ⊕ ψ := ∼(∼ϕ⊗∼ψ) (1.14)
Monteiro-Baaz Delta operator Another interesting connective that can
be added to the language of a given logic L(∗) is the unary connective 4, whose
associated truth function is:
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δ(a) =
{
0, if a 6= 1,
1, otherwise
(1.15)
for every a ∈ [0, 1].
The resulting propositional calculus, which we will denote by L4(∗), is de-
fined on the language l4 := lL(∗) ∪ {4}. The following formulas, introduced in
[Baa96] in the framework of Go¨del Logic:
(A41) 4ϕ ∨ ¬4 ϕ,
(A42) 4(ϕ ∨ ψ)→ (4ϕ ∨4ψ),
(A43) 4ϕ→ ϕ,
(A44) 4ϕ→44 ϕ,
(A45) 4(ϕ→ ψ)→ (4ϕ→4ψ).
become then tautologies of the logic L4(∗).
Further properties Most of the logics considered so far enjoy the following
properties.
Definition 1.1.7. 1. We say that a logic L enjoys the Local Deduction Theo-
rem (LDT , for short) if for each finite theory Γ and formulas ϕ,ψ, it holds
that Γ, ϕ |= ψ iff there exists a natural number n such that Γ |= ϕn → ψ.
2. We say that a logic L enjoys Delta Deduction Theorem (4DT , for short)
if, for each finite theory Γ and formulas ϕ,ψ, it holds that Γ, ϕ |= ψ iff
Γ |= 4ϕ→ ψ.
3. We say that a logic L enjoys Invariance under Substitution (Sub, for short)
if, for every formulas ϕ,ψ, χ and every formula ζ occurring in χ, it holds
that ϕ↔ ψ |= χ[ϕ/ζ]↔ χ[ψ/ζ].
Next we recall the definition of core fuzzy logic and of 4-core fuzzy logic
given in [HC06] and that of strict core fuzzy logic given in [CE11].
Definition 1.1.8. 1. We say that a logic L is a core fuzzy logic if it is finitary,
enjoys LDT , Sub and expands L(MTL).
2. We say that a logic L is a strict core fuzzy logic if it is finitary, enjoys
LDT , Sub and expands L(SMTL).
3. We say that a logic L4 is a 4-core fuzzy logic if it enjoys 4DT , Sub and
expands L4(MTL).
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1.1.2 Fuzzy (multi-)modal logic
In this section we introduce the framework of multi-modal logic. It is important
because, as we will see, multi-modal language is a notational variant of the
description language mainly considered in this work. For this reason, we will
consider the general framework of multi-modal language of which the uni-modal
language is a particular case.
Modal Logic was already known and studied in ancient times by the Aris-
totele’s school. In its modern version it has been defined by C. I. Lewis and
C. H. Langford, who, in [LL32] established a modern notation, gave sets of
axioms for some logical system and provided a matrix-like truth-functional se-
mantics for those systems. Further studies, due, above all, to E. J. Lemmon
(see [Lem57, Lem66a, Lem66b]) introduced an algebraic semantics for Lewis
and Langford Systems.
Nevertheless, the real cornerstone in the study of Modal Logic has been the
work of S. Kripke, who, in [Kri63, Kri65], defined what is nowadays known
as Kripke semantics, based on a particular kind of relational structures, called
Kripke frames. This kind of structures gave a clear and well-defined semantics
to modal systems, allowing great advancements in the study of Modal Logic,
also under the syntactic and computational points of view.
Syntax
Given a propositional language l, a multi-modal language l2 is obtained by
adding a non-empty finite subset of the set of unary modal connectives {2n : n ∈
N} ∪ {3n : n ∈ N}. From this new language, the set of modal formulas Fml2 is
built by recursively applying the same rules as for propositional formulas, but
in the new multi-modal language.
So, a multi-modal language l2 is defined as an expansion of a given proposi-
tional language l by means of a set of modal connectives.
An exhaustive study of Uni-modal Logic in the classical framework can be
found in [BdRV01]. Within the framework of many valued logics, the study of
modal expansions is much more recent and some advances have been done in
[Fit92a, Fit92b, HH96, Ha´j98c, MO09, Ha´j10, BEGR11, CR11]. We adopt the
definitions given in [BEGR11] in the next pages.
Semantics
As was said, a notion that has become fundamental for the study of Modal Logic,
under a semantical point of view, is that of Kripke frames and Kripke models.
In this work we consider a many-valued generalization of the classical notion of
Kripke model following the one provided in [BEGR11].
Definition 1.1.9 (Kripke frames and models). Given an algebra T and m ∈ N,
a T-valued Kripke frame is a tuple F = 〈W,R1, . . . , Rm〉, where
• W is a non-empty crisp set, called domain or set of possible worlds,
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• for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m, Ri is a binary relation (called accessibility relation)
valued in T; i.e., it is a mapping Ri : W ×W −→ T .
A Kripke frame is said to be crisp if, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m, the range of Ri
is included in {0, 1}. The class of all T-valued frames will be denoted by Fr and
the class of crisp frames by CFr.
A Kripke T-model is a pair M = 〈F, V 〉, where F is a T-valued Kripke frame
and V is a mapping V : At ×W −→ T assigning to each propositional variable
and each world in W a value in T . The map V can be uniquely extended to a
map, which we also denote by V , assigning to each pair formed by a formula
ϕ ∈ Fml2 and a world w ∈W an element of T in such a way that:
• V (>, w) = 1;
• V (⊥, w) = 0;
• V (r, w) = r ∈ T for each truth constant r ∈ l;
• V (?(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn), w) = ?ˆ(V (ϕ1, w), . . . , V (ϕn, w)), for every n-ary proposi-
tional connective ? ∈ l and its truth function ?ˆ ∈ lT;
• for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, V (2iϕ,w) = infw′∈W {Ri(w,w′)⇒ V (ϕ,w′)};
• for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, V (3iϕ,w) = supw′∈W {Ri(w,w′) ∗ V (ϕ,w′)}.
The universal modality , denoted 2U is a modality whose associated accessi-
bility relation is the total relation, i.e., the fuzzy relation U : W ×W → T such
that, for every v, w ∈W , it holds that U(v, w) = 1.
Logic
In the following definition we define a list of notions that can be considered about
a many-valued multi-modal logic, some of them will be equivalent to reasoning
tasks in Fuzzy Description Logic.
Definition 1.1.10. Consider a formula ϕ ∈ Fml2 an algebra T, r ∈ T and a
Kripke T-model M = 〈F, V 〉, then:
• we say that w ∈W satisfies ϕ, denoted M, w  ϕ, if V (ϕ,w) = 1;
• we say that w ∈ W positively satisfies ϕ, denoted M, w pos ϕ, if
V (ϕ,w) > 0;
• we say that w ∈W r-satisfies ϕ, denoted M, w r ϕ, if V (ϕ,w) = r;
• we say that M locally satisfies (resp. positively, r-) ϕ, denoted M |=l ϕ
(resp. M |=posl ϕ, M |=rl ϕ), if there exists w ∈ W such that M, w  ϕ
(resp. M, w pos ϕ, M, w r ϕ); in this sense we say that ϕ is locally
satisfiable (resp. positively, r-) if there is a Kripke T-model M which
locally satisfies (resp. positively, r-) it;
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• we say that M globally satisfies (resp. positively, r-) ϕ, denoted M |=g ϕ
(resp. M |=posg ϕ, M |=rg ϕ), if infw∈W {V (ϕ,w)} ≥ 1 (resp. for every
w ∈W it holds that V (ϕ,w) > 0, infw∈W {V (ϕ,w)} ≥ r); in this sense we
say that ϕ is globally satisfiable (resp. positively, r-) if there is a Kripke
T-model M which globally satisfies (resp. positively, r-) it;
• we say that ϕ is a local consequence of a set of formulas Γ ⊆ Fml2 , denoted
Γ |=l ϕ if, for every Kripke T-modelM = 〈F, V 〉 and w ∈W , if w 1-satisfies
every formula in Γ, then w 1-satisfies ϕ;
• we say that ϕ is a global consequence of a set of formulas Γ ⊆ Fml2 ,
denoted Γ |=g ϕ, if, every Kripke T-model M = 〈F, V 〉 which globally
1-satisfies every formula in Γ, globally 1-satisfies ϕ as well;
• we say that ϕ is valid in the frame F, denoted F |= ϕ, if it is globally
1-satisfied in every Kripke T-model based on F; in this sense, given a class
K of frames, we write K |= ϕ to mean that ϕ is valid in every frame in that
class.
Following the notation used in [BEGR11], we will denote the set of formulas
that are valid in every frame of a class K under the algebra of truth values T,
by Λ(K,T).
Besides these sets of valid formulas, we will consider the sets Sat(K,T),
Satpos(K,T) and Satr(K,T) of satisfiable, positively satisfiable and r-satisfiable
formulas respectively, in a class of frames K and under the algebra of truth values
T.
1.1.3 First order predicate logic
Syntax
In order to define what a predicate language is, we need the notion of signature.
Definition 1.1.11. A predicate signature s consists of a countable set of relation
symbols (also called predicates) P1, . . . , Pn, . . ., each one with arity ≥ 1, a count-
able set of function symbols f1, . . . , fn, . . ., each one with its arity, a countable
set of constant symbols c1, . . . , cn, . . ., that are 0-ary function symbols.
Given a countable set V ar of individual variables, the set of Terms over a
predicate signature is defined inductively as follows:
• every variable x ∈ V ar is a term,
• every constant c ∈ s is a term,
• if t1, . . . , tn are terms and f ∈ s is an n-ary function symbol, then
f(t1, . . . , tn) is a term.
16
Now, let l be a propositional language, as defined in Section 1.1.1, then the set
of symbols l∀ := l∪ {∀,∃} is a first order language. The set Fml∀,s of Formulas
over a first order language l∀ and predicate signature s is defined inductively as
follows:
• ⊥ and > are formulas,
• if t1, . . . , tn are terms and P ∈ s is an n-ary predicate, then P (t1, . . . , tn)
is a formula (called atomic formula),
• if ϕ1, . . . , ϕn are formulas and ? ∈ l is an n-ary logical connective, then
?(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) is a formula,
• if ϕ(x) is a formula and x a variable, then (∀x)ϕ(x) and (∃x)ϕ(x) are
formulas.
As usual a variable that does not fall within the scope of a quantifier is said to
be free, otherwise, it is said to be bound. The notation ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) means that
the variables that are free in ϕ are among x1, . . . , xn. We say that a formula that
has no free variable is closed, otherwise it is open. Given a term t and a formula
ϕ(x1, . . . , xn), we denote by ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)[t/x1] the result of substituting every
occurrence of variable x1 for t in ϕ(x1, . . . , xn).
Semantics
From a semantical point of view, first order models consist of a domain, an
algebra of truth values and an assignment function.
Definition 1.1.12. A first order structure for a given signature s and an MTL-
chain T is a pair (M,T), where M=(M, (PM)P∈s, (fM)f∈s, (cM)c∈s), is such
that:
1. The set M , called domain, is a non-empty set,
2. for each predicate symbol P ∈ s of arity n, PM is an n-ary T-fuzzy relation
on M , i.e. an n-ary function PM : M
n −→ T ,
3. for each function symbol f ∈ s of arity n, fM is an n-ary (crisp) function
on M and
4. for each constant symbol c ∈ s, cM is an element of M .
The truth value ‖ϕ‖(M,T)v of a predicate formula ϕ under a given assignment
v is defined as follows.
Definition 1.1.13. Let s be a first order signature, T an MTL-chain and (M,T)
a first order structure. Then an assignment v is a mapping v : V ar −→ M .
As usual each assignment, defined on the set of individual variables, extends
univocally to an assignment (that we will denote by v as well) satisfying, for
every terms t1, . . . , tn and each n-ary function f ∈ s, that
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v(f(t1, . . . , tn)) = fM(v(t1), . . . , v(tn)).
To denote that assignment v assigns objects a1, . . . , an to variables x1, . . . , xn,
we will write v([a1/x1], . . . , [an/xn]).
Moreover, each assignment v, defined on the set of individual variables yields a
first order model ‖·‖(M,T)v : Fml∀,s −→ T such that:
1. for each n-tuple of terms t1, . . . , tn and each n-ary relation P ∈ s, it holds
that
‖P (t1, . . . , tn)‖(M,T)v = PM(v(t1), . . . , v(tn)) (1.16)
2. if ϕ1, . . . , ϕn are formulas, ? ∈ l an n-ary logical connective and ?ˆ ∈ lT its
truth function, then
‖?(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)‖(M,T)v = ?ˆ(‖ϕ1‖(M,T)v , . . . , ‖ϕn‖(M,T)v ) (1.17)
3. if ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) is a formula and v is a first order assignment such that
v(xi) = ai and ai ∈M , for 1 < i ≤ n, then we have that
‖(∀x1)ϕ(x1, x2, . . . , xn)‖(M,T)v = inf
a∈M
{‖ϕ(a, a2, . . . , an)‖(M,T)} (1.18)
4. if ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) is a formula and v is a first order assignment such that
v(xi) = ai and ai ∈M , for 1 < i ≤ n, then we have that
‖(∃x1)ϕ(x1, x2, . . . , xn)‖(M,T)v = sup
a∈M
{‖ϕ(a, a2, . . . , an)‖(M,T)} (1.19)
Clearly, depending on the model, the infimum and supremum of a set of
values of formulas do not necessarily exist and, in this case we will say that a
given quantified formula has an undefined truth value. Following [Ha´j98c], we
will say that if, for a given model ‖·‖(M,T)v , both infima and suprema of sets of
values are defined for every formula, then ‖·‖(M,T)v is a safe model. Moreover,
if, for a given first order structure (M,T), each assignment v, defined in it, is
safe, we will say that (M,T) is a safe structure.
From now on and for simplicity, we will omit the name “safe” before the first
order structures, i.e., when we speak about a first order structure (M,T), we
implicitly mean a safe first order structure (M,T).
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Logic The notions of tautologies, logical consequence and satisfiability are de-
fined as in the case of propositional logic, but, this time o closed formulas of a
predicate language and with respect to first order structures. The same holds
for the notions of deduction theorems and core fuzzy logics.
As in the case of propositional logics, in fact, it makes sense the notions of
first order logic of a variety K and first order logic of a (continuous) t-norm ∗.
Definition 1.1.14. Let K be a class of chains and l a propositional language
such that t(l) = t(lK). We define the first order logic of the class K (called
L∀(K)) as the set of tautologies over K.
Consider a t-norm ∗ and the minimal variety V([0, 1]∗) containing [0, 1]∗,
then we will denote the logic L∀(V([0, 1]∗)) by the first order logic of the t-norm
∗ (sometimes we will specify that it is the the first order logic of the t-norm ∗
with general semantics).
Definition 1.1.15. Let [0, 1]∗ be a standard algebras and l a propositional
language such that t(l) = t(l[0,1]∗). We define the first order logic of a t-norm ∗
(called L∀(∗)) as the set of tautologies over [0, 1]∗.
When ∗ is the  Lukasiewicz (product, Go¨del, respectively) t-norm, we will
denote the logic L∀(∗) by  Lukasiewicz (product, Go¨del, respectively) first order
logic with standard semantics. Notice that the  Lukasiewicz and product first
order logic with general semantics do not coincide with the  Lukasiewicz and
product first order logic with standard semantics (see [Ha´j98c]).
As for propositional logic, if there is a model ‖·‖(M,T)v , with either T =
[0, 1]G or T = [0, 1]Π such that, for a closed formula ϕ, it holds that model
‖ϕ‖(M,T)v = r ∈ (0, 1), then, for any r′ ∈ (0, 1) it can be found a model ‖·‖(M
′,T)
v
such that model ‖ϕ‖(M′,T)v = r′. So, in what follows, we will speak only about 1-
satisfiability and positive satisfiability in the case of Go¨del and product standard
chains.
If T is either [0, 1] L or  Ln it is possible to define the notion of r-satisfiability
as well. Indeed, ϕ is r-satisfiable, for r ∈ T , if there exists a first order structure
(M,T) and an assignation v such that ‖ϕ‖(M,T)v = r. In this case we say that
(M,T)v r-satisfies ϕ, in symbols (M,T)v |=r ϕ.
The witnessed model property Generalizing the classical case, the value
of a universally (existentially) quantified formula is defined, like in (1.18) ((1.19)
respectively) as the infimum (supremum) of the corresponding set of values. In
the context of Classical Logic, as well as every finitely valued logic, infima and
suprema turn out to be minima and maxima, respectively. However, when we
move to infinitely valued logics, this is not the case. The infimum or supremum
of a set of values X may be an element r /∈ X, i.e., a quantified formula may
have no witness. Following these ideas, Ha´jek introduced in [Ha´j05] the notion of
witnessed model, i.e., a model in which each quantified formula has a witness and
proved that this is an important property because it implies a limited form of
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finite model property for certain fragments of predicate fuzzy logic (see [Ha´j05]
and Section 3.1 of this dissertation).
Witnessed models have been firstly defined in [Ha´j05] in the following way:
Definition 1.1.16. For any structure (M,T),
• a formula (∀x)ϕ(x, x1, . . . , xn) is T-witnessed in M if, for each tuple
c1, . . . , cn ∈ M , there is an assignment v : V ar −→ M and an element
c ∈M such that v(xi) = ci, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, v(x) = c and
‖(∀x)ϕ(x, x1, . . . , xn)‖(M,T)v = ‖ϕ(x, x1, . . . , xn)‖(M,T)v ,
• a formula (∃x)ϕ(x, x1, . . . , xn) is T-witnessed in M if, for each tuple
c1, . . . , cn ∈ M , there is an assignment v : V ar −→ M and an element
c ∈M such that v(xi) = ci, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, v(x) = c and
‖(∃x)ϕ(x, x1, . . . , xn)‖(M,T)v = ‖ϕ(x, x1, . . . , cn)‖(M,T)v .
M is T-witnessed if all quantified formulas are T-witnessed in M.
Later on, in [HC06], Ha´jek and Cintula consider the following couple of
formulas already given by Baaz in [Baa96]:
(C∃) (∃y)((∃x)ϕ(x)→ ϕ(y)),
(C∀) ((∃y)(ϕ(y)→ (∀x)ϕ(x))).
They proved that formulas (C∃) and (C∀) identify a first order core fuzzy
logic associated to the class K restricted to witnessed models (hence denoted
L∀w(K)) in the sense that these two formulas are tautologies of L∀w(K). More-
over, in [Ha´j07a] it is proved that,  Lukasiewicz first order logic L∀(V([0, 1]∗))
is the only logic of a t-norm equivalent to its restriction to witnessed mod-
els L∀w(V([0, 1]∗)), i.e., (C∃) and (C∀) are tautologies of L∀(V([0, 1] L)). Thus
 Lukasiewicz is the only infinite-valued logic of a t-norm with general semantics
which is complete with respect to witnessed models. We will refer to this prop-
erty as the witnessed model property, which  Lukasiewicz first order logic with
general semantics has.
Moreover,
• In [Ha´j98c, Theorem 5.4.30] it is proven that, if a formula ϕ is not true in
a [0, 1] L-model, then there exists an integer n such that ϕ is not true in an
 Ln-model.
• In [Ha´j05, Lemma 3] Ha´jek proves that, if a formula ϕ is 1-satisfiable in a
[0, 1] L-model, then it is 1-satisfiable in a witnessed [0, 1] L-model.
So, tautologies and 1-satisfiable formulas in L∀(∗ L) coincide with tautolo-
gies and 1-satisfiable formulas in L∀w(∗ L) and, therefore, L∀(∗ L) enjoys the
witnessed model property as well.
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The quasi-witnessed model property Neither Go¨del, nor Product first-
order Logic (neither defined by the respective varieties nor by the t-norms) have
the witnessed model property because formulas (C∀) are not a tautologies of
these logics. Nevertheless, in [LM07] it is proved that Product Predicate Logic
enjoys a weaker property, what we call quasi-witnessed model property. Quasi-
witnessed models3 are models in which, whenever the value of a universally
quantified formula is strictly greater than 0, then it has a witness, while exis-
tentially quantified formulas have always a witness.
Definition 1.1.17. For any first-order structure (M,T), a formula
(∀x)ϕ(x, x1, . . . , xn) is T-quasi-witnessed in M if for each tuple c1, . . . , cn of
elements in M ,
1. either there exists an assignment v : V ar −→ M and an element c ∈ M
such that v(xi) = ci, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, v(x) = c and
‖(∀x)ϕ(x, x1, . . . , xn)‖(M,T)v = ‖ϕ(x, x1, . . . , xn)‖(M,T)v ,
2. or there exists an assignment v : V ar −→ M such that v(xi) = ci, for
1 ≤ i ≤ n and
‖(∀x)ϕ(x, x1, . . . , xn)‖(M,T)v = 0.
A formula (∃x)ϕ(x, x1, . . . , xn) is T-quasi-witnessed in M if it is witnessed.
We say that a first-order structure (M,T) is quasi-witnessed if for every
assignment v of the variables on M every formula is quasi-witnessed.
In [CE11]4 we introduced both the so-called strict core fuzzy logics and the
following couple of formulas (generalizations of formulas (C∃) and (C∀) of Ha´jek-
Cintula to cope with quasi-witnessed models). If L∀ is any strict core fuzzy
first-order logic, we denote by L∀qw the restriction of L∀ to quasi-witnessed
models.
Consider the couple of formulas:
(C∃) (∃y)((∃x)ϕ(x)→ ϕ(y)),
(ΠC∀) ¬¬(∀x)ϕ(x)→ ((∃y)(ϕ(y)→ (∀x)ϕ(x))).
The first one, (C∃), is the same as in the case of witnessed models and the
second one says that formula (C∀) is true in a structure (M,T) only when the
truth value of (∀x)ϕ(x) is different from 0, i.e., when ‖¬¬(∀x)ϕ(x)‖(M,T) = 1.
3These models are called “closed models” in [LM07] but we decided, after some discussions
with colleagues, to use the more informative name of “quasi-witnessed models”. We take into
account the fact that the name “closed” is used in mathematics and logic in different contexts
with different meanings and could induce some confusion.
4The full paper is reported in the Appendix B.
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In the same paper, we proved, following the approach of [HC06] that formulas
(C∃) and (ΠC∀) are tautologies of the restriction of any first-order strict core
fuzzy logic to quasi-witnessed models. From this result, the one in [LM07] about
the completeness of Product first-order Logic with general semantics with respect
to quasi-witnessed models, follows as a corollary. Moreover, we proved that
formulas (C∃) and (ΠC∀) are tautologies in no logic of a continuous t-norm, but
Product and  Lukasiewicz predicate logics with general semantics.
In the case of the Product first order logic with standard semantics, the land-
scape is not the same. In Appendix A it is reported a result from [CEB10], where
it is proved that 1-validity and positive satisfiability restricted to quasi-witnessed
models and unrestricted positive satisfiability indeed coincide under the stan-
dard product semantics [0, 1]Π and the same holds for tautologies. For the
1-satisfiability problem under standard product semantics, completeness with
respect to quasi-witnessed models is still an open problem.
1.1.4 A solution to sorites paradox
After having introduced the framework of MFL, we can explain a formal solution
to the sorites paradox (see [Nog08]). Consider the propositional logic L(∗), where
∗ is the  Lukasiewicz t-norm and the propositional evaluation e : {pn : n ∈ N} →
[0, 1] such that:
• e(p10.000) = 1,
• for every n ∈ N such that 0 < n ≤ 10.000, it holds that e(pn → pn−1) =
0.9999.
which, intuitively, means that it is totally true that 10.000 sand grains are a
heap, but, when we took a sand grain away from a heap, what we obtain is a
bit less a heap than the original one. Then, from the semantics of  Lukasiewicz
implication, we have that:
• e(pn) = n10.000 ,
• in particular, e(p0) = 0.
which, intuitively says that, while 10.000 sand grains are a heap, 0 sand grain
are not, and every amount of sand grain that falls in between is a sand heap
in a degree that is neither fully true, nor totally false, but proportional to the
number of sand grain. Hence,  Lukasoewicz Logic, as defined before, does not
have to preserve the value of the assumption in sorites paradox; and so, there is
no paradox now.
1.2 (Classical) Description Logic
This dissertation proposes a generalization of Classical Description Logic (DL)
to the many-valued and fuzzy case. In order to make a confrontation of the new
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generalized framework with the classical one, we briefly introduce in this section
the classical framework on DL. For an exhaustive presentation of the subject, the
reader is invited to look at the general Handbook of Description Logic [BCM+03]
and the more recent paper [BHS08].
1.2.1 A little bit of history
Description Logics are usually considered as an evolution of frame-based systems.
The main examples of frame-based systems are Quillian’s Semantic networks
(see [Qui67]) and Minsky’s Frame systems (see [Min81]). Frame-based systems
were formalisms based on researches about human cognitive behavior. In this
sense, given a memory model, their goal was to obtain a program that imitates
human mental skills, e.g. natural language understanding. For this reason these
systems were thought in a way that they could support language ambiguity and
this fact made them far from based on formal logic, when their authors were not
explicitly against the use of logic.
During the second half of 70’s began to be clear the limits of frame-based
systems. Among those limits we can find the following ones:
• it was not so clear what the systems had to compute (see [Woo75]),
• there was not a simple way to give these system a clear formal semantics,
• most aspects of these systems can be formalized by means of first order
logic and it seems that the contributions of frame-based systems is not so
novel (see [Hay77]).
Despite the first version of KL-ONE, developed by R. J. Brachman in [Bra79],
was not based on formal logic, nevertheless this new representation system
brought some significative novelty to the old framework of frame-based systems.
We report some of them:
• it considers the tasks of extracting implicit conclusions from existing knowl-
edge,
• it gives the user the possibility of defining new complex concepts and roles,
• it introduces the difference between individual concepts and generic con-
cepts,
• the difference between the concept definitions with sufficient and necessary
condition and those with just necessary ones is studied,
• classification (computation of the hierarchy of subsumptions) and realiza-
tion (computation of the more specific atomic concept) are added to the
reasoning tasks,
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Besides these novelties, KL-ONE had some weaknesses that became evident
quite early. Among those weaknesses we can find the lack of a clear formal
semantics and the fact that the algorithms for deciding classification and real-
ization were incomplete. In order to overcome the weaknesses of KL-ONE it has
been proposed, as guidelines for new systems:
1. the fact of thinking the system under the point of view of functionality, i.e.
focussing on the reasoning services provided to the user, more than under
the point of view of the mere concept representation,
2. a clearer distinction between the knowledge representing relations among
concepts and that representing assertions about individuals.
Besides the weaknesses that KL-ONE-like systems had, they brought a new
way to see knowledge representation systems. On the one hand, in fact it has
been adopted the so-called functional approach, that consisted in putting the
attention on the services provided by the KR systems, more than on the way it
represents knowledge. This change of perspective can be seen at the origin of the
growing interest that, since the 80’s, researchers put on decision algorithms and
their complexity. On the other hand, the need of a clear semantics can be seen
at the origin of the fact that systems began to be more and more logic-based
and an unambiguous Tarsky-style semantics was adopted.
The fact of putting attention on the reasoning tasks and on the logical lan-
guage of the systems allowed to think about those systems in a more abstract
way as clearly defined description languages. This means, as well, that the lan-
guages are now quantitatively comparable, mainly under two points of view: the
computational complexity of reasoning, on the one side, and the expressivity of
the language, on the other. Since the 80’s, the history of proper DL systems
is, indeed, characterized by the tradeoff between complexity and expressivity of
the language and the search of a fair equilibrium between these two features has
been the main fuel of the great advancements that researches in DL have seen
since then.
The DL systems of the 80’s, like BACK and LOOM, used so-called structural
subsumption algorithms. These kinds of algorithm perform a comparison in the
syntactic structure of two given concepts after having transformed them in a
suitable normal form. Structural subsumption algorithms are relatively efficient
when applied to very inexpressive languages, as proven in [BL84]. Nevertheless,
in more expressive languages these algorithms turn out to be incomplete. Fur-
ther researches of the same period, like [BL85], allowed by the use of abstract
languages, revealed that expressivity improvements increase intractability of the
reasoning tasks. In particular, [Neb90] revealed that reasoning in presence of a
Terminological Box is a computationally intractable problem in itself.
The 90’s saw the introduction of a new kind of algorithms: the tableau based
algorithms (see, for example, [HNSS90]). These kind of algorithms revealed to
be complete also for quite expressive DLs and allowed a systematic study of
complexity of reasoning in various DLs, in particular, those related with logical
languages (see [DLN+92, SSS91]). Moreover, they are suitable to be highly
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optimized in such a way that they can lead to a good practical behavior of the
system. In the same period the relationships between DLs and classical modal
logics ([Sch91]) and with fragments of classical first order logic ([Bor96]) are
investigated.
Nowadays very expressive DL systems are used as the reasoning engines of the
Semantic Web and for knowledge representation in medical and bio-informatic
data bases.
1.2.2 Syntax
Knowledge is represented in DL systems through the construction of concepts
by means of a set of symbols that consists of:
• a set NA of concepts names,
• a set NR of role names,
• a set NI of individual names,
• and a family of concept and role constructors.
The difference between description languages consists in the family of concept
and role constructors utilized to build up concept descriptions and each of these
sets is denoted by a sequence of letters. In what follows we briefly introduce,
by means of syntactic rules, the symbology used to denote each constructor,
the name of the constructor and the letter used to denote the language that
the constructor utilizes. Since, however, we are interested in those languages
that are related to modal and first order logic, we will give an account of DL
languages up to the one that is known as ALC (see also [BHS08]). For this
reason, besides not considering most existing concept constructors, we will not
consider any role constructors as neither, since they fall outside ALC.
Concept constructors
Given a variable A ∈ NA for an atomic concept, a variable R ∈ NR for a role
name and variables for complex concepts C,D, an ALC concept is inductively
built in accordance with the following syntactic rules:
C,D −→ ⊥ empty concept FL0
> universal concept FL0
A atomic concept FL0
C uD conjunction FL0
∀R.C value restriction FL0
∃R.> restricted existential quantif. FL−
¬A atomic complementation AL
¬C complementation C
C unionsqD disjunction U
∃R.C existential quantification E
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Here the name FL stands for “frame language” because it has more or less the
same expressive power of frame-based systems. On the other hand, the name AL
stands for “attributive language”, since it marks the difference between frame-
based systems and the new systems based on a description of attributes and
predicates.
1.2.3 Semantics
An interpretation is a pair I = (∆I , ·I) consisting of a nonempty set ∆I (called
domain) and of an interpretation function ·I that assigns:
1. to each individual name a ∈ NI an element aI ∈ ∆I such that aI 6= bI
if a 6= b (Unique Name Assumption, different individuals denote different
objects of the domain),
2. to each atomic concept A a subset AI ⊆ ∆I of the domain set,
3. to each role name R a binary relation RI ⊆ ∆I ×∆I on the domain set.
Moreover, the interpretation function is inductively extended to complex
concepts as follows:
⊥I = ∅
>I = ∆I
(¬C)I = ∆I \ CI
(C uD)I = CI ∩DI
(C unionsqD)I = CI ∪DI
(∃R.>)I = {a ∈ ∆I : exists b ∈ ∆I such that RI(a, b)}
(∀R.C)I = {a ∈ ∆I : for every b ∈ ∆I , RI(a, b)→ CI(b)}
(∃R.C)I = {a ∈ ∆I : exists b ∈ ∆I such that RI(a, b) ∧ CI(b)}
1.2.4 Inclusions between languages: the ALC hierarchy
A straightforward consequence of the semantics of constructors is that everyALE
and every ALU concepts are ALC concepts, but there are ALE concepts that
are not ALU concepts and vice-versa. So, the hierarchy of languages between
AL and ALC appears as in Figure 1.2.
1.2.5 Reasoning
As said before, besides the description of the world, a fundamental service pro-
vided by DL systems is that of inferring hidden conclusions from known premises.
In this section we give an account of the syntax and semantics of the premises
and the types of conclusions that can be inferred from those premises.
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Figure 1.2: The hierarchy of sub-ALC languages
Knowledge bases
A general concept inclusion (GCI) (or inclusion axiom) is an expression of the
form:
C v D
where C,D are ALC concepts. An interpretation I satisfies an inclusion axiom
C v D if CI ⊆ DI .
An equivalence axiom is an expression of the form:
C ≡ D
which, in the classical case, is an abbreviation for the pair of axioms C v D and
D v C. An interpretation I satisfies an equivalence axiom C ≡ D if CI = DI .
A finite set T of GCIs is called a terminology or TBox. An axiom of the
form A ≡ C, where A is a concept name, is called a definition. It is said that
a concept name A directly uses a concept name B in a TBox T if there is a
definition A v C in T such that B occurs in C. Furthermore, it is said that a
concept name A uses a concept name B if B is in the transitive closure of the
relation of directly using with respect to A. A TBox T is called definitorial or
acyclic if:
• it contains only definitions,
• it contains at most one definition for each concept name occurring in it,
• no concept name occurring in it uses itself.
A concept assertion axiom (or assertion) is an expression of the form:
C(a)
where C is a concept and a ∈ NI . An interpretation I satisfies an assertion
C(a) if aI ∈ CI .
A role assertion axiom is an expression of the form:
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R(a, b)
where R ∈ NR and a, b ∈ NI . An interpretation I satisfies a role assertion
R(a, b) if 〈aI , bI〉 ∈ RI .
A finite set of concept and role assertion axioms is called ABox. An ABox is
said to be local if the same individual name a appears in each assertion.
Finally a knowledge base (KB for short) K consists of a TBox and an ABox,
each one possibly empty.
Main inference problems
Consider a knowledge base K = (T ,A, ), a pair of concepts C,D, a pair of roles
R,S and a pair of individuals a, b, then we can define the main reasoning tasks
considered in the literature.
• Checking whether C is satisfiable means checkin whether there exists an
interpretation I such that CI 6= ∅. In this case we say that interpretation
I satisfies concept C, in symbols I |= C.
• Checking whether K is consistent means checkin whether there is an inter-
pretation I that satisfies every assertion axiom in A and every inclusion
axiom in T . In this case we say that I is a model of K, in symbols I |= K.
• Checking whether C is satisfiable with respect to K means checkin whether
there exists a model I of K such that CI 6= ∅.
• Checking whether concept D subsumes concept C with respect to K (in
symbols K |= C v D) means checkin whether, in every model I of K, it
holds that CI ⊆ DI .
• Checking whether two concepts C,D are equivalent with respect to K (in
symbols K |= C ≡ D) means checkin whether, in every model I of K, it
holds that CI = DI .
• Checking whether an individual a is an instance of C with respect to K
(in symbols K |= C(a)) means checkin whether, in every model I of K, it
holds that aI ∈ CI .
Reduction to knowledge base consistency
Due to the classical semantics, in DL languages where all the boolean opera-
tors are present, each one of the above reasoning problems can be reduced to
knowledge base (in)consistency in the following way:
• Concept C is satisfiable if and only if the knowledge base K = {C(a)} is
consistent, where a is a new individual name.
• Concept C is satisfiable with respect to the knowledge base K if and only if
the new knowledge base K∪{C(a)} is consistent, where a is an individual
name not occurring in K.
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• Concept D subsumes concept C with respect to the knowledge base K if
and only if the new knowledge base K∪{(C u¬D)(a)} is inconsistent, for
a new individual name a.
• Two concepts C,D are equivalent with respect to the knowledge base K
if and only if the new knowledge base K ∪ {(C u ¬D)(a), (¬C uD)(a)} is
inconsistent, for a new individual name a.
• An individual a is an instance of concept C with respect to the knowledge
base K if and only if the new knowledge base K∪{(¬C(a)} is inconsistent.
Complexity
The study of the computational complexity of the reasoning tasks is fundamen-
tal in Description Logics and it has worked, since the beginning of the research
on DL, as an engine for the improvements made on this subject. This is due
to the fact that DLs have always been characterized by a tradeoff between ex-
pressivity and tractability of their languages, with the aim of searching for a
fragment of first order logic that gives a good compromise between them. For
many languages, the complexity classes they belong to, have been identified and
often a systematic study of what causes the increment of complexity has been
undertaken. Some examples of those systematic studies are:
• subsumption in language FL− jumps from PTIME to co-NP ([Neb90])
when a terminology is considered,
• concept satisfiability in language FL− jumps from PTIME to co-NP when
disjunction and atomic complementation are added ([SSS91]),
• concept satisfiability in language FL− jumps from PTIME to PSPACE
when unrestricted complementation is added ([SSS91]),
• concept satisfiability in language FL− jumps from PTIME to NP when
unrestricted existential quantification is added ([DLN+92]).
The classical complexity results we are more interested in are the following:
• Concept satisfiability for language ALC is PSPACE-complete ([SSS91]).
• Knowledge base consistency for language ALC is in EXPTIME ([DM00]).
This is so because they are generalized to the many-valued framework in the
present dissertation.
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Chapter 2
Fuzzy Description Logic
In this chapter we introduce our proposal of Fuzzy Description Logic following
the guidelines provided by Ha´jek in [Ha´j05]. We introduce our proposal of a
syntax and semantics for Fuzzy Description Logics up to the language that,
in the classical case, would correspond to ALC. We discuss the consequences
that these choices have on the hierarchy of basic FDL languages. Moreover, we
provide a translation from ALC-like concepts to fuzzy first order formulas and
prove that it preserves the meaning of the involved concepts. We also provide
a translation from ALC-like concepts to fuzzy multi-modal formulas and vice-
versa and, again, prove that it preserves the meaning of the expressions involved.
Finally, in a section dedicated to related works, we will report other proposals
existing in the literature and discuss how our proposal fits among them.
The definitions provided in this chapter are thought over BL chains as al-
gebras of truth values T. Nevertheless, except for the definability of weak con-
junction u and weak disjunction unionsq they are true in general for MTL chains. The
results are limited to T being either the  Lukasiewicz, the Go¨del or the Product
standard chains (i.e. with domain T = [0, 1]) in the infinite-valued case and T
being a finite BL chain (over domain T = {0, 1n , . . . , n−1n , 1} in the n+ 1-valued
case).
2.1 Syntax
In this section we introduce the syntax of concepts and fuzzy axioms.
2.1.1 Concepts
The signature in our proposal of FDLs is the same as for classical DLs since
the difference is related to the semantics of concepts and roles. In fact here
the semantics of concepts and roles will be fuzzy sets and fuzzy relations. A
description signature is a tuple D = 〈NI , NA, NR〉, where:
• NI = {a, b, . . . } is a countable set of individual names,
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• NA = {A,B, . . . } is a countable set of atomic concepts or concept names,
• NR = {R,S, . . . } is a countable set of atomic roles or role names.
Complex concepts in the FDL languages considered in the present disser-
tation are built inductively from atomic concepts and roles by means of the
corresponding subset of the following concept constructors:
C,D −→ ⊥ empty concept FL0
> universal concept FL0
A atomic concept FL0
C D strong conjunction FL0
∀R.C value restriction FL0
∃R.> restricted existential quantif. FL−
∼A atomic complementation AL
r : r ∈ S constant concept XS
4C delta operator D
C A D implication I
C uD weak conjunction I
C unionsqD weak disjunction I
∼C complementation C
C D strong disjunction U
∃R.C existential quantification E
where A ∈ NA, and R ∈ NR.
The notation proposed here is thought in order to maintain, as much as possi-
ble, the similarity with classical DL notation while, at the same time, introducing
the notation used in the framework of MFL. So:
• The language FL0, as in the classical case, contains
– the empty concept ⊥,
– the universal concept >,
– the strong conjunction ,
– the value restriction ∀R,
as concept constructors.
• The language FL− is built, as in the classical case, by adding the restricted
existential quantification ∃R.> to FL0.
• The language AL is built, again, as in the classical case, by adding the
atomic complementation ∼ A to language FL−. In this case, we will use
the symbol ∼ for complementation in languages that include ALC, because
it is traditionally used in MFL to denote the involutive negation.
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• The language XS , where X stands for a generic FDL language and the
superindex S denotes the domain of a suitable subalgebra of T, contains
a constant concept constructor r for each r ∈ S. For “the domain S of a
suitable subalgebra” of T we mean, if not explicitly stated, the set [0, 1]∩Q
in the infinite-valued case, and the full T in the finite-valued case.
• We introduce the symbol D for languages that have Delta operator 4.
• We prefix the symbol I in those languages that have implication A.
• We use symbol U in those languages that contain strong disjunction .
• The name for languages that include the unrestricted existential quantifi-
cation ∃R.C will be denoted with E as in the classical case.
For the sake of clarity, sometimes it will be necessary to specify the algebra
of truth values T considered. In those cases we will prepose the algebra name
before the one of the FDL language, like T-FDL, otherwise, we will write FDL.
2.1.2 Knowledge bases
Knowledge bases are defined as in the classical case, but in our framework inclu-
sion and assertion axioms are graded, as usually done in the literature on FDL
(see, for example [Str04a], [CGCE10]).
A fuzzy concept inclusion axiom (or fuzzy inclusion) is an expression of one
of the following four forms:
〈C v D ≥ r〉 non-strict lower bound inclusion axioms (2.1)
〈C v D ≤ r〉 non-strict upper bound inclusion axioms (2.2)
〈C v D > r〉 strict lower bound inclusion axioms (2.3)
〈C v D < r〉 strict upper bound inclusion axioms (2.4)
where C,D are concepts and r ∈ T ∩Q.
A fuzzy concept assertion axiom (or fuzzy assertion) is an expression of one
of the following four forms:
〈C(a) ≥ r〉 non-strict lower bound assertion axioms (2.5)
〈C(a) ≤ r〉 non-strict upper bound assertion axioms (2.6)
〈C(a) > r〉 strict lower bound assertion axioms (2.7)
〈C(a) < r〉 strict upper bound assertion axioms (2.8)
where C is a concept, a is an individual name and r ∈ T ∩Q.
Finally, a fuzzy role assertion axioms (or fuzzy role assertion) is an expression
of the form:
〈R(a, b) ≥ r〉 role assertion axioms (2.9)
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where R is an atomic role, a, b are individual constants and r ∈ T ∩Q. Note that
for roles we only consider non-strict lower bound role assertions 〈R(a, b) ≥ r〉.
This is due to the fact that in the literature only fuzzy role assertions like (2.9)
are considered.
A knowledge base (KB) for the languages considered in this dissertation has
two components: a fuzzy terminological box or fuzzy ontology (TBox) and an
fuzzy assertional box (ABox).
A fuzzy TBox for an FDL language is a finite set of fuzzy inclusions. A fuzzy
ABox is a finite set of fuzzy assertions and role assertions. A fuzzy KB is a pair
K = 〈T ,A〉, where the first component is a fuzzy TBox and the second one is a
fuzzy ABox.
2.2 Semantics
2.2.1 Concepts
Given a BL-chain T = 〈T, ∗,⇒,∧,∨, 0, 1〉1, a T-interpretation is a pair I =
(∆I , ·I) consisting of a nonempty (crisp) set ∆I (called domain) and of a fuzzy
interpretation function ·I that assigns:
1. to each concept name A ∈ NC a fuzzy set, that is, a function AI : ∆I −→
T ,
2. to each role name R ∈ NR a fuzzy relation, that is, a function RI : ∆I ×
∆I −→ T ,
3. to each individual name a ∈ NI an object aI ∈ ∆I such that aI 6= bI
if a 6= b (Unique Name Assumption, different individuals denote different
objects of the domain).
The semantics of complex concepts is a function CI : ∆I → [0, 1] inductively
defined as follows:
1Note that we are indeed considering algebras with domain either [0,1] or {0, 1
n
, . . . , n−1
n
, 1}
and sometimes expanded with either operation δ, a set of 0-ary operations (truth constants)
T ∩ Q or the involutive negation 1− x. We remind that maximum Y is defined by
x Y y := 1− ((1− x) ∗ (1− y)).
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⊥I(x) := 0
>I(x) := 1
rI(x) := r
(∼ C)I(x) := 1− CI(x)
(4C)I(x) := 4CI(x)
(C D)I(x) := CI(x) ∗DI(x)
(C uD)I(x) := min{CI(x), DI(x)}
(C D)I(x) := 1− ((1− CI(x)) ∗ (1−DI(x)))
(C unionsqD)I(x) := max{CI(x), DI(x)}
(C A D)I(x) := CI(x)⇒ DI(x)
(∀R.C)I(x) := infy∈∆I{RI(x, y)⇒ CI(y)}
(∃R.C)I(x) := supy∈∆I{RI(x, y) ∗ CI(y)}
Note that, from the above semantics, residuated negation ¬, weak conjunc-
tion u and weak disjunction unionsq are present in languages that include IFL0 be-
cause, if the algebra of truth values T is a BL chain, these operators are definable
from the implication A, the strong conjunction  and the empty concept ⊥. In
fact:
• The constructor of weak conjunction u is definable from the implication
and the strong conjunction in the following way:
C uD := C  (C A D).
• The constructor of weak disjunction unionsq is definable from the implication
and the weak conjunction in the following way:
C unionsqD := ((C A D) A D) u ((D A C) A C).
• The constructor of residuated negation ¬ is definable from the implication
and the empty concept in the following way:
¬C := C A ⊥.
Hence, these operators can be considered as abbreviations in the language
IFL0 and in every language expanding it.
2.2.2 Fuzzy axioms
From the semantics of concepts we can define the semantics of fuzzy axioms.
We say that a T-interpretation I satisfies axioms of type (2.1), (2.2), (2.3) and
(2.4) respectively, if
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inf
x∈∆I
{CI(x)⇒ DI(x)} ≥ r (2.10)
inf
x∈∆I
{CI(x)⇒ DI(x)} ≤ r (2.11)
inf
x∈∆I
{CI(x)⇒ DI(x)} > r (2.12)
inf
x∈∆I
{CI(x)⇒ DI(x)} < r (2.13)
We say that a T-interpretation I satisfies axioms of type (2.5), (2.6), (2.7)
and (2.8) respectively if
CI(aI) ≥ r (2.14)
CI(aI) ≤ r (2.15)
CI(aI) > r (2.16)
CI(aI) < r (2.17)
We say that a T-interpretation I satisfies axioms of type (2.9), if
RI(aI , bI) ≥ r (2.18)
As we do for languages, when the algebra T is clear from the context or it
does not matter which algebra is considered (e.g. the result explained does not
depend on a particular algebra T), we will simply speak about interpretations.
2.2.3 Witnessed, quasi-witnessed and strongly witnessed
interpretations
As we have already mentioned in Section 1.1.3 for the case of first order fuzzy
logic, interpretations of concepts of type ∀R.C and ∃R.C, need not have a witness
when we deal with an infinite set of truth values. Taking these considerations into
account, in [Ha´j05] the notion of witnessed interpretation has been introduced.
Since then most researchers preferred to restrict the reasoning tasks to witnessed
interpretations because it seems a quite natural restriction and reasoning tasks
so restricted have a very good computational behavior.
Definition 2.2.1 (Witnessed interpretation [Ha´j05]). An interpretation I =
(∆I , ·I) is witnessed in case that
(wit∃) for every concept C, every role name R and every a ∈ ∆I there is b ∈ ∆I
such that
(∃R.C)I(a) = RI(a, b) ∗ CI(b),
(wit∀) for every concept C, every role name R and every a ∈ ∆I there is b ∈ ∆I
such that
(∀R.C)I(a) = RI(a, b)⇒ CI(b).
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Following the definition of closed model from [LM07], in [CEB10] the notion
of quasi-witnessed interpretation has been introduced.
Definition 2.2.2 (Quasi-witnessed interpretation [CEB10]). An interpretation
I = (∆I , ·I) is quasi-witnessed when it satisfies condition (wit∃) and
(qwit∀) for every concept C, every role name R and every a ∈ ∆I either
(∀R.C)I(a) = 0 or there is b ∈ ∆I such that
(∀R.C)I(a) = RI(a, b)⇒ CI(b).
In [BP11b] the notion of strongly witnessed interpretation has been intro-
duced.
Definition 2.2.3 (Strongly witnessed interpretation [BP11b]). An interpreta-
tion I = (∆I , ·I) is strongly witnessed when it satisfies conditions (wit∃), (wit∀)
and moreover
(swit∀) for every pair of concepts C,D, there is some b ∈ ∆I such that
inf
x∈∆I
{CI(x)⇒ DI(x)} = CI(b)⇒ DI(b)
This further restriction to the notion of witnessed interpretation is not so
much used because, if T is a continuous chain, it imposes a too strict constraint
to the interpretations considered. Indeed, as mentioned in [BP11b], “it does not
capture the spirit of fuzzy concept inclusions”, since “it is not really necessary
that the infimum of the values for the residuum is indeed reached”. On the other
hand, if T is a finite chain, it is straightforward that every interpretation I is
strongly witnessed.
2.3 The Hierarchy of basic FDL languages
Due to the above defined semantics, in our framework under strict standard
semantics the languages ALE , ALD and IAL are not strictly contained in ALC.
This is due to the fact that, in the logic of a strict t-norm, implication is not
definable from conjunction and negation (neither the residuated negation, nor
the involutive one). The existential quantifier is not definable from the universal
one by means of the negation (neither the residuated negation, nor the involutive
one) and the same definition as in classical DL. Moreover, the Delta constructor
4 needs the residuated negation ¬ (defined from the implication A and the
constant ⊥) and the involutive negation ∼ to become definable.
Since in our framework we do not have the same possibility of reducing
languages like in the classical case, the hierarchy of basic languages obtained
is more cumbersome. The new hierarchy of FDL languages over the logic of a
strict t-norm is represented in Figure 2.1, that shows the partially ordered set of
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Figure 2.1: Hierarchy of basic languages under strict standard semantics
inclusions among the languages obtained by successively adding a basic operator
or another.
In languages with complementation ∼, the strong disjunction  is definable
from the strong conjunction  and ∼ by the following De Morgan law, i.e., as
C D := ∼(∼C ∼D)
hence, the language ALU is strictly contained in the language ALC.
Notice that the top of the poset in Figure 2.1 will be called in our framework
IALCE , instead of ALC, as in the classical case.
Figure 2.1 represent the worst scenario. Indeed, hierarchy in Figure 2.1
can be simplified when we deal with infinite  Lukasiewicz Logic. In this case,
indeed, the fact that the residuated negation is involutive implies that E and
U are definable by duality from value restriction and the strong conjunction
respectively, by means of the involutive negation as is usually done in classical
DL and the same holds for the constructor of implication. Thus, in the case of
FDLs based on  Lukasiewicz Logic, the languages ALCE , IALC, IALCE coincide
with ALC. Nevertheless, due to the fact that in [0, 1] L the constructor 4 is not
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Figure 2.2: Hierarchy of basic languages under [0, 1] L
definable at all, the hierarchy of basic languages for  Lukasiewicz is still more
cumbersome than in the classical case. The new hierarchy of basic languages
based on infinite  Lukasiewicz standard semantics is given in Figure 2.2, that
shows the partially ordered set of inclusions among the languages obtained by
successively adding a basic operator or another.
It is worth remarking that the presence of truth constants modifies neither
the hierarchy in Figure 2.1 nor the one in Figure 2.2.
Finally, in the case of finite  Lukasiawicz t-norm,  Ln, since the constructor 4
is definable already in language FL0 as
4C := Cn
where Cn stands for C n. . . C, we have that the hierarchy of basic languages
is the same as in the classical case, i.e. the one represented in Figure 1.2.
2.4 Simplifying knowledge bases
Since in FDL there is the possibility of considering a graded notion of subsump-
tion, equivalence and assertion, there are obviously more types of fuzzy axioms
in FDL than crisp axioms in classical DL, as we have seen in Section 2.1.2. A
question that naturally arises is, then, whether those types can be simplified,
that is, whether there are axioms that can be defined in terms of other axioms,
as it is done in classical DL for the case e.g. of the equivalence axioms, that
can be expressed as a conjunction of inclusion axioms. So, for simplification
of knowledge bases we mean that, given a knowledge base K, we can obtain
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a knowledge base K′ that is satisfied by the same interpretations as K, but is
expressed in a simpler syntax, that is, by means of a smaller number of axiom
types.
Besides the fact that, in general, a richer logical language allows to simplify
knowledge bases, we have to consider the cases of different standard algebras
of truth values T separately, because there are simplifications that can be per-
formed under certain standard algebras but not under others. Moreover, de-
pending on the standard algebra T considered, there are simplifications that
can be performed in more or less rich FDL languages.
2.4.1 The case of infinite-valued  Lukasiewicz Logic
We begin with the case when T = [0, 1] L. In this case the presence of an
involutive negation ∼ or delta operator 4 and truth constants from Q ∩ [0, 1]
make a substantial difference in the simplifications that can be performed on the
set of axioms.
Language FL0
There are kinds of simplifications that can be performed already in the more
basic FDL languages. Exact value axioms 〈C v D = r〉 and 〈C(a) = r〉 as
well as equivalence axioms 〈C ≡ D B r〉 are often considered in the literature.
Here we explain why we are not considering them in our framework. Note that
the simplification performed on equivalence axioms is the same that is usually
considered in classical DL.
Exact value axioms Axioms of types:
〈C v D = r〉, 〈C(a) = r〉
are abbreviations for the simultaneous presence of non-strict lower and upper
bound axioms, i.e. axioms (2.1) and (2.2) in the first case, and axioms (2.5) and
(2.6) in the second case. In other words, the knowledge base K∪{〈C v D = r〉}
can be substituted by the knowledge base K ∪ {〈C v D ≥ r〉, 〈C v D ≤ r〉}.
The same holds for axioms 〈C(a) = r〉.
Fuzzy equivalence axioms Differently from the classical case, a fuzzy equiv-
alence axiom can not always be equivalently substituted by a couple of fuzzy
inclusions. Consider, for example the fuzzy equivalence
〈C ≡ D ≤ r〉 (2.19)
Clearly axiom (2.19) is not equivalent to the couple of fuzzy inclusions
〈C v D ≤ r〉 (2.20)
〈D v C ≤ r〉 (2.21)
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because there are interpretations that satisfy e.g. (2.20) (and, hence, (2.19)),
but not (2.21) (and, hence, not both). Notice that the same holds when, instead
of a non-strict upper bound ≤, the equivalence has either a strict upper bound
< or an equality =.
On the contrary, as in the classical framework, the constraints expressed by
means of (either strict or not) lower bound equivalence axioms can be expressed
by means of the simultaneous presence of the corresponding two fuzzy inclusion
axioms. This means that the knowledge base
K ∪ {〈C ≡ D ≥ r〉}
can be substituted by the knowledge base
K ∪ {〈C v D ≥ r〉, 〈D v C ≥ r〉},
with r ∈ T . Of course, the same holds true with >, instead of ≥.
Summarizing:
• Axioms of type 〈C ≡ D = r〉 can be substituted by the couple of axioms
〈C ≡ D ≥ r〉 and 〈C ≡ D ≤ r〉.
• Axioms of type 〈C ≡ D ≥ r〉 can be substituted by the couple of axioms
〈C v D ≥ r〉 and 〈D v C ≥ r〉.
• Axioms of type 〈C ≡ D > r〉 can be substituted by the couple of axioms
〈C v D > r〉 and 〈D v C > r〉.
Each knowledge base without exact value equivalences can be equivalently
reduced to another one containing only (either strict or not) upper bound equiv-
alence axioms.
Language FL0C
Since in our framework we are considering the involutive negation ∼ whose truth
function is 1− x, with x ∈ [0, 1], we have the possibility of expressing axioms of
types (2.6) and (2.8) in terms of axioms of types (2.5) and (2.7) in the following
way:
• Axioms of type 〈C(a) ≤ r〉 can be rewritten as 〈∼ C(a) ≥ 1− r〉.
• Axioms of type 〈C(a) < r〉 can be rewritten as 〈∼ C(a) > 1− r〉.
Language IFL0DQ∩[0,1]
When the operator 4 and truth constants from Q ∩ [0, 1] are present in the
language as well as the implication A, we have the possibility of expressing
axioms of types (2.7) and (2.8) in terms of axioms of type (2.5) in the following
way:
• Axioms of type 〈C(a) > r〉 can be rewritten as 〈¬ 4 (C A r)(a) ≥ 1〉.
• Axioms of type 〈C(a) < r〉 can be rewritten as 〈¬ 4 (r A C)(a) ≥ 1〉.
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Summary
In Table 2.1 we summarize which types of axioms are necessary in the presence
of some constructors in any language extending FL0.
Axioms
Language (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) (2.6) (2.7) (2.8) (2.9)
FL0 × × × × × × × × ×
+ C/I × × × × × × ×
+ C/I,D,Q∩[0,1] × × × × × ×
Table 2.1: Minimal types of axioms under  Lukasiewicz standard semantics
2.4.2 The cases of infinite-valued Product and Go¨del logics
When either T = [0, 1]Π or T = [0, 1]G, more or less the same simplifications on
the types of axioms can be performed as in the case when T = [0, 1] L. However,
there are differences that we will report in what follows. Notice that having
the implication constructor A in the language does not imply the definability of
complementation, and conversely. Nevertheless the constructor 4 is definable as
soon as the implication A and the complementation ∼ are both in the language
just considering
4 C := ¬ ∼ C (2.22)
Language IFL0CQ∩[0,1]
From the definability of the Delta operator 4 we obtain that, when either T =
[0, 1]Π or T = [0, 1]G, a rewriting of axioms of type (2.7) in terms of axioms
of type (2.5) can be performed already in the language IFL0CQ∩[0,1] in the
following way:
Axioms of type 〈C(a) > r〉 can be rewritten as 〈¬ 4 (C A r)(a) ≥ 1〉.
Summary
In Table 2.2 we summarize which types of axioms are necessary in the presence
of some constructors in any language extending FL0.
2.4.3 The case of finite t-norms
When the algebra of truth values T is a finite t-norm, that is, either Gn,  Ln
or any ordinal sum of copies of them, more simplifications than in the infinite-
valued case can be performed in simpler languages.
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Axioms
Language (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) (2.6) (2.7) (2.8) (2.9)
FL0 × × × × × × × × ×
+ C × × × × × × ×
+ I, C,Q∩[0,1] × × × × × ×
Table 2.2: Minimal types of axioms under either product or Go¨del standard
semantics
Language FL0
In the case of finite t-norms, besides the simplifications concerning exact value
axioms and equivalence axioms, already in the language FL0 strict bound axioms
(2.3), (2.4), (2.7) and (2.8) can be rewritten in terms of non-strict axioms (2.1),
(2.2), (2.5) and (2.6), respectively. This is due to the fact that, with a finite set
of truth values, if a truth value is strictly greater than a given value r ∈ T , then
it is greater or equal to the lower truth value greater or equal than r. Note that,
when T is a finite BL chain, there is always such a value. So, let I be an FDL
interpretation and let T = {r0, r1, . . . , rn} be such that its domain is ordered by
0 = r0 < r1 < . . . < rn = 1, then:
• Axiom 〈C v D > ri〉, with i < 1, can be rewritten in terms of axiom
〈C v D ≥ ri+1〉,
• Axiom 〈C v D < ri〉, with i > 0, can be rewritten in terms of axiom
〈C v D ≤ ri−1〉,
• Axiom 〈C(a) > ri〉, with i < 1, can be rewritten in terms of axiom 〈C(a) ≥
ri−1〉,
• Axiom 〈C(a) < ri〉, with i > 0, can be rewritten in terms of axiom 〈C(a) ≤
ri−1〉.
Language FL0C
In the same way as for the infinite-valued case, in presence of an involutive
negation ∼, we have the possibility of expressing axioms of types (2.6) and (2.8)
in terms of axioms of types (2.5) and (2.7).
Summary
In Table 2.3 we summarize which types of axioms are necessary in the presence
of some constructors in any language extending FL0.
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Axioms
Language (2.1) (2.2) (2.5) (2.6) (2.9)
FL0 × × × × ×
FL0C × × × ×
Table 2.3: Simplfying KBs under finite t-norms semantics
2.5 Reasoning tasks
Among the reasoning tasks that can be defined in a multi-valued framework
we find the generalization of the ones that are usual in a classical framework,
as reported in Section 1.2.5. Being the logic many-valued, these tasks can be
considered in their graded versions. In addition to these reasoning tasks, more
tasks which are proper of a many-valued framework have been introduced in the
literature. In what follows, let r ∈ T .
• Fuzzy knowledge base consistency is the problem of checking whether,
for a given fuzzy KB K = 〈T ,A〉 there is a T-interpretation I that satisfies
every axiom in K; in this case we say that the KB is consistent and that
I satisfies K, in symbols I |= K.
• Different notions of the concept satisfiability with respect to a (possibly
empty) knowledge base K have been considered in the literature.
– Lower bound r-satisfiability is the problem of checking whether, for
concept C, there exists a T-interpretation I which satisfies K and an
object a ∈ ∆I such that CI(a) ≥ r. In this case we say that concept
C is (≥ r)-satisfiable.
– Exact value r-satisfiability is the problem of checking whether, for
concept C, there exists a T-interpretation I which satisfies K and an
object a ∈ ∆I such that CI(a) = r. In this case we say that concept
C is r-satisfiable. In the particular case when r = 1, we will simply
say that C is satisfiable.
– Positive satisfiability is the problem of checking whether, for concept
C, there exists a T-interpretation I which satisfies K, an object a ∈
∆I and a truth value s ∈ T , with s > 0, such that CI(a) = s. In this
case we say that concept C is positively satisfiable or consistent.
Notice that, as we have seen in Section 1.1.1, when the knowledge base K
is indeed empty and the algebra T considered is either [0, 1]Π or [0, 1]G,
the notions of (≥ r)-satisfiability and r-satisfiability may not make sense
when r < 1. The notions of (≥ r)- and r-satisfiability will be used only
when T is [0, 1] L.
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• Concept r-subsumption is the problem of checking whether, given con-
cepts C,D, for every T-interpretation I and every a ∈ ∆I , it holds that
CI(a)⇒ DI(a) ≥ r, in this case we say that concept D subsumes concept
C in a degree greater or equal to r (or that D r-subsumes C).
• Entailment of an axiom by a knowledge base is the problem of
checking whether, for a given fuzzy axiom ϕ and a fuzzy KB K, every
T-interpretation I which satisfies K, also satisfies ϕ; in this case we say
that K entails ϕ, in symbols K |= ϕ.
• The best satisfiability degree of a concept with respect to a KB
(defined in [SB07]) is the problem of determining, for a given fuzzy con-
cept C and a fuzzy knowledge base K, the supremum of the satisfac-
tion degree of C by interpretations satisfying K; that is, bsd(K, C) =
supI|=K{supx∈∆I{CI(x)}}.
• The best entailment degree of an axiom with respect to a KB
(defined in [Str01]) is the problem of determining, for a given (non-fuzzy)
axiom ϕ = C v D or ϕ = C(a) and a fuzzy knowledge base K, the
supremum of r ∈ T with respect to which 〈ϕ ≥ r〉 is entailed by K; that
is, bed(K, ϕ) = sup{r : K |= 〈ϕ ≥ r〉}.
2.5.1 Reductions among reasoning tasks
In the classical framework it is usual to consider reductions between reasoning
tasks in order to apply procedures, that have been designed for a given task, to
other tasks that are reducible to the given one. In particular, within the classi-
cal framework, every reasoning task can be polynomially reduced to knowledge
base (in)consistency (see [BHS08, pag. 142]). In this section we will see which
reductions can be performed in FDLs.
Proposition 2.5.1 (Reduction to KB consistency). Let T be in the family
{[0, 1] L, [0, 1]Π, [0, 1]G,  Ln, Gn}, then the following statements hold for language
T-FL0:
1. Concept r-satisfiability with respect to a (possibly empty) KB can be poly-
nomially reduced to KB consistency.
2. Concept (≥ r)-satisfiability with respect to a (possibly empty) KB can be
polynomially reduced to KB consistency.
3. Concept positive satisfiability with respect to a (possibly empty) KB can be
polynomially reduced to KB consistency.
4. Concept r-subsumption can be polynomially reduced to KB consistency.
5. Entailment of an axiom by a KB can be polynomially reduced to KB con-
sistency.
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Proof. 1. A concept C is r-satisfiable with respect to knowledge base K if
and only if K ∪ {〈C(a) ≥ r〉, 〈C(a) ≤ r〉} is consistent, where a ∈ NI does
not occur in K.
2. A concept C is (≥ r)-satisfiable with respect to knowledge base K if and
only if K ∪ {〈C(a) ≥ r〉} is consistent, where a ∈ NI does not occur in K.
3. A concept C is positively satisfiable with respect to knowledge base K if
and only if K ∪ {〈C(a) > 0〉} is consistent, where a ∈ NI does not occur
in K.
4. A concept C is r-subsumed by concept C if and only if the knowledge base
K = {〈C v D < r〉} is inconsistent.
5. In the case of entailment, the way the reduction is performed, depends on
the type of axiom entailed.
• A knowledge base K entails an axiom 〈C v D ≥ r〉 if and only if
K ∪ {〈C v D < r〉} is inconsistent.
• A knowledge base K entails an axiom 〈C v D ≤ r〉 if and only if
K ∪ {〈C v D > r〉} is inconsistent.
• A knowledge base K entails an axiom 〈C v D > r〉 if and only if
K ∪ {〈C v D ≤ r〉} is inconsistent.
• A knowledge base K entails an axiom 〈C v D < r〉 if and only if
K ∪ {〈C v D ≥ r〉} is inconsistent.
• A knowledge base K entails an axiom 〈C(a) ≥ r〉 if and only if K ∪
{〈C(a) < r〉} is inconsistent.
• A knowledge base K entails an axiom 〈C(a) ≤ r〉 if and only if K ∪
{〈C(a) > r〉} is inconsistent.
• A knowledge base K entails an axiom 〈C(a) > r〉 if and only if K ∪
{〈C(a) ≤ r〉} is inconsistent.
• A knowledge base K entails an axiom 〈C(a) < r〉 if and only if K ∪
{〈C(a) ≥ r〉} is inconsistent.
Since in the languages considered in this dissertation there is only one type
of role assertion axioms and the role negation constructor is lacking, entailment
of role axioms (2.9) cannot be reduced to KB consistency.
Moreover, we will consider reductions to reasoning tasks other than KB con-
sistency that will be useful in the following chapters. First of all we will see how
to reduce KB consistency to other reasoning tasks.
Proposition 2.5.2 (Reduction of KB consistency). Let T be in the family
{[0, 1] L, [0, 1]Π, [0, 1]G,  Ln, Gn}, then the following statements hold for language
T-FLT0 :
1. KB consistency can be polynomially reduced to concept r-satisfiability with
respect to a non-empty KB.
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2. KB consistency can be polynomially reduced to concept 1-satisfiability with
respect to a non-empty KB.
3. KB consistency can be polynomially reduced to concept positive satisfiability
with respect to a non-empty KB.
4. KB consistency can be polynomially reduced to the entailment of an axiom
by a KB.
Proof. 1. Knowledge base K is consistent if and only if concept r is r-
satisfiable w.r.t. K.
2. Knowledge base K is consistent if and only if concept > is 1-satisfiable
w.r.t. K.
3. Knowledge base K is consistent if and only if concept > is positively sat-
isfiable w.r.t. K.
4. Knowledge base K is consistent if and only if axiom 〈⊥ ≥ 1〉 is not entailed
by K if and only if axiom 〈> v ⊥ ≥ 1〉 is not entailed by K.
Another interesting item is the reduction of reasoning tasks without knowl-
edge bases to concept r-satisfiability and r-subsumption. in this case, however,
we have to distinguish the cases depending on the standard algebra T considered.
Proposition 2.5.3. Let T be in the family {[0, 1] L, [0, 1]Π, [0, 1]G,  Ln, Gn}, then
the following statements hold for language T-IFLT0 :
1. Concept (≥ r)-satisfiability can be polynomially reduced to concept 1-
satisfiability.
2. Concept positive satisfiability can be polynomially reduced to concept 1-
subsumption.
Proof. 1. Concept C is (≥ r)-satisfiable if and only if concept concept r A C
is 1-satisfiable.
2. Concept C is positively satisfiable if and only if concept concept C is not
1-subsumed by ⊥.
Proposition 2.5.4. Let T ∈ {[0, 1]Π, [0, 1]G} and r ∈ (0, 1], then the following
statements hold for language FL0:
1. Concept (≥ r)-satisfiability and positive satisfiability are equivalent prob-
lems.
2. Concept positive satisfiability can be polynomially reduced to concept 1-
subsumption.
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Proof. 1. For every r ∈ (0, 1] it is straightforward that, if C is (≥ r)-
satisfiable, then it is positively satisfiable. So, we need to prove that if
concept C is positively satisfiable, then it is (≥ r)-satisfiable. Suppose
that C is positively satisfiable, there exists a [0, 1]∗-interpretation (with
∗ ∈ {Π, G}) I and a ∈ ∆I and s ∈ (0, 1) such that CI(a) = s. Without
loss of generality, we can suppose that s < r. It is well known (see for
instance [SCE+06]) that we can obtain a [0, 1]∗-interpretation I ′ such that
CI
′
(a) = r.
2. As in the  Lukasiewicz case, concept C is positively satisfiable if and only
if concept C is not 1-subsumed by ⊥.
Notice that, in language [0, 1] L-IFL0, a concept C can be positively satis-
fiable, but not (≥ r)-satisfiable, for some r ∈ [0, 1]. As an example, consider
concept A u ¬A. This is indeed positively satisfiable under [0, 1] L, but not, say,
(≥ 0.7)-satisfiable.
Proposition 2.5.5. Let T ∈ { Ln, Gn}, then the following statements hold for
language IFL0CT :
1. Concept rm-subsumption, can be polynomially reduced to concept (≥ 1 −
rm−1)-satisfiability, when rm > 0.
2. For every r ∈ T , concept (≥ r)-satisfiability can be polynomially reduced
to concept 1-satisfiability.
3. Concept positive satisfiability can be polynomially reduced to concept 1-
satisfiability.
Proof. 1. Concept C is rm-subsumed by concept D if and only if concept
∼ (C A D) is not (≥ 1− rm−1)-satisfiable.
2. Concept C is (≥ r)-satisfiable if and only if concept r A C is 1-satisfiable.
3. Concept C is positively satisfiable if and only if concept r1 A C is 1-
satisfiable, where r1 is the lower truth value strictly greater than 0.
2.6 Relation to first order predicate logic
In [Bor96], Borgida provides a translation of DL concepts into first order classical
logic. The relationship between FDL and first order fuzzy logic has been firstly
described in [TM98]. A more systematic investigation on this subject has been
undertaken in [GCAE10] and [CGCE10], where it is investigated the idea, pre-
sented in [Ha´j05] of a Fuzzy Description Logic tightly related to Mathematical
Fuzzy Logic. In [TM98], [GCAE10] and [CGCE10] FDL is indeed presented as a
fragment of MFL. Here we will present a quite different way to obtain the same
translation and prove that it preserves the meaning of the expressions involved
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by defining their respective semantics from each other, according to the schema
in Figure 2.3.
FDL //_________OO

FOLOO

FDL interpretations // FO structures
Figure 2.3: Relations to FOL
2.6.1 Concepts
Given a description signature D = 〈NI , NC , NR〉, we define the first order sig-
nature sD = NI ∪NC ∪NR, where
• NI is the set of constant symbols,
• NC ∪NR is the set of unary and binary predicates.
Let l be the propositional language of an extension L of MTL logic and V ar
a countable set of individual variables. Then, for every concept name A ∈ NC ,
every role name R ∈ NR and every x, y ∈ V ar, we can define the translations
τx : NC −→ Fml∀,sD
and
τx,y : NR −→ Fml∀,sD
of concept and role names, respectively, into the set of atomic first order formulas
of the logic L∀, in the following way:
τx(A) := A(x)
τx,y(R) = R(x, y).
This translation can be inductively extended over the set of complex concept
in the following way:
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τx(⊥) := ⊥
τx(>) := >
τx(r) := r
τx(¬C) := ¬τx(C)
τx(∼ C) := ∼ τx(C)
τx(4C) := 4τx(C)
τx(C D) := τx(C)⊗ τx(D)
τx(C uD) := τx(C) ∧ τx(D)
τx(C D) := τx(C)⊕ τx(D)
τx(C unionsqD) := τx(C) ∨ τx(D)
τx(C A D) := τx(C)→ τx(D)
τx(∀R.C) := (∀y)(τx,y(R)→ τy(C)), with y 6= x
τx(∃R.C) := (∃y)(τx,y(R)⊗ τy(C)), with y 6= x
Notice that as a result of such translation, we obtain first order formulas
τx(C) with only the free variable x.
Next we show, in Lemmas 2.6.1 and 2.6.3, that the translation preserves
the same meaning of the original expression. We show this property through
a definition of a first order structure and of an FDL interpretation from each
other.
Let I = (∆I , ·I) be an FDL interpretation, then we can define the first order
structure MI = (MI , {PMI : P ∈ NC ∪NR}, {cMI : c ∈ NI}), where:
• MI := ∆I ,
• for each concept name A ∈ NC , AMI is the unary function AMI : MI −→
T , such that, for every a ∈MI , it holds that AMI (a) = AI(a),
• for each role nameR ∈ NR, RMI is the binary functionRMI : MI×MI −→
T , such that, for every a, b ∈MI , it holds that RMI (a, b) = RI(a, b),
• for each individual a ∈ NI , aMI is an element of MI , such that aMI = aI .
Lemma 2.6.1. Let C be a T-IALCEDS concept. Then ‖τx(C)‖(MI ,T)v([a/x]) = CI(a)
for every object a ∈ ∆I .
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of complex concepts.
• For concept names and constant concepts it is straightforward by defini-
tion.
• Suppose that the statement holds for concepts C and D. Then
‖τx(C D)‖(MI ,T)v([a/x]) =
= ‖τx(C)⊗ τx(D)‖(MI ,T)v([a/x]) =
= ‖τx(C)‖(MI ,T)v([a/x]) ∗ ‖τx(D)‖(MI ,T)v([a/x]) =
= CI(a) ∗DI(a) =
= (C D)I(a).
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In the same way the statement can be proved also for constructors
u,,unionsq,A,∼,4 and ¬.
• Suppose that the statement holds for the role name R and for concept C.
Then
‖τx(∀R.C)‖(MI ,T)v([a/x]) =
= ‖(∀y)(τx,y(R)→ τy(C))‖(MI ,T)v([a/x]) =
= inf
y∈MI
{‖τx,y(R)‖(MI ,T)v([a/x]) ⇒ ‖τy(C)‖(MI ,T)v([a/x])} =
= inf
y∈∆I
{RI(a, y)⇒ CI(y)} =
= (∀R.C)I(a).
In the same way the statement can be proved also for concept ∃R.C.
So, for every T-IALCEDS concept C we have that ‖τx(C)‖(MI ,T)v([a/x]) = CI(a).
On the other hand, let M be a first order structure such that sD = sM , then
we can define the interpretation IM = (∆IM , ·IM), where:
• ∆IM = M ,
• for each concept name A ∈ NC , AIM is the unary function AIM : ∆IM −→
T , such that, for every a ∈ ∆IM , it holds that AIM(a) = AM(a),
• for each role name R ∈ NR, RIM is the binary function AIM : ∆IM ×
∆IM −→ T , such that, for every a, b ∈ ∆IM , it holds that RIM(a, b) =
RM(a, b),
• for each individual a ∈ NI , aIM is an element of ∆IM , such that aIM = aM.
As a straightforward consequence of the definitions of MI and IM, we have
the following lemma.
Lemma 2.6.2. For every T-interpretation I and every first order structure
(M,T) it holds that
• I = IMI ,
• M = MIM .
From Lemma 2.6.2 and Lemma 2.6.1 we can prove a further consequence.
Lemma 2.6.3. Let C be an T-IALCEDS concept. Then we have that CIM(a) =
‖τx(C)‖(M,T)v([a/x]) for every object a ∈M .
51
Proof. From Lemma 2.6.1 we have that
CIM(a) = ‖τx(C)‖(MIM ,T)v([a/x]) .
From Lemma 2.6.2 we have that
‖τx(C)‖(MIM ,T)v([a/x]) = ‖τx(C)‖(M,T)v([a/x]).
So,
CIM(a) = ‖τx(C)‖(M,T)v([a/x]).
Remark 2.6.4. The first order language considered could be built by means of
a set V ar of just two variables. The limitation to just two variables is enough
in order to define the translation only for the kind of first order formulas that
correspond to IALCEDS concepts. In fact, in case of nested quantifier, like in
the concept:
∀R.∃R.∀R.A
we have that the translation is
τx(∀R.∃R.∀R.A) = (∀y)(R(x, y)→ (∃x)(R(y, x)⊗ (∀y)(R(x, y)→ A(y))))
whose meaning, with respect to a structure (M,T) is
infy∈M{RM(x, y)⇒ supx∈M{RM(y, x) ∗ infy∈M{RM(x, y)⇒ AM(y)}}}
and, since the inner variable “y” is closed, when a value for the outer function
“inf” has to be calculated, this variable falls outside its scope.
Moreover, in case of conjugated quantified concepts, like
(∀R.A) (∃R.B)
we have that the translation is
τx((∀R.A) (∃R.A)) = (∀y)(R(x, y)→ A(y))⊗ (∃y)(R(x, y)⊗B(y))
whose meaning, with respect to a structure (M,T) is
infy∈M{RM(x, y)⇒ AM(y)} ∗ supy∈M{RM(x, y) ∗BM(y)}}}
where each appearance of variable “y” is closed inside the scope of a different
quantifier and, for this reason, it does not fall inside the scope of the other
quantifier.
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2.6.2 Fuzzy axioms
First of all, we utilize the translation τx(·), introduced in Section 2.6.1 in order
to obtain a corresponding translation τ from fuzzy axioms to first order formulas.
Notice that, since the formulas obtained as a translation of axioms are closed,
the super-index ·x does not make sense in this case and we will omit it.
Let x be an individual variable, then, for the fuzzy inclusion axioms, the
translation is defined as follows:
τ(〈C v D ≥ r〉) := r → (∀x)(τx(C)→ τx(D)),
τ(〈C v D ≤ r〉) := (∀x)(τx(C)→ τx(D))→ r,
τ(〈C v D > r〉) := ¬4 ((∀x)(τx(C)→ τx(D))→ r),
τ(〈C v D < r〉) := ¬4 (r → (∀x)(τx(C)→ τx(D))),
For the fuzzy assertion axioms, the translation is defined as follows:
τ(〈C(a) ≥ r〉) := r → τx(C)[a/x],
τ(〈C(a) ≤ r〉) := τx(C)[a/x]→ r,
τ(〈C(a) > r〉) := ¬4 (τx(C)[a/x]→ r),
τ(〈C(a) < r〉) := ¬4 (r → τx(C)[a/x]),
For the fuzzy role assertion axioms, the translation is defined as follows:
τ(〈R(a, b) ≥ r〉) := r → τx,y(R)[a/x, b/y]
As for concepts, here again it is possible to show that the translation preserves
the meaning of the original expressions, through the same translation between
first order structures and FDL interpretations given in Section 2.6.1.
Lemma 2.6.5. Let 〈ϕ B r〉 be a fuzzy axiom with B∈ {≥,≤, >,<}. Then a
T-interpretation I satisfies 〈ϕ B r〉 if and only if (MI ,T) 1-satisfies τ(〈ϕ B r〉).
Proof. Let 〈ϕ B r〉 be a fuzzy axiom and I a T-interpretation, then
• If 〈ϕ B r〉 = 〈C v D ≥ r〉, then I satisfies 〈C v D ≥ r〉 if and only if
infx∈∆I{CI(x)⇒ DI(x)} ≥ r. By Lemma 2.6.1, we have that
r ≤ inf
x∈∆I
{CI(x)⇒ DI(x)} =
= inf
x∈∆I
{‖τx(C)‖(MI ,T) ⇒ ‖τx(D)‖(MI ,T)} =
= inf
x∈∆I
{‖τx(C)→ τx(D)‖(MI ,T)} =
= ‖(∀x)(τx(C)→ τx(D))‖(MI ,T).
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So, since the residuated implication → defines an order, we have that
structure (MI ,T) satisfies r → (∀x)(τx(C)→ τx(D)) = τ(〈C v D ≥ r〉).
In the same way can be proved that the statement holds for axioms of type
(2.2).
• If 〈ϕ B r〉 = 〈C v D > r〉, then I satisfies 〈C v D > r〉 if and only
if infx∈∆I{CI(x) ⇒ DI(x)} > r. Hence infx∈∆I{CI(x) ⇒ DI(x)}  r
i.e. I does not satisfy axiom 〈C v D ≤ r〉. By the previous result
we have that (MI ,T) does not satisfy τ(〈C v D ≤ r〉) = (∀x)(τx(C) →
τx(D))→ r. Then ‖(∀x)(τx(C)→ τx(D))→ r‖(MI ,T) < 1 and, therefore,
‖¬ 4 (∀x)(τx(C) → τx(D)) → r‖(MI ,T) = 1. In the same way can be
proved that the statement holds for axioms of type (2.4).
• If 〈ϕ B r〉 = 〈C(a) ≥ r〉, then I satisfies 〈C(a) ≥ r〉 if and only if
CI(aI) ≥ r. By Lemma 2.6.1, we have that
r ≤
≤ CI(aI) =
= ‖τx(C)‖(MI ,T)[aMI /x] =
= ‖τx(C)[a/x]‖(MI ,T).
So, since the residuated implication → defines an order, we have that
structure (MI ,T) satisfies r → τx(C)[a/x] = τ(〈C(a) ≥ r〉). In the same
way can be proved that the statement holds for axioms of type (2.6).
• If 〈ϕ B r〉 = 〈C(a) > r〉, then I satisfies 〈C(a) > r〉 if and only if
CI(aI) > r. Hence CI(aI)  r i.e. I does not satisfy axiom 〈C(a) ≤ r〉.
By the previous result we have that (MI ,T) does not satisfy τ(〈C(a) ≤
r〉) = τx(C)[a/x] → r. Then ‖τx(C)[a/x] → r‖(MI ,T) < 1 and, therefore,
‖¬4 τx(C)[a/x]→ r‖(MI ,T) = 1. In the same way can be proved that the
statement holds for axioms of type (2.8).
• If 〈ϕ B r〉 = 〈R(a, b) ≥ r〉, then I satisfies 〈R(a, b) ≥ r〉 if and only if
RI(aI , bI) ≥ r. By the definition of (MI ,T), we have that
r ≤
≤ RI(aI , bI) =
= ‖τx,y(R)‖(MI ,T)[aMI /x,bMI /y] =
= ‖τx,y(R)[a/x, b/y]‖(MI ,T).
So, since the residuated implication → defines an order, we have that
structure (MI ,T) satisfies r → τx,y(R)[a/x, b/y] = τx,y(〈R(a, b) ≥ r〉).
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So, for every fuzzy axiom 〈ϕ B r〉 it holds that a T-interpretation I satisfies
〈ϕ B r〉 if and only if (MI ,T) satisfies τ(〈ϕ B r〉).
Remark 2.6.6. In FDLs where the residuated negation is Go¨del negation, as well
as in FDLs based on finite-valued  Lukasiewicz Logic there is no need of operator
4 in order to translate strict axioms, since this operator is definable within the
language either as (2.22) in the former case and as:
4x := xn−1
in the latter.
Let ϕ be an axiom and r ∈ T . If the residuated negation is Go¨del, then we
have that
τ(〈C v D > r〉) := ¬¬ ∼ ((∀x)(τx(C)→ τx(D))→ r),
τ(〈C v D < r〉) := ¬¬ ∼ (r → (∀x)(τx(C)→ τx(D))),
τ(〈C(a) > r〉) := ¬¬ ∼ (τx(C)[a/x]→ r),
τ(〈C(a) < r〉) := ¬¬ ∼ (r → τx(C)[a/x]),
If n is the cardinality of T , we have that
τ(〈C v D > r〉) := ¬(((∀x)(τx(C)→ τx(D))→ r)n−1),
τ(〈C v D < r〉) := ¬((r → (∀x)(τx(C)→ τx(D)))n−1),
τ(〈C(a) > r〉) := ¬((τx(C)[a/x]→ r)n−1),
τ(〈C(a) < r〉) := ¬((r → τx(C)[a/x])n−1),
2.6.3 Reasoning tasks
Now we can utilize the translation τx(·), introduced in Section 2.6.1 and extended
to fuzzy axioms in the previous subsection in order to obtain a corresponding
translation of the reasoning tasks. In what follows, let C,D be two IALCE-
concepts and r, s ∈ T .
• For concept r-satisfiability, we can consider the following three problems
of first order logic:
– C is (≥ r)-satisfiable if and only if the formula r → τx(C) is 1-
satisfiable;
– C is r-satisfiable if and only if formula τx(C) is r-satisfiable if and
only if the formula r ↔ τx(C) is 1-satisfiable;
– C is positively satisfiable if and only if the formula ¬τx(C) is not a
theorem.
• D r-subsumes C if and only if the formula r → τx(C A D) is valid.
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• A knowledge base K = 〈T ,A〉 is consistent if and only if the closed formula∧
〈ϕBr〉∈T ∪A τ(〈ϕ B r〉) is 1-satisfiable.
• C is r-satisfiable with respect to knowledge base K = 〈T ,A〉 if and only if
the formula
(∧
〈ϕBr〉∈T ∪A τ(〈ϕ B r〉)
) ∧ (r → τx(C)) is 1-satisfiable.
• Knowledge base K = 〈T ,A〉 entails the fuzzy axiom 〈ϕ B r〉 if and only if
the closed formula τ(〈ϕ B r〉) is a logical consequence of the set of closed
formulas {τ(〈ψ B s〉) : 〈ψ B s〉 ∈ T ∪ A}.
• The best satisfiability degree of a concept C with respect to a KB K =
〈T ,A〉, translated to first order logic, is the problem of determining which
is the higher value r with respect to which formula
(∧
〈ϕBs〉∈T ∪A τ(〈ϕ B
r〉)) ∧ (r → τx(C)) is 1-satisfiable. With respect to the usual problems in
first order logic, this problem can be considered as a family of problems,
rather than as a single one, that is, one satisfiability problem for each
r ∈ T .
• The best entailment degree of an axiom ϕ with respect to a KB K = 〈T ,A〉,
translated to first order logic, is the problem of determining which is the
higher value r with respect to which τ(〈ϕ B r〉) is a logical consequence of
the set of formulas {τ(〈ψ B s〉) : 〈ψ B s〉 ∈ T ∪ A}. Again, this problem
can be considered as one logical consequence problem for each r ∈ T .
2.7 Relation to multi-modal logic
In [Sch91] it is provided a translation of DL concepts into classical propositional
multi-modal logic. The relationship between FDL and fuzzy multi-modal logic
has been described in [CEG12] for the case of finite-valued  Lukasiewicz Logic. In
that paper the relationship between both formalisms is obtained through their
respective relations with first order predicate logic. Here we present a alternative
version of the result in [CEG12] by means of a more direct translation.
2.7.1 Concepts
Given a description signature D = 〈NI , NC , NR〉, we define the multi-modal
language l2D := l ∪ {2R, : R ∈ NR} ∪ {3R, : R ∈ NR} over the set AtD =
{pA : A ∈ NC} of propositional variables where
• l is the set of propositional connectives of any extension L of MTL logic,
• {2R, : R ∈ NR} ∪ {3R, : R ∈ NR} is a set of unary modal operators.
For every concept name A ∈ NC we can define the translation τ : NC −→
AtD from the set of concept names into the set of propositional variables of the
language l2D , in the following way:
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τ(A) := pA
This translation can be inductively extended over the set of complex concepts
in the following way:
τ(⊥) := ⊥,
τ(>) := >,
τ(r) := r,
τ(¬C) := ¬τ(C),
τ(∼ C) := ∼ τ(C),
τ(4C) := 4τ(C),
τ(C D) := τ(C)⊗ τ(D)
τ(C uD) := τ(C) ∧ τ(D)
τ(C D) := τ(C)⊕ τ(D)
τ(C unionsqD) := τ(C) ∨ τ(D)
τ(C A D) := τ(C)→ τ(D)
τ(∀R.C) := 2Rτ(C)
τ(∃R.C) := 3Rτ(C)
Next we show that the translation preserves the meaning of the original
expression through a definition of a Kripke model from an FDL interpretation.
Let I = (∆I , ·I) be an FDL interpretation, then we can define the T-valued
Kripke model MI = 〈WI , {RMI : R ∈ NR}, VI〉, where:
• WI = ∆I ,
• for each role name R ∈ NR, RMI is a T-valued accessibility relation on
WI , i.e. a binary function RMI : WI ×WI −→ T , such that, for every
a, b ∈WI , it holds that RMI (a, b) = RI(a, b),
• for each element a ∈WI and for every propositional variable pA ∈ AtD, it
holds that VI(pA, a) = AI(a).
Lemma 2.7.1. Let C be an T-IALCEDS concept. Then, for every x ∈ ∆I , it
holds that VI(τ(C), a) = CI(a), for every object a ∈ ∆I .
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of complex concepts.
• For concept names and constant concepts it is straightforward by defini-
tion.
• Suppose that the statement holds for concepts C and D. Then
VI(τ(C D), a) =
= VI(τ(C)⊗ τ(D), a) =
= VI(τ(C), a) ∗ VI(τ(D), a) =
= CI(a) ∗DI(a) =
= (C D)I(a).
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In the same way the statement can be proved also for constructors
u,,unionsq,A,∼,4 and ¬.
• Suppose that the statement holds for concept C. Then
VI(τ(∀R.C), a) =
= VI(2Rτ(C), a) =
= inf
y∈WI
{RMI (a, y)⇒ VI(τ(C), y)} =
= inf
y∈∆I
{RI(a, y)⇒ CI(y)} =
= (∀R.C)I(a).
In the same way the statement can be proved also for concept ∃R.C.
So, for every T-IALCEDS concept C and every a ∈ ∆I it holds that CI(a) =
VI(τ(C), a).
In the case of multi-modal logic it is also possible to provide a translation from
multi-modal formulas into description concepts. Given a multi-modal language
l2 = l ∪ {2R, : R ∈ NR} ∪ {3R, : R ∈ NR}, with I countable and a set of
propositional variables At = {p1, p2, . . .}, we define the description signature
Dl2 = 〈N l2I , N l2C , N l2R 〉, where
• N l2I := ∅,
• N l2C := {Ap : p ∈ At},
• N l2R := {Ri : 2i ∈ l2}.
For every propositional variable p ∈ At we can define the translation ρ :
At −→ N l2C from the set of propositional variable into the set of concept names
of the signature Dl2 , in the following way:
ρ(p) := Ap
This translation can be inductively extended over the set of complex concepts
in the following way:
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ρ(⊥) := ⊥
ρ(>) := >
ρ(r) := r
ρ(¬ϕ) := ¬ρ(ϕ)
ρ(∼ ϕ) := ∼ ρ(ϕ)
ρ(4ϕ) := 4ρ(ϕ)
ρ(ϕ⊗ ψ) := ρ(ϕ) ρ(ψ)
ρ(ϕ ∧ ψ) := ρ(ϕ) u ρ(ψ)
ρ(ϕ⊕ ψ) := ρ(ϕ) ρ(ψ)
ρ(ϕ ∨ ψ) := ρ(ϕ) unionsq ρ(ψ)
ρ(ϕ→ ψ) := ρ(ϕ) A ρ(ψ)
ρ(2iϕ) := ∀Ri.ρ(ϕ)
ρ(3iϕ) := ∃Ri.ρ(ϕ).
As a straightforward consequence of the definitions of τ and ρ, we have the
following lemma.
Lemma 2.7.2. For every T-ALCEDS concept C and every multi-modal formula
ϕ it holds that:
• ρ(τ(C)) = C,
• τ(ρ(ϕ)) = ϕ.
Again, it is possible to show that the translation preserves the meaning of the
original expression through a definition of an FDL interpretation from a Kripke
model. Let M = 〈W, {R1, . . . , Rn}, V 〉 be a T-valued Kripke model, then we can
define the interpretation IM = (∆IM , ·IM), where:
• ∆IM := W ,
• for each concept name Ap ∈ N l2C , AIMp is the unary function
AIMp : ∆
IM −→ T , such that, for every a ∈ ∆IM , it holds that
AIMp (a) = V (p, a),
• for each role name Ri ∈ N l2R , RIMi is the binary function RIMi : ∆IM ×
∆IM −→ T , such that, for every a, b ∈ ∆IM , it holds that
RIMi (a, b) = Ri(a, b).
As a straightforward consequence of the definitions of MI and IM, we have
the following lemma.
Lemma 2.7.3. For every T-interpretation I and every T-valued Kripke model
M it holds that:
• I = IMI ,
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• M = MIM .
From Lemma 2.7.2, Lemma 2.7.3 and Lemma 2.7.1 we can prove a further
consequence.
Lemma 2.7.4. Let ϕ be a multi-modal formula. Then, for every w ∈W it holds
that (ρ(ϕ))IM(w) = V (ϕ,w).
Proof. From Lemma 2.7.1 we have that
(ρ(ϕ))IM(w) = VIM(τ(ρ(ϕ)), w).
From Lemma 2.7.2 we have that
VIM(τ(ρ(ϕ)), w) = VIM(ϕ,w).
From Lemma 2.7.3 we have that
VIM(ϕ,w) = V (ϕ,w).
So, (ρ(ϕ))IM(w) = V (ϕ,w).
2.7.2 Fuzzy axioms
First of all, we utilize the translation τ(·), introduced in Section 2.7 in order
to obtain a corresponding translation of the fuzzy inclusion axioms proposed in
Section 2.1.2. In this case, however, we need to use a multi-modal language that
contains the universal modality 2U (see page 15), as well as Delta operator 4
and truth constants.
τ(〈C v D ≥ r〉) := 2U (r → (τ(C)→ τ(D)))
τ(〈C v D ≤ r〉) := 2U ((τ(C)→ τ(D))→ r)
τ(〈C v D > r〉) := 2U¬4 ((τ(C)→ τ(D))→ r)
τ(〈C v D < r〉) := 2U¬4 (r → (τ(C)→ τ(D)))
Here again it is possible to show that the translation preserves the meaning
of the original expressions. Note that, for formulas starting with the univer-
sal modality 2U fuzzy axiom satisfiability coincide both with local and global
satisfiability of its multi-modal translation.
Lemma 2.7.5. Let 〈ϕ B r〉 be a fuzzy inclusion axiom, with B∈ {≥,≤, >,<}.
Then a T-interpretation I satisfies 〈ϕ B r〉 if and only if MI globally satisfies
τ(〈ϕ B r〉) if and only if MI locally satisfies τ(〈ϕ B r〉).
Proof. Let 〈ϕ B r〉 be a fuzzy axiom and I a T-interpretation.
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• If 〈ϕ B r〉 = 〈C v D ≥ r〉, then I satisfies it if and only if
infx∈∆I{CI(x)⇒ DI(x)} ≥ r. By Lemma 2.6.1, we have that
r ≤
≤ inf
x∈∆I
{CI(x)⇒ DI(x)} =
= inf
x∈WI
{VI(τ(C), x)⇒ VI(τ(D), x)} =
= inf
x∈WI
{VI(τ(C)→ τ(D), x)}.
Hence, for every x ∈ WI , it holds that r ≤ VI(τ(C) → τ(D), x) and,
therefore,
1 =
= inf
x∈WI
{r ⇒ VI(τ(C)→ τ(D), x)} =
= inf
w∈WI
{RU (w, x)⇒ VI(r → (τ(C)→ τ(D), x))} =
= VI(2U (r → (τ(C)→ τ(D))), w) =
= VI(τ(〈C v D ≥ r〉), w),
for every w ∈WI . So, MI both globally and locally 1-satisfies τ(〈ϕ B r〉).
In the same way it can be proved that the statement holds for axioms of
type (2.2).
• If 〈ϕ B r〉 = 〈C v D > r〉, then I satisfies it if and only if
infx∈∆I{CI(x) ⇒ DI(x)} > r. Hence infx∈∆I{CI(x) ⇒ DI(x)}  r
i.e. I does not satisfy axiom 〈C v D ≤ r〉. By the previous result we have
that MI satisfies τ(〈C v D ≤ r〉) = 2U ((τ(C) → τ(D)) → r), neither
globally, nor locally. Then VI(2U ((τ(C)→ τ(D))→ r), w) < 1, for every
w ∈ WI and, therefore, VI(2U¬ 4 ((τ(C) → τ(D)) → r), w) = 1. In the
same way can be proved that the statement holds for axioms of type (2.4).
So, for every fuzzy inclusion axiom 〈ϕ B r〉 it holds that a T-interpretation I
satisfies 〈ϕ B r〉 if and only if MI satisfies τ(〈ϕ B r〉).
In a language without a universal modality 2U (but with Delta operator 4
and truth constants) we can not obtain multi-modal formulas as a translation of
fuzzy axioms. Nevertheless, their satisfiability with respect to an interpretation
I can be translated to either global or local satisfiability of certain multi-modal
formulas with respect to model MI , depending on what kind of axiom has to be
translated. So, in such a language, a translation of the fuzzy inclusion axioms
can be obtained as follows:
61
Lemma 2.7.6. For every T-interpretation I the following equivalences hold:
1. I |= 〈C v D ≥ r〉 ⇐⇒ MI |=rg τ(C)→ τ(D)
⇐⇒ MI |=1g r → (τ(C)→ τ(D)),
2. I |= 〈C v D ≤ r〉 ⇐⇒ MI |=1l (τ(C)→ τ(D))→ r,
3. I |= 〈C v D > r〉 ⇐⇒ MI |=1g ¬4 ((τ(C)→ τ(D))→ r),
⇐⇒ MI 21l (τ(C)→ τ(D))→ r
4. I |= 〈C v D < r〉 ⇐⇒ MI |=1l ¬4 (r → (τ(C)→ τ(D))),
⇐⇒ MI 2rg τ(C)→ τ(D)
Proof. Let I be a T interpretation, then:
1. We have that I satisfies 〈C v D ≥ r〉 if and only if infx∈∆I{CI(x) ⇒
DI(x)} ≥ r. By Lemma 2.7.1, we have that
r ≤
≤ inf
x∈∆I
{CI(x)⇒ DI(x)} =
= inf
x∈WI
{VI(τ(C), x)⇒ VI(τ(D), x)} =
= inf
x∈WI
{VI(τ(C)→ τ(D), x)}.
Hence, on the one hand, for every x ∈ WI , it holds that r ≤ VI(τ(C) →
τ(D), x), that is, MI |=rg τ(C) → τ(D). On the other hand, for every
x ∈WI , it holds that VI(r → (τ(C)→ τ(D)), x) = 1, that is, MI |=1g r →
(τ(C)→ τ(D)).
2. We have that I satisfies 〈C v D ≤ r〉 if and only if infx∈∆I{CI(x) ⇒
DI(x)} ≤ r. By Lemma 2.7.1, we have that
r ≥
≥ inf
x∈∆I
{CI(x)⇒ DI(x)} =
= inf
x∈WI
{VI(τ(C), x)⇒ VI(τ(D), x)} =
= inf
x∈WI
{VI(τ(C)→ τ(D), x)}.
Hence, there exists x ∈WI such that VI(r → (τ(C)→ τ(D)), x) = 1, that
is, MI |=1l r → (τ(C)→ τ(D)).
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3. We have that I satisfies 〈C v D > r〉 if and only if infx∈∆I{CI(x) ⇒
DI(x)} > r. Hence infx∈∆I{CI(x) ⇒ DI(x)}  r i.e. I does not satisfy
axiom 〈C v D ≤ r〉. So, by item 2, we have that MI 21l (τ(C)→ τ(D))→
r. Moreover, since infx∈∆I{CI(x) ⇒ DI(x)}  r, then, by Lemma 2.7.1,
we have that
r 
 inf
x∈∆I
{CI(x)⇒ DI(x)} =
= inf
x∈WI
{VI(τ(C), x)⇒ VI(τ(D), x)} =
= inf
x∈WI
{VI(τ(C)→ τ(D), x)}.
Hence, for every x ∈ WI , it holds that VI((τ(C) → τ(D)) → r, x) < 1,
that is, VI(¬ 4 (τ(C) → τ(D)) → r, x) = 1. So, MI |=1g ¬ 4 ((τ(C) →
τ(D))→ r).
4. We have that I satisfies 〈C v D < r〉 if and only if infx∈∆I{CI(x) ⇒
DI(x)} < r. Hence infx∈∆I{CI(x) ⇒ DI(x)}  r i.e. I does not satisfy
axiom 〈C v D ≥ r〉. So, by item 1, we have that MI 2rg τ(C) → τ(D).
Moreover, since infx∈∆I{CI(x)⇒ DI(x)} < r, then, by Lemma 2.7.1, we
have that
r >
> inf
x∈∆I
{CI(x)⇒ DI(x)} =
= inf
x∈WI
{VI(τ(C), x)⇒ VI(τ(D), x)} =
= inf
x∈WI
{VI(τ(C)→ τ(D), x)}.
Hence there exists x ∈WI such that VI(r → (τ(C)→ τ(D)), x) < 1, that
is, VI(¬ 4 (r → (τ(C) → τ(D)), x)) = 1. So, MI |=1l ¬ 4 (r → (τ(C) →
τ(D))).
Differently from the case of first order logic and despite the fact that FDL
interpretations can be a semantics for fuzzy assertions, within the multi-modal
language it is not possible to translate fuzzy assertions like 〈C(a) ≥ r〉. This
is due to the fact that in multi-modal languages there is not a syntactic entity
that can work as a translation for FDL individuals.
2.7.3 Reasoning tasks
Now we can utilize the translation τ(·), introduced in Section 2.7 and extended
to fuzzy axioms in the previous subsection in order to obtain a corresponding
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translation of the reasoning tasks. Nevertheless, analogously to the fact that we
can not obtain a corresponding translation of fuzzy assertion axioms we can not
obtain a translation to multi-modal logic of the problems related to knowledge
bases where the ABox is non-empty. For this reason we will not consider in this
section the knowledge base consistency problem when the ABox is not empty
and will only consider problems related to knowledge bases K = 〈T ,A〉, where
A = ∅. In what follows, let C,D be two concepts and r, s ∈ T .
• For concept r-satisfiability, we can consider the following three problems
of multi-modal logic:
– C is (≥ r)-satisfiable if and only if formula τ(C) is locally s-satisfiable
for some s ≥ r, if and only if formula r → τ(C) is locally 1-satisfiable;
– C is r-satisfiable if and only if formula τ(C) is locally r-satisfiable if
and only if formula r ↔ τ(C) is locally 1-satisfiable.
– C is positively satisfiable if and only if formula τ(¬C) is not a theo-
rem.
• D r-subsumes C if and only if formula r → τ(C A D) is valid.
• A knowledge base K = 〈T 〉 is consistent if and only if formula∧
〈ϕBr〉∈T τ(〈ϕ B r〉) is globally 1-satisfiable.
• C is r-satisfiable w.r.t. K = 〈T 〉 if and only if there exists a T-valued
Kripke model M such that both M |=1g
(∧
〈ϕBr〉∈T τ(〈ϕ B r〉)
)
and M |=rl
τ(C).
• Knowledge base K = 〈T 〉 entails the fuzzy axiom 〈ϕ B r〉 if and only if
formula τ(〈ϕ B r〉) is a global consequence of the set of formulas {τ(〈ψ B
s〉) : 〈ψ B s〉 ∈ T }.
• The best satisfiability degree of a concept C with respect to a KB K = 〈T 〉,
translated to multi-modal logic, is the problem of determining which is the
higher value r with respect to which there exists a T-valued Kripke model
M such that both M |=1g
(∧
〈ϕBr〉∈T τ(〈ϕ B s〉)
)
and M |=1l r → τ(C).
With respect to the usual problems in multi-modal logic, this problem can
be considered as a family of problems, rather than as a single one, that is,
one satisfiability problem for each r ∈ T .
• The best entailment degree of an axiom ϕ with respect to a KB K = 〈T 〉,
translated to multi-modal logic, is the problem of determining which is the
higher value r with respect to which τ(〈ϕ B r〉) is a global consequence of
the set of formulas {τ(〈ψ B s〉) : 〈ψ B s〉 ∈ T }. Again, this problem can
be considered as one logical consequence problem for each r ∈ T .
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2.8 Related work
Since the first articles on FDL, it was evident that generalizing the formalism
of DL to the fuzzy framework consists in generalizing its semantics. A first step
in this sense is that of generalizing the semantics of atomic concepts and roles
from crisp sets and relations to fuzzy sets and fuzzy relations respectively and
the semantics of subsumption to the inclusion between fuzzy sets. Nevertheless
this does not mean there is a wide agreement on how to generalize the semantics
of complex concepts and, since the beginning of the research on FDL, several
solutions have been proposed.
The first attempt in this direction is the one of [Yen91]. At that time the
notation reported in Section 1.2.2 had not been fully adopted in the DL com-
munity and [Yen91] has been thought as a generalization of [BL84] where the
so-called Term Subsumption Languages (TSL) is developed. The language stud-
ied in [Yen91], denoted “FT SL−”, takes, as concept constructors, conjunction
(: andC1, . . . , Cn), value restriction (: allRC), restricted existential quantifi-
cation (: someR>), modifiers (:NOT, :VERY, :SLIGHTLY, etc.) and an
ancestor of concrete domains. The semantics underlying this first proposal was
called test score semantics (see [Zad82]). This name just means that scores
(what we nowadays call “truth values”) are assigned to concepts after perform-
ing tests to the system. However, what is interesting, under our point of view, in
the semantics used in [Yen91], is the truth functions used to calculate the truth
values of complex concepts, in particular.
• It is suggested to use the min function to compute the value of a conjunc-
tion (: andC1, . . . , Cn) of concepts. Besides this suggestion, the author
not only recognizes that any other t-norm can be used as the semantics of
conjunction, but also that both lower and upper bounds for conjunctions
can be computed considering min and  Lukasiewicz t-norms as upper and
lower bounds respectively.
• The semantics of value restriction (: allRC) is defined in two alternative
ways. Through a fuzzy implication operator, as is done nowadays, and
through the notion of conditional necessity from possibility theory. The
author, however, adopts the second option.
The semantics defined in [Yen91] was enough general to leave open the adop-
tion of a truth function for conjunction. Nevertheless, [Yen91] was inspired by
practical purposes and his goal was providing a more refined tool for knowledge
representation.
Later on, [TM98] has a more theoretic fashion. The evolution of the nota-
tion towards a logical-like abstraction, that can be seen in the DL community,
influenced [TM98], which utilizes the same modern notation reported in Section
1.2.2. The language studied in this work was called ALCFM (the subindex FM
stands for infinitely many truth values). It presents, as concept constructors,
conjunction u, disjunction unionsq, value restriction ∀R.C, existential quantifier ∃R.C
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and manipulators (what we call modifiers) MiC. The authors of [TM98] utilize
a translation of the FDL language to fuzzy first order logic2 and provide a se-
mantics to fuzzy first order logic that, through the translation, turns out to be
the semantics of the FDL language, in accordance with the schema in Figure
2.4.
FDL //
&&N
NN
NN
NN
FOLOO

FO structures
Figure 2.4: Relations to FOL in [TM98]
The choice of the truth functions for the logical connectives falls on min
and max for conjunction and disjunction, respectively. The semantics for the
existential quantifier is the one provided in Section 2.1.1 and it is the first place
where it has been defined this way. This work is also the first in defining the
semantics for value restriction ∀R.C by means of the so-called Kleene-Dienes
implication, defined on [0, 1] as:
x⇒ y := max{1− x, y}
which is a straightforward generalization of the classical one. In particular, if
I is an FDL interpretation, the semantics of value restriction ∀R.C, based on
Kleene-Dienes implication, is defined in the following way:
(∀R.C)I(x) = infy∈∆I{max{1−RI(x, y), CI(y)}}.
Finally, for the semantics of manipulators MiC, unary function on [0, 1] were
used, as in the framework of fuzzy hedges (see [CHN11] for details).
Until [TM98], the research on FDL has been quite limited, but in the same
year Straccia published his first work on FDL, [Str98]. The language studied in
this work is called (and, indeed, it is) ALC and the semantics adopted is the
same as the one used in [TM98], plus a unary function that gives the semantics
to concept complementation defined as:
¬x := 1− x.
The set of operations that includes min{x, y},max{x, y},max{1− x, y} and
1 − x on the real unit interval is commonly denoted with the name of Zadeh’s
semantics. The strength of [Str98] and of its journal version [Str01], is that they
set up a clear syntax and semantics, very close to the classical ones and relate
each other without the intermediate step of first order logic, like in [TM98]. In
2The fuzzy first order logic considered in [TM98], however, was not the same calculus
developed in the framework of Mathematical Fuzzy Logic.
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this way Fuzzy Description Logic is set up as an autonomous discipline with a
clearly defined syntax an semantics as the one provided in [Str01].
Moreover, [Str98] is the first place where fuzzy axioms have been defined this
way, since in previous papers the notion of fuzzy axioms was not considered.
In [Str98], just non-strict lower bound axioms are considered. In [Str01] have
been introduced axioms stating a non-strict upper bound as well, but strict
bound axioms are not considered. Since then, some works on FDL consider
strict bound axioms, like [Str04a, SSP+05a, Str06, BS10b] and some others do
not consider strict bound axioms, like [Str04b, Str05b, BS07, CGCE10, BBS11,
BP11a, BP11f, CEG12].
Later, in [Str04b], the same author considers also the more general frame-
work of semantics based on lattices that are supposed to be not necessarily
chains. These works, indeed, opened the door to the possibility of expanding
the language in order to cover the advances that had been done in the classical
framework. A fuzzy semantics for concrete domains was introduced in [Str05c].
A semantics for unqualified number restriction, role hierarchies, inverse and
transitive roles was introduced in [SSP+05a]. A semantics for nominals was
introduced in [SSP+05b]. A semantics for qualified number restriction was in-
troduced in [BDGR07].
However, due to the absence of a residuated implication, an FDL based on
Zadeh’s semantics is too weak and it can lead to counter-intuitive consequences.
This fact has been pointed out in [Ha´j05], where the example of the assertion “all
hotels near to the main square are expensive” is presented in order to highlight
the consequences of using Kleene-Dienes implication in the semantics of value
restriction. Such assertion can be formally expressed as
∀hasNear.Expensive(MainSquare) (2.23)
Here we will further develop Ha´jek’s example. Consider the following fuzzy
ABox HOT ELS:
• 〈hasNear(MainSquare,Hotel_1) = 0.9〉,
• 〈hasNear(MainSquare,Hotel_2) = 0.5〉,
• 〈hasNear(MainSquare,Hotel_3) = 0.1〉,
• 〈Expensive(Hotel_1) = 0.9〉,
• 〈Expensive(Hotel_2) = 0.5〉,
• 〈Expensive(Hotel_3) = 0.1〉,
The HOT ELS ABox indeed depicts the ideal situation imagined by Ha´jek,
where “for each hotel the degree of its being near to the main square equals the
degree of its being expensive” and where “there is at least one hotel which is near
to the main square in degree 0.5”. In Figure 2.5 we report an interpretation that
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•
Hotel1
1−0.9 •
MainSquare
1−0.5 •
Hotel2 Hotel3
1−0.6 •
Figure 2.5: Interpretation satisfying HOT ELS
satisfies ABox HOT ELS, where the distance between MainSquare and Hotel_x
is calculated as 1− hasNear(MainSquare,Hotel_x).
In this ideal situation the truth value of assertion (2.23) should be 1, because
hotels are at least as expensive as they lie near the main square. Now, if the
truth value of (2.23) is calculated using the truth function of any residuated
implication, its value is indeed 1. In spite, using the truth function of Kleene-
Dienes implication, the result is different. In fact, in every interpretation I that
is a model of HOT ELS, we have that:
(∀hasNear.Expensive(MainSquare))I =
= inf
x∈∆I
{NearI(MainSquareI , x)⇒ ExpensiveI(x)} ≤
≤ inf{max{1− 0.9, 0.9},max{1− 0.5, 0.5},max{1− 0.1, 0.1}} =
= inf{0.9, 0.5, 0.9}
= 0.5
So, the truth value of assertion (2.23), using Kleene-Dienes implication, is at
most 0.5 in a model of HOT ELS, against the intuition, reflected in HOT ELS,
that its truth value should be 1.
But the example can go beyond this situation. Consider, in fact, the ABox
HOT ELS ′ obtained by adding to HOT ELS the following set of assertions:
• 〈hasNear(SideSquare,Hotel_1) = 0.1〉,
• 〈hasNear(SideSquare,Hotel_2) = 0.4〉,
• 〈hasNear(SideSquare,Hotel_3) = 0.4〉,
In this new situation the truth value of assertion
∀hasNear.Expensive(SideSquare) (2.24)
should be no higher than the value of assertion (2.23), because SideSquare lies
very far away from the most expensive hotel (Hotel_1) and there is one hotel
whose degree of being near is higher than its degree of being expensive (Hotel_3).
Indeed, in the situation depicted by ABox HOT ELS ′, the main square is the
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square that has near the more expensive hotels and the side square is the one
that lies nearer to the cheaper hotels. In Figure 2.5 we report an interpretation
that satisfies ABox HOT ELS ′.
•
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•
Hotel1
1−0.9 •
MainSquare
1−0.5 •
Hotel2 Hotel3
1−0.6 •
Figure 2.6: Interpretation satisfying HOT ELS ′
For this reason, it appears counter intuitive the possibility that SideSquare
can be an instance of concept ∀hasNear.Expensive in a degree higher than
SideSquare. Again, if its truth value is calculated with the use of the truth
function of any residuated implication, its value is indeed strictly less than 1. In
spite, using the truth function of Kleene-Dienes implication, the result can be
higher than the truth value of ∀hasNear.Expensive(MainSquare). In fact, in
every interpretation I that is a model of HOT ELS ′, and where we have that:
(∀hasNear.Expensive(SideSquare))I
= infx∈∆I{NearI(SideSquareI , x)⇒ ExpensiveI(x)}
= inf{max{1− 0.1, 0.9},max{1− 0.4, 0.5},max{1− 0.4, 0.1}}
= inf{0.9, 0.6, 0.6}
= 0.6
> 0.5
= (∀hasNear.Expensive(MainSquare))I
So, the truth value of assertion (2.24) is greater than that of (2.23) in every
model of HOT ELS ′, against the intuition, reflected in HOT ELS ′, that hotels
should be more expensive around the main square.
For this reason, Ha´jek proposes, in [Ha´j05], a more general framework based
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on Mathematical Fuzzy Logic. As we have seen, with the only exception of
[Yen91], the operation min is the only function adopted as a semantics for the
conjunction concept constructor until [Ha´j05]. In this new framework, not only
the semantics of conjunction is a t-norm, but it is also recovered the idea, firstly
proposed in [TM98], of a tight relation between FDL and first order fuzzy logic
that, in the meanwhile, has been defined in the general framework of Math-
ematical Fuzzy Logic (MFL) developing the basic ideas of [Ha´j98c]. The new
framework proposed in [Ha´j05] inspired several successive works on FDL. Among
the ones that consider a t-norm-based semantics we can find [Str05c] and, more
recently, [CEB10] and [BP11b]. Among the ones that deepen the relationships
between FDL and MFL we can find [GCAE10], [CGCE10] and [CEG12].
The new framework proposed in [Ha´j05] supposed also a re-thinking about
the notation used in FDL. Indeed, the use of the same notation of DL for FDL
has been based on the fact that, in order to generalize DLs to the multi-valued
framework, it seemed enough to generalize the semantics of concepts and roles
to fuzzy sets and fuzzy relations. With this idea it is obvious that the same
concept constructors (and, with them, the same formal languages) could be
maintained in a multi-valued framework. This formalization worked indeed well
when the semantics adopted as underlying truth value algebra was the Zadeh’s
semantics. But, since [Ha´j05], some researchers on FDLs began to consider the
use of residuated implications as formalized in the framework of MFL. However,
adopting a framework based on MFL and maintaining the same notation as in the
classical case, could produce a slight confusion. This is due to several reasons
related to differences between the classical and the many-valued framework.
Commonly, with some exceptions, such differences include the following items:
1. two kinds of conjunctions can be considered in the many-valued framework,
with different mathematical properties, and the same holds for disjunction,
2. implication is, in general, not definable from other connectives,
3. the quantifiers are not definable from each other by means of the equiva-
lence ∃R.C ≡ ¬∀R.¬C,
4. the disjunction is not definable from the residuated negation ¬C := C → ⊥
and the conjunction u.
All these items must be taken into account both when choosing the symbols
denoting the constructors of our description languages and when building the
hierarchy of fuzzy description languages, as we have already seen in Section 2.3.
As an example recall that, in classical DLs, ALE is strictly contained in ALC,
while within many fuzzy DLs, by item 3 above, this is not the case.
In particular, we find worth discussing the case of implication. In classical
DL, the implication is not usually a primitive concept constructor, even though
implication is often implicitly used. This is due to the fact that the implication
is definable from conjunction and negation. Nevertheless, in the logic MTL
and many of its extensions, implication is in general not definable from other
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connectives. The first time that the concept constructor → for the implication
is included in the definition of the language as a primitive connective has been
in [Ha´j05]. Here we prefer to use the symbol A introduced in [CGCE10].
The introduction of a new symbol for implication allows to utilize a concept
constructor that is not otherwise definable, even if quite useful in order to define,
in BL and its extensions, other concept constructors like those for weak conjunc-
tion (whose semantics and symbol are the minimum and u respectively), weak
disjunction (whose semantics and symbol are the maximum and unionsq respectively)
and residuated negation (whose definition is C A ⊥).
Another issue that could take great advantage from the use of a residu-
ated implication is the semantics of concept subsumption. Since the first works
on FDL, in fact, the semantics for subsumption between concepts is defined
by means of the inclusion between fuzzy sets, that is, concept C is subsumed
by concept D if and only if, for every interpretation I and every x ∈ ∆I , it
holds that CI(x) ≤ DI(x). If the truth function of the implication A is the
residuum of the truth function of the strong conjunction , this is equivalent
to say that concept C A D is valid or, equivalently, that concept ¬(C A D) is
not positively satisfiable. If, otherwise, the truth function of the implication is
max{1−CI(x), DI(x)} the above relation between fuzzy set inclusion and impli-
cation does not hold anymore. As an example, consider two concepts A and B.
As a matter of fact, their conjunction AuB is always subsumed by both concepts,
that is, AuB v A. In Zadeh’s semantics, in fact, for every interpretation I and
every x ∈ ∆I , it holds that (A u B)I(x) = min{AI(x), BI(x)} ≤ AI(x). Nev-
ertheless, when the truth function of the implication is max{1−AI(x), BI(x)}
it is not true that concept (A u B) A A is valid. As a counter-example to the
relationship between the notion of fuzzy set inclusion based on the order ≤ and
Kleene-Dienes implication, consider interpretation I where:
• ∆I = {a},
• AI(a) = BI(a) = 0.5,
then,
((A uB) A A)I(a) =
= max{1−min{AI(a), BI(a)}, AI} =
= max{1−min{0.5, 0.5}, 0.5} =
= 0.5
As we can see from the example of interpretation I, the value of concept
A uB is less or equal than the value of concept A, but concept (A uB) A A is
not a valid concept.
The advantage of considering a residuated implication, however not only
consists in the fact that it behaves well with the inclusion between fuzzy concepts,
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but, above all, that by means of a residuated implication it is possible to define
a graded notion of subsumption. By defining the semantics of subsumption as:
(C v D)I := infx∈∆I{CI(x)⇒ DI(x)}
we are not just able to say whether concept C is totally subsumed in concept D,
but, when it is not the case, we can also give a truth value to this subsumption.
This is indeed a great increase in expressivity.
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Chapter 3
Decidability
Decidability is a fundamental topic in classical DL. In FDL it is a very important
topic as well. The study of decidability in FDL has brought to the generalization
of classical algorithms, as well as to the design of new ones. Even though, how-
ever, decidability results for reasoning tasks without knowledge bases coincide
with those of the classical framework, the same does not hold in presence of on-
tologies, when the set of truth values considered is infinite. For IALCE language
over most infinite t-norms, in fact, different undecidability results have been re-
cently proved, that outline a significative difference with the classical case. In
this chapter we deal with IALCE language over product and  Lukasiewicz infi-
nite t-norms. The same problems for IALCE language over finite t-norms will be
addressed in the next chapter where we deal with the computational complexity
of reasoning tasks without knowledge bases.
The content of the present chapter is the following. In Section 3.1 we report
a reduction from IALCE concepts to sets of propositional formulas provided in
[Ha´j05]. Through such a reduction the decidability of the witnessed satisfia-
bility and subsumption problems without knowledge bases over infinite-valued
 Lukasiewicz semantics has been proved in [Ha´j05]. We report it because we
analyze it under several points of view throughout the present chapter and the
next one. In Section 3.2, a quasi-witnessed extension of the reduction reported
in Section 3.1 that deals with infinite interpretations of IALE language over the
standard product chain without ontologies is provided. Such extension allows to
prove decidability of the quasi-witnessed positive satisfiability problem for the
IALE language over product t-norm. In Section 3.3 we give a brief account
of how, by menas of the reductions given in the previous two sections, the de-
cidability of the witnessed and quasi-witnessed subsumption problems without
knowledge bases is proved for the same languages of Section 3.1 and Section 3.2.
In Section 3.4, we provide an undecidability result for the knowledge base con-
sistency problem of ALC language over the standard  Lukasiewicz chain. Further
results existing in the literature will be reported in Section 3.5.
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3.1 Witnessed satisfiability and  Lukasiewicz
logic
Concept satisfiability is one of the simplest reasoning tasks in FDL and the one
that is more studied in the logical counterpart. Since [Ha´j05] the attention of
most researchers focussed on the satisfiability with respect to witnessed inter-
pretations, that we will call, from now on, witnessed satisfiability.
In [Ha´j05] it is proved that concept witnessed r-satisfiability is a decidable
problem for a Fuzzy Description Logic restricted to language IALCE , based on
any t-norm. In order to achieve such result, in [Ha´j05] is defined an algorithm
that, given a concept C0, obtains a propositional theory PC0 . We report the
algorithm from [Ha´j05] in Definition 3.1.2. Before introducing the algorithm, we
need some previous definitions from [Ha´j05].
Definition 3.1.1. 1. Nesting degree of quantifiers in C (or C(a)) is defined
inductively:
• nest(C) = 0, if C is an concept name or a constant concept;
• if C is a concept, then nest(∼ C) = nest(C);
• if C and D are concepts, then nest(C  D) = nest(C A D) =
max(nest(C), nest(D));
• if C is a concept and R a role name, then nest(∀R.C) = nest(∃R.C) =
nest(C) + 1.
2. Generalized atoms are quantified concepts, i.e. concepts of the form ∀R.C
or ∃R.C, where C is a propositional combination of concepts and gener-
alized atoms; the latter will be called generalized atoms of C. We will
also use the term generalized atom for instances of quantified concepts,
the context will clarify the precise meaning.
Next we report Ha´jek’s reduction from [Ha´j05].
Definition 3.1.2 ([Ha´j05, Definition 3]). Given C0(a0) with nesting degree n,
step 0 just transfers it to further processing in step 1; the constant a0 has level
0. For i > 0 step i processes generalized atoms of formulas transferred from step
i− 1; they have the form (QR.C)(b), where Q is ∀ or ∃, R is a role, C a concept
with nesting degree ≤ n − i and b is a constant of level i. For each generalized
atom α in question, do the following:
If α is (∀R.C)(b) then produce a new constant dα and the axiom
(∀R.C)(b) ≡ (R(b, dα) A C(dα))
If α is (∃R.C)(b) then produce dα and the axiom
(∃R.C)(b) ≡ (R(b, dα) C(dα))
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In both cases call the generated axioms witnessing axioms for α and dα a
constant belonging to R, b.
After this is done for all α in question (in the present step) consider each α
once more and do the following:
If α is (∀R.C)(b) and dβ is any constant belonging to R, b and different from
dα, produce the axiom
(∀R.C)(b) A (R(b, dβ) A C(dβ))
Similarly for α being (∃R.C)(b), produce
(R(b, dβ) C(dβ)) A (∃R.C)(b)
The collection of formulas produced in some step will be denoted by PC0(a0)
or, simply PC0 .
After proving that the given algorithm is correct and complete with respect
to the problems considered, Ha´jek proves that, for language IALCE over any
t-norm, satisfiability, validity and subsumption with respect to witnessed inter-
pretations coincide with the same problems with respect to finite interpretations.
Hence, when these problems are restricted to witnessed interpretations, the FDLs
considered enjoy the finite model property and are decidable.
Theorem 3.1.3 ([Ha´j05, Corollary 1]). For every continuous t-norm ∗, wit-
nessed r-satisfiability is a decidable problem in language IALCE.
Depending on the t-norm ∗ considered, witnessed satisfiability, validity and
subsumption do not need to coincide with the same problem with respect to
unrestricted interpretations, but both notions indeed coincide in some cases,
as we have seen in Section 1.1.3. In particular, under [0, 1] L, we have that
unrestricted r-satisfiability is a decidable problem.
Theorem 3.1.4 ([Ha´j05, Theorem 1]). r-satisfiability is a decidable problem in
[0, 1] L-ALC.
If T is a finite BL-chain, then, trivially, witnessed satisfiability coincides with
unrestricted satisfiability, for each notion of satisfiability considered. The same
holds for validity and subsumption.
As remarked in [Ha´j05] and [HC06] by means of counter-examples, in the
case of infinite-valued Go¨del and product t-norms, there exist formulas that are
satisfiable, but not in a witnessed interpretation.
3.2 Quasi-witnessed satisfiability and Product
Logic
In [CEB10] it is proved that concept quasi-witnessed positive satisfiability is a
decidable problem for a Fuzzy Description Logic restricted to language IALE ,
based on product t-norm.
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We will use the notations Satpos and Sat to denote the sets of positively
satisfiable and 1-satisfiable concepts, respectively; and we will write QSatpos
and QSat to denote the same sets restricted to quasi-witnessed interpretations.
In particular, in [CEB10] has been proven the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2.1. The sets QSatpos and QSat are decidable.
In Appendix A it is proved that quasi-witnessed positive satisfiability and
unrestricted positive satisfiability indeed coincide under the standard product
semantics. Hence unrestricted positive satisfiability is a decidable problem in
language [0, 1]ΠIALE . For the 1-satisfiability problem under standard prod-
uct semantics, completeness with respect to quasi-witnessed models and, thus,
decidability of language IALE based on product t-norm are still open problems.
The proof of Theorem 3.2.1 follows the one provided in [Ha´j05] for the case
of witnessed interpretations. We report here the whole proof.
The Reduction to the Propositional Case
In order to prove that positive satisfiability in a quasi-witnessed interpretation
is decidable we are going to codify quasi-witnessed interpretations by means of
finite number of formulas in the propositional product logic.
First of all, let us a fix an infinite set Ind = {ai : i ∈ N}, whose elements will
be called individuals or constants. With a little language abuse, throughout Sec-
tion 3.2, an assertion will denote any propositional combination of expressions
of the forms C(a) and R(a, b), where C is a concept, R is a role name and a, b
are individuals. The definitions of the notions of nesting degree and generalized
atoms can be found in Definition 3.1.1. In the next definition we provide a first
version of a labeling function that we need in order to prove the result. An
enhanced version of this function will be given in Definition 4.3.5, but for the
purpose of the present section, the one in Definition 3.2.2 is enough.
Definition 3.2.2 (Labeling (first version)). Let C0 be a concept. The labeling
function is the function which associates to every occurrence D of a subconcept
in C0 an element of N≤k (where k = nest(C0)) defined by the conditions:
1. l(C0) is the empty sequence ε,
2. if D is a propositional combination of concepts D1, . . . , Dn, then l(Di) :=
l(D) for every i ≤ n.
3. if D is ∀R.D′ or ∃R.D′, then l(D′) is the concatenated sequence l(D), i,
where i is the minimum number m such that the sequence l(D),m has not
been used to label any occurrence in C0.
In order to illustrate the notions provided in Definition 3.1.1 and Definition
3.2.2, as well as further definitions, we propose an example that will be used
throughout Chapter 4.
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Example 3.2.3. Consider the concept
Example := ∀R.∃R.A u ¬∀R.(∃R.A ∃R.A)
where A is an atomic concept. Then,
1. concept Example has nesting degree 2.
2. the generalized atoms in Example are: ∀R.∃R.A, ∀R.(∃R.A  ∃R.A) and
∃R.A.
3. the labelling function associated with occurrences in Example is given by
the genealogical tree
A : 1, 1
∃R.A : 1
∀R.∃R.A : ∅
A : 2, 1
∃R.A : 2
A : 2, 2
∃R.A : 2
∃R.A ∃R.A : 2
∀R.(∃R.A ∃R.A) : ∅
¬∀R.(∃R.A ∃R.A) : ∅
Example : ∅
Here we have used the notation D : σ to indicate that the labelling of
occurrence D is the sequence σ.
Next, for every concept C0 we are going to recursively associate two finite
sets PC0 and YC0 of assertions.
Definition 3.2.4 (Algorithm). Given a concept C0, we construct finite sets
PC0 and YC0 of assertions. The construction takes steps 0, . . . , n where n is
the nesting degree of the concept C0. At each step some generalized atoms are
processed; and at each step we add some new constants from Ind and some
new formulas to PC0 and YC0 and we transfer some assertions of concepts for
processing in the next step. The assertions produced in step i will have nesting
degree ≤ n− i; after step n is completed the algorithm stops.
At step 0, we simply transfer the assertion C0(d) to be further processed
in step 1; and we say that constant d has level 0. For i > 0, step i selects the
generalized atoms in formulas transferred from step i−1 and processes them. We
know that the generalized atoms just selected have the form QR.C(dσ), where
Q ∈ {∀,∃}, R is a role, C a concept with nesting degree ≤ n− i, dσ is a constant
produced in the previous step and σ is the label of the generalized atom we are
considering. For each generalized atom α, at step i we firstly do the following:
• If α is ∀R.C(dσ), then produce a new constant dσ,m and add to PC0 the
assertion
(∀R.C(dσ) ≡ (R(dσ, dσ,m) A C(dσ,m))) unionsq ¬∀R.C(dσ).
• If α is ∃R.C(dσ), then produce a new constant dσ,m and add to PC0 the
assertion:
(R(dσ, dσ,m) C(dσ,m)) ≡ ∃R.C(dσ).
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We will say that dσ,m is a constant associated to R, dσ. Now, we consider
each α of the present step and do the following:
• If α is (∀R.C)(dσ) and dσ,m is any constant associated to R, dσ, then add
to PC0 the assertion
∀R.C(dσ) A (R(dσ, dσ,m) A C(dσ,m)).
• If α is (∃R.C)(dσ) and dσ,m is any constant associated to R, dσ, then add
to PC0 the assertion
(R(dσ, dσ,m) C(dσ,m)) A ∃R.C(dσ).
• If α is (∀R.C)(dσ), then add to YC0 the assertion
¬∀R.C(dσ) (R(dσ, dσ,m) A C(dσ,m)).
Example 3.2.5. Following Definition 3.2.4, the assertions belonging to
PExample are:
• (∀R.∃R.A(d) ≡ (R(d, d1) A ∃R.A(d1))) unionsq ¬∀R.∃R.A(d),
• (∀R.(∃R.A∃R.A)(d) ≡ (R(d, d2) A (∃R.A∃R.A)(d2)))unionsq¬∀R.(∃R.A
∃R.A)(d),
• ∀R.∃R.A(d) A (R(d, d2) A A(d2)),
• ∀R.(∃R.A ∃R.A)(d) A (R(d, d1) A (∃R.A ∃R.A)(d1)),
• ∃R.A(d1) ≡ (R(d1, d1,1)A(d1,1)),
• ∃R.A(d2) ≡ (R(d2, d2,1)A(d2,1)),
• ∃R.A(d2) ≡ (R(d2, d2,2)A(d2,2)),
• (R(d2, d2,2)A(d2,2)) A ∃R.A(d2),
• (R(d2, d2,1)A(d2,1)) A ∃R.A(d2).
While the assertions belonging to YExample are:
• ¬∀R.∃R.A(d) (R(d, d1) A ∃R.A(d1)),
• ¬∀R.(∃R.A ∃R.A)(d) (R(d, d2) A (∃R.A ∃R.A)(d2)).
As it is said above our aim is to reduce our problem to one in the correspond-
ing propositional calculus. Here we will consider this propositional logic using
as variables the set
At := {pR(a,b) : R is a role name and a, b ∈ Ind} ∪
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{pC(a) : C atomic or quantified concept and a ∈ Ind}.
We stress that we are taking a concrete fix set as variables. Nevertheless, for a
particular concept C0 it is clear that a finite subset AtC0 of At would be enough.
Using that all assertions are indeed propositional combinations of expressions of
the form C(a) and R(a, b), the following definition is meaningful. This definition
tells us that we can look at assertions as propositional formulas with variables
in At.
Definition 3.2.6. The map pr associates to every assertion a formula in the
propositional logic (with the variables given above) according to the following
clauses:
1. pr(A(a)) = pA(a) if A is an atomic concept or generalized atom,
2. pr(R(a, b)) = pR(a,b) if R is a role name and a, b ∈ Ind,
3. pr(⊥(a)) = ⊥,
4. pr(>(a)) = >
5. pr((C D)(a)) = pr(C(a))⊗ pr(D(a)),
6. pr((C A D)(a)) = pr(C(a))→ pr(D(a)).
If P is a set of assertions, then pr(P ) is {pr(α) : α ∈ P}.
Example 3.2.7. If PExample is the set defined in the Example 3.2.5, then,
following Definition 3.2.6, propositional formulas belonging to pr(PExample) are:
• (p∀R.∃R.A(d) ≡ (pR(d,d1) → p∃R.A(d1))) ∨ ¬p∀R.∃R.A(d),
• (p∀R.(∃R.A∃R.A)(d) ≡ (pR(d,d2) → (p∃R.A∃R.A)(d2))) ∨
¬p∀R.(∃R.A∃R.A)(d),
• p∀R.∃R.A(d) → (pR(d,d2) → pA(d2)),
• p∀R.(∃R.A∃R.A)(d) → (pR(d,d1) → p(∃R.A∃R.A)(d1)),
• p∃R.A(d1) ≡ (pR(d1,d1,1) ⊗ pA(d1,1)),
• p∃R.A(d2) ≡ (pR(d2,d2,1) ⊗ pA(d2,1)),
• p∃R.A(d2) ≡ (pR(d2,d2,2) ⊗ pA(d2,2)),
• (pR(d2,d2,2) ⊗ pA(d2,2))→ p∃R.A(d2),
• (pR(d2,d2,1) ⊗ pA(d2,1))→ p∃R.A(d2).
On the other hand, propositional formulas belonging to pr(YExample) are:
• ¬p∀R.∃R.A(d) ⊗ (pR(d,d1) → p∃R.A(d1)),
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• ¬p∀R.(∃R.A∃R.A)(d) ⊗ (pR(d,d2) → p(∃R.A∃R.A)(d2)).
The next and crucial step in the proof is the following result. We leave the
proofs of each one of the directions for Proposition 3.2.12 and Proposition 3.2.18.
Proposition 3.2.8. Let C0 be a concept, and let PC0 and YC0 be the two finite
sets associated by Definition 3.2.4. For every r ∈ [0, 1], the following statements
are equivalent:
1. C0 is satisfiable with truth value r in a quasi-witnessed interpretation,
2. there is some propositional evaluation e over the set At such that
e(pr(C(d0))) = r, e(pr(PC0)) = 1, and e(ψ) 6= 1 for every ψ ∈ pr(YC0).
From now on we will say that a propositional evaluation e is quasi-witnessing
relatively to C0 (quasi-witnessing, for short) when it satisfies that e(pr(PC0)) = 1,
and e(ψ) 6= 1 for every ψ ∈ pr(YC0).
As a consequence of this last proposition we are now able to prove Theo-
rem 3.2.1. This is so because by Proposition 3.2.8 we know that C ∈ QSat if
and only if
∨
pr(YC0) is not logical consequence, in the corresponding proposi-
tional calculus, of the set {pr(C(d0))} ∪ pr(PC0).
Hence, we have a reduction of this problem to the semantic consequence
problem, with a finite number of hypothesis, in the corresponding propositional
calculus. This problem can be formalized as the problem of deciding, given two
propositional formulas ϕ and ψ, whether ψ is a semantic consequence of ϕ, i.e.,
whether each propositional evaluation which gives value 1 to ϕ, also gives value
1 to ψ (see Section 1.1.1). In [Ha´j06, Theorem 3] it is proved that such problem
is decidable for the expansion of product logic with truth constants, but, since a
formula without truth constants can be considered as a formula of the expanded
language in which do not appear truth constants, this result also holds for the
product logic without truth constants. Thus, the proof of Proposition 3.2.8 is
the only missing step in order to prove Theorem 3.2.1.
From FDL interpretations to propositional evaluations
The purpose of this subsection is to show the downwards implication of Proposi-
tion 3.2.8. Let us assume that for a given concept C0, there is a quasi-witnessed
interpretation I and an object a such that CI0 (a) = r for some r ∈ [0, 1]. The
following definition tells us a way to obtain a propositional evaluation satisfying
the requirements in Proposition 3.2.8.
Definition 3.2.9. Let I be a quasi-witnessed interpretation, a an object of the
domain and C0 a concept. Let us consider PC0 , YC0 as the sets of assertions
obtained from the concept C0 by applying Definition 3.2.4. We assume that the
individual a0 has been interpreted in I as the object a; and for each step, we
assume that constants in previous steps have been interpreted in I. For each
generalized atom α processed in that step, do the following:
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(∀1) If α = ∀R.C(dσ) and there exists u ∈ ∆I such that RI(dIσ , u)⇒ CI(u) =
infd∈∆I{RI(dIσ , d)⇒ CI(d)}, then interpret the constant dσ,m as u (call-
ing the expansion of ∆I by these constants again ∆I).
(∀2) If α = ∀R.C(dσ) and there is no u ∈ ∆I such that RI(dIσ , u) ⇒ CI(u) =
infd∈∆I RI(dIσ , d) ⇒ CI(d)}, then choose an element u ∈ ∆I such that
0 < RI(dIσ , u)⇒ CI(u) < 1. Such an element exists since, being I a quasi-
witnessed interpretation, we have, on the one hand, that, for each u ∈ ∆I ,
RI(dIσ , u) ⇒ CI(u) > 0 and, on the other hand, if there was no element
u ∈ ∆I such that RI(dIσ , u) ⇒ CI(u) < 1, then infd∈∆I{RI(dIσ , d) ⇒
CI(d)} = 1 = RI(dIσ , u) ⇒ CI(u) against the supposition. Once chosen
the element u, interpret the constant dσ,m as u (calling the expansion of
∆I by these constants again ∆I).
(∃) If α = ∃R.C(dσ), then choose an element u ∈ ∆I witnessing α and interpret
the constant dσ,m as u (calling the expansion of ∆
I by these constants
again ∆I).
Finally, for every generalized atom and every atomic formula α, occurring in
PC0 ∪ YC0 , define eI(pr(α)) = αI .
Using and modifying an example reported in [BS09], we provide the following
instance of the above definition.
Example 3.2.10. Consider the interpretation I such that:
1. ∆I = {a, b, c, g, f} ∪ {gi | i ∈ N\{0}},
2. there is a binary relation r such that
• r(b, c) = r(g, f) = 1,
• r(a, b) = r(a, g) = 0.5,
• r(a, gi) = 0.5i,
• r(x, y) = 0, when x, y is any other pair of elements of the domain.
3. there is a unary predicate s such that
• s(c) = s(f) = 0.5
• s(x) = 0, for any other element x of the domain.
So, if we take
• RI = r,
• AI = s,
• dI = a,
• dI1 = b,
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• dI1,1 = c,
• dI2 = g
• dI2,1 = dI2,2 = f ,
then it is easy to check that:
1. I is a quasi-witnessed model of concept Example,
2. eI(pr(ϕ)) = 1, for each ϕ ∈ PExample,
3. eI(pr(ψ)) < 1, for each ψ ∈ YExample.
In Lemma 3.2.11 and Proposition 3.2.12, we are going to prove that all propo-
sitional evaluations obtained in this way are quasi-witnessing.
Lemma 3.2.11. Let I be a quasi-witnessed interpretation, C0 a concept, and
let us consider PC0 , YC0 as the sets of assertions obtained from the concept C0
by applying Definition 3.2.4. Then, the propositional evaluation eI is quasi-
witnessing relatively to C0.
Proof. We will show the result considering, case by case, the five kinds of propo-
sitions we can find in pr(PC0) and pr(YC0).
1. Consider the assertion (∀R.C(dσ) ≡ (R(dσ, dσ,m) A C(dσ,m))) unionsq
¬∀R.C(dσ), then:
(∀1) If, following Definition 3.2.9, we have interpreted the constant
dσ,m as an element u ∈ ∆I such that RI(dIσ , u) ⇒ CI(u) =
infd∈∆I{RI(dIσ , d)⇒ CI(d)}, then we have that
eI(pr((∀R.C(dσ) ≡ (R(dσ, dσ,m) A C(dσ,m))) unionsq ¬∀R.C(dσ))) =
= (eI(pr(∀R.C(dσ))) ≡
(eI(pr(R(dσ, dσ,m)))⇒ eI(pr(C(dσ,m))))) ∨ ¬eI(pr(∀R.C(dσ))) =
= ((∀R.C)I(dIσ) ≡ (RI(dIσ , dIσ,m)⇒ CI(dIσ,m))) ∨ ¬(∀R.C)I(dIσ) =
= (∀R.C)I(dIσ) ≡ (RI(dIσ , dIσ,m)⇒ CI(dIσ,m)) =
= 1
(∀2) If there is no u ∈ ∆I such that RI(dIσ , u) ⇒ CI(u) =
infd∈∆I{RI(dIσ , d) ⇒ CI(d)}, then, since I is a quasi-witnessed in-
terpretation,
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eI(pr((∀R.C(dσ) ≡ (R(dσ, dσ,m) A C(dσ,m))) unionsq ¬∀R.C(dσ))) =
= (eI(pr(∀R.C(dσ))) ≡
eI((pr(R(dσ, dσ,m)))⇒ eI(pr(C(dσ,m))))) ∨ ¬eI(pr(∀R.C(dσ))) =
= ((∀R.C)I(dIσ) ≡ (RI(dIσ , dIσ,m)⇒ CI(dIσ,m))) ∨ ¬(∀R.C)I(dIσ) =
= ¬(∀R.C)I(dIσ) =
= 1
In both cases we have that
eI(pr((∀R.C(dσ) ≡ (R(dσ, dσ,m) A C(dσ,m))) unionsq ¬∀R.C(dσ))) = 1.
2. Consider the assertion ∃R.C(dσ) ≡ (R(dσ, dσ,m)  C(dσ,m)). Then, by
Definition 3.2.9, we have that
eI(pr(∃R.C(dσ) ≡ (R(dσ, dσ,m) C(dσ,m)) =
= eI(pr(∃R.C(dσ))) ≡ eI((pr(R(dσ, dσ,m))) ∗ eI(pr(C(dσ,m)))) =
= ∃R.CI(dIσ) ≡ (RI(dIσ , dIσ,m) ∗ CI(dIσ,m)) =
= 1.
3. Consider the assertion ∀R.C(dσ) A (R(dσ, dσ,m) A C(dσ,m)). Since
(∀R.C(dσ))I = infd∈∆I{RI(dIσ , d) ⇒ CI(d)}, then, by Definition 3.2.9
we have that
eI(pr(∀R.C(dσ) A (R(dσ, dσ,m) A C(dσ,m)))) =
= eI(pr(∀R.C(dσ))⇒ (eI(pr(R(dσ, dσ,m))⇒ eI(pr(C(dσ,m))) =
= (∀R.C)I(dIσ)⇒ (RI(dIσ , dIσ,m)⇒ C(dIσ,m)) =
= 1.
4. Consider the assertion (R(dσ, dσ,m)  C(dσ,m)) A ∃R.C(dσ). Since
(∃R.C(dσ))I = supd∈∆I{RI(dIσ , d) ∗ CI(d)}, then, by Definition 3.2.9 we
have that
eI(pr((R(dσ, dσ,m) A C(dσ,m))) A ∃R.C(dσ)) =
= eI(pr(R(dσ, dσ,m))) ∗ eI(pr(C(dσ,m)))⇒ eI(pr(∃R.C(dσ))) =
= (RI(dIσ , d
I
σ,m) ∗ C(dIσ,m))⇒ ∃R.CI(dIσ) =
= 1.
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5. Consider the assertion ¬∀R.C(dσ) (R(dσ, dσ,m) A C(dσ,m)), then:
(∀1) if, following Definition 3.2.9, we have interpreted the constant
dσ,m as an element u ∈ ∆I such that RI(dIσ , u) ⇒ CI(u) =
infd∈∆I{RI(dIσ , d)⇒ CI(d)}, then we have that if, on the one hand,
eI(pr(¬∀R.C(dσ))) = 1, then eI(pr(∀R.C(dσ))) = 0 and, there-
fore, by Definition 3.2.9, eI(pr(R(dσ, dσ,m) A C(dσ,m))) = 0. Hence
eI(pr(¬∀R.C(dσ)  (R(dσ, dσ,m) A C(dσ,m)))) = 0 < 1. If, on the
other hand, eI(pr(R(dσ, dσ,m) A C(dσ,m))) = 1, then, by assump-
tion, eI(pr(∀R.C(dσ))) = 1 and, therefore, again, eI(pr(¬∀R.C(dσ)
(R(dσ, dσ,m) A C(dσ,m)))) = 0 < 1.
(∀2) if there is no u ∈ ∆I such that RI(dIσ , u) ⇒ CI(u) =
infd∈∆I{RI(dIσ , d) ⇒ CI(d)}, then, since I is a quasi-witnessed
interpretation, we have that, necessarily, ∀RI .CI(dIσ) = 0 and,
hence, eI(pr(¬∀R.C(dσ))) = 1. However, since, by Definition 3.2.9,
we have interpreted the constant dσ,m as an element u ∈ ∆I
such that 0 < RI(dIσ , u) ⇒ CI(u) < 1 and, therefore, we have
that eI(pr(R(dσ, dσ,m) A C(dσ,m))) < 1. So, eI(pr(¬∀R.C(dσ) 
(R(dσ, dσ,m) A C(dσ,m)))) < 1.
Hence, for every proposition pr(ϕ) ∈ pr(PC0), it holds that eI(pr(ϕ)) = 1
and for every proposition pr(ψ) ∈ pr(YC0), it holds that eI(pr(ψ)) < 1 and,
therefore, eI is a quasi-witnessing propositional evaluation.
Proposition 3.2.12. Let I be a quasi-witnessed interpretation, C0(a0) a IALE-
assertion and PC0 , YC0 the sets of assertions produced from C0(a0) applying Def-
inition 3.2.4, then, for every α ∈ PC0 ∪ YC0 , it holds that eI(pr(α)) = αI .
Proof. We will prove the Lemma by induction on the structure of α.
1. If α is an atomic formula, it is straightforward from Definition 3.2.9.
2. If α is a generalized atom, it is straightforward from Lemma 3.2.11.
3. If α is of the form δ ? γ where δ, γ are either atomic formulas or gen-
eralized atoms, ? is a concept constructor and ?ˆ is the respective alge-
braic operation, suppose, by inductive hypothesis, that eI(pr(δ)) = δI
and eI(pr(γ)) = γI . Hence,
eI(pr(α)) =
= eI(pr(δ ? γ)) =
= eI(pr(δ))?ˆeI(pr(γ)) =
= δI ?ˆγI =
= (δ ? γ)I = αI .
Hence, for every proposition pr(α) in pr(PC0 ∪ YC0), it holds that
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eI(pr(α)) = αI .
In particular,
eI(pr(C0(a0))) = CI0 (a
I
0 )
as we wanted to prove.
This finishes the proof of the downwards implication of Proposition 3.2.8.
From propositional evaluations to DL interpretations
The aim of this subsection is to prove the upwards implication of Propo-
sition 3.2.8. Let us assume that there is a propositional evaluation quasi-
witnessing relatively to C0 such that e(pr(C0(d))) = r for some r ∈ [0, 1]. First
of all, we provide a way to obtain a quasi-witnessed interpretation from a quasi-
witnessing propositional evaluation with the above features.
Definition 3.2.13. Let C0(a0) be an assertion, PC0 and YC0 be the sets of con-
cepts and axioms produced from C0(a0) applying Definition 3.2.4, let pr(PC0),
pr(YC0) be the sets of propositions obtained by applying Definition 3.2.6 and
let e be a quasi-witnessing propositional evaluation. Then we define a witnessed
interpretation Iwe as follows:
1. ∆I
w
e is the set of all constants dσ occurring in formulas of PC0 ∪ YC0 .
2. For each atomic concept A, let:
(a) AI
w
e (dσ) = e(pr(A(dσ))), where σ = l(A), if pr(A(dσ)) occurs in
pr(PC0),
(b) AI
w
e (dσ) = 0, otherwise.
3. For each role R let:
(a) RI
w
e (dσ, dσ,m) = e(pr(R(dσ, dσ,m))), if pr(R(dσ, dσ,m)) occurs in
pr(PC0),
(b) RI
w
e (dσ, dσ,m) = 0, otherwise.
In order to illustrate Definition 3.2.13, we provide an example of the witnessed
interpretation arising from pr(PExample) and pr(YExample).
Example 3.2.14. Let e be a propositional evaluation such that
• pR(d,d1) = pR(d,d2) = 0.5,
• pR(d1,d1,1) = pR(d2,d2,1) = pR(d2,d2,2) = 1,
• pA(d1,1) = pA(d2,1) = pA(d2,2) = 0.5.
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• • •
•
A(d1,1)=0.5
1
OO
•
A(d2,1)=0.5
1???????
__???????
A(d2,2)=0.5
1
??
•
d1
d
0.5???????
__???????
d2
0.5
??
Figure 3.1: A witnessed interpretation for concept Example
As we have seen in the previous section, this is indeed a quasi-witnessing
propositional evaluation. Moreover, following Definition 3.2.13, we obtain the
interpretation depicted in Figure 3.1
We point out that this interpretation, however, is not a model of the concept
Example.
The structure that can be built using the guidelines in Definition 3.2.13 is a
witnessed interpretation which would be enough in case we were only interested
on witnessed interpretations. But in order to encompass all quasi-witnessed
interpretations we need the following extension of the above interpretation.
Definition 3.2.15. Let C0(a0) be an assertion, PC0 and YC0 be the sets of first
order formulas produced from C0(a0) applying Definition 3.2.4. and d := a0.
Let pr(PC0), pr(YC0) be the sets of propositions obtained by applying Definition
3.2.6 and let e be a quasi-witnessing propositional evaluation; finally let Iwe be
the interpretation defined in Definition 3.2.13. Then we define the first order
interpretation Ie as the following expansion of Iwe :
1. The domain ∆Ie is obtained by adding to ∆I
w
e an infinite set of new
individuals {diσ|i ∈ N\{0}}, for each dσ ∈ ∆I
w
e , but not for d.
2. If A is an atomic concept, and pr(A(diσ)) occurs in pr(PC0), then
AIe(diσ) = (A
Ie(dσ))i.
3. For each role R:
(a) if R appears in an universally quantified formula, then:
i. if e(pr(∀R.C(dσ))) 6= e(pr(R(dσ, dσ,m) A C(dα))), then:
A. RIe(dσ, diσ,m) = (R
Ie(dσ, dσ,m))i, for every i ∈ N\{0},
B. RIe(diσ, d
j
σ,m) = (R
Ie(dσ, dσ,m))j , for every i, j ∈ N\{0},
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ii. if e(pr(∀R.C(dσ))) = e(pr(R(dσ, dσ,m) A C(dσ,m))), then
RIe(diσ, d
j
σ,m) = (R
Ie(dσ, dσ,m))j ,
for every i, j ∈ N\{0}, if i = j and
RIe(diσ, d
j
σ,m) = 0,
otherwise,
(b) if R appears in an existentially quantified formula, then
RIe(diσ, d
j
σ,m) = (R
Ie(dσ, dσ,m))j ,
for every i, j ∈ N\{0}, if i = j and
RIe(diσ, d
j
σ,m) = 0,
otherwise.
In order to illustrate Definition 3.2.15, we provide an example of the quasi-
witnessed interpretation arising from pr(PExample) and pr(YExample).
Example 3.2.16. Let e be the same propositional evaluation as in the previous
example, then, following Definition 3.2.13, we obtain the interpretation depicted
in Figure 3.2.
. . . • • • • • • • • • . . .
. . . •
d21,1
12
OO
•
d11,1
11
OO
•
d1,1
1
OO
•
d2,1
1///////
WW///////
d2,2
1
OO
•
d12,1
11///////
WW///////
d12,2
11
OO
•
d22,1
12///////
WW///////
d22,2
12
OO
. . .
•
d1
d
0.5@@@@@@@@
__@@@@@@@@
d11d
2
1
d2
0.5
OO
d12
0.51~~~~~~~~
??~~~~~~~~
d22
0.52ooooooooooooo
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Figure 3.2: A quasi-witnessed interpretation for concept Example
In this case it is worth pointing out that this interpretation is indeed a model
of Example.
Lemma 3.2.17. Let D(dσ) ∈ Sub(C0) and e a quasi-witnessing propositional
evaluation, then, for each i ∈ N\{0}, it holds that
DIe(diσ) = (D
Ie(dσ))i.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the nesting degree of C0.
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(0) An assertion with nesting degree equal to 0 is either an atomic concept or
a propositional combination of atomic concepts:
1. If C0 is an atomic concept, then it is straightforward from Definition
3.2.15.
2. Let C0 = E?ˆF , where E,F are atomic concepts and ?ˆ ∈ {⇒, ∗}. Sup-
pose, by inductive hypothesis, that the claim holds for two concepts
E,F , then:
(EIe ?ˆF Ie)(diσ) =
= EIe(diσ)?ˆF
Ie(diσ) =
= (EIe(dσ))i?ˆ(F Ie(dσ))i =
= (EIe(dσ)?ˆF Ie(dσ))i =
= (EIe ?ˆF Ie(dσ))i
(k+1) Let D(dσ) be a generalized atom with nesting degree equal to k+ 1 and
suppose, by inductive hypothesis, that, for each generalized atom E(dσ,m)
with nesting degree equal to k, it holds that EIe(diσ,m) = (E
Ie(dσ,m))i,
then:
1. If D(dσ) = ∃R.E(dσ), then, by Definition 3.2.15,
DIe(diσ) =
= sup
d∈∆Ie
{RIe(diσ, d) ∗ EIe(d) =
= RIe(diσ, d
i
σ,m) ∗ EIe(diσ,m)
and, by inductive hypothesis, Definition 3.2.4 and Definition 3.2.15,
RIe(diσ, d
i
σ,m) ∗ EIe(diσ,m) =
= (RIe(dσ, dσ,m))i ∗ (EIe(dσ,m))i =
= (RIe(dσ, dσ,m) ∗ EIe(dσ,m))i =
= (DIe(dσ))i.
2. If D(dσ) = ∀R.E(dσ), and e(pr(∀R.E(dσ))) = (R(dσ, dσ,m) A
E(dσ,m)), then, by Definition 3.2.15,
EIe(diσ) =
= inf
d∈∆Ie
{RIe(diσ, d)⇒ EIe(d) =
= RIe(diσ, d
i
σ,m)⇒ EIe(diσ,m)
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and, by inductive hypothesis, Definition 3.2.4 and Definition 3.2.15,
RIe(diσ, d
i
σ,m)⇒ EIe(diσ,m) =
= (RIe(dσ, dσ,m))i ⇒ (EIe(dσ,m))i =
= (RIe(dσ, dσ,m)⇒ EIe(dσ,m))i =
= (DIe(dσ))i.
3. If D(dσ) = ∀R.E(dσ), and e(pr(∀R.E(dσ))) 6= (R(dσ, dσ,m) A
E(dσ,m)), then, by Definition 3.2.15,
DIe(dσ) = 0
and, therefore, by Definition 3.2.15,
DIe(diσ) =
= inf
d∈∆Ie
{RIe(diσ, d)⇒ EIe(d)} =
= inf
j∈N\{0}
{RIe(diσ, djσ,m)⇒ EIe(djσ,m)} =
= 0 =
= (DIe(dσ))i.
So, in every case we have that DIe(diσ) = (D
Ie(dσ))i.
Proposition 3.2.18. Let e be a quasi-witnessing propositional evaluation, then,
for every assertion α,
e(pr(α)) = αIe .
Proof. The proof is by induction on the nesting degree of α.
(0) An assertion with nesting degree equal to 0 is either an atomic concept or
a propositional combination of atomic concepts:
1. If α is an atomic concept, then it is straightforward from Definition
3.2.13.
2. Let α = C2D, where C,D are concepts, 2 ∈ {A,} and let ?{→,⊗}
and ?ˆ ∈ {⇒, ∗}. Suppose that the inductive hypothesis holds for
two concepts C,D, then, by Definition 3.2.6 we have that, for each
concept constructor ?:
(C2D)Ie =
= CIe ?ˆDIe =
= e(pr(C))?ˆe(pr(D)) =
= e(pr(C) ? pr(D)) =
= e(pr(C2D))
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(k+1) Let α be a generalized atom with nesting degree equal to k + 1 and
suppose, by inductive hypothesis, that, for each generalized atom β with
nesting degree ≤ n, occurring within the scope of the quantifier of α, it
holds that e(pr(β)) = βIe .
1. If α = ∃R.C(dσ), then, since e is quasi-witnessing we have that
e(pr(α)) = e(pr(R(dσ, dσ,m) C(dσ,m)))
and, by Definition 3.2.13 and inductive hypothesis, we have that
e(pr(R(dσ, dσ,m) C(dσ,m))) = RIe(dσ, dσ,m) ∗ CIe(dσ,m).
Let d ∈ ∆Ie be any constant different from dσ,m, then either d is
associated to to R, dσ or not.
In the first case, since e is quasi-witnessing and e(pr(R(dσ, d) 
C(d)))⇒ e(pr(α)) = 1, then
RIe(dσ, d) ∗ CIe(d) ≤ e(pr(α)).
In the second case, by Definition 3.2.13,
RIe(dσ, d) ∗ CIe(d) =
= 0 ∗ CIe(d) =
= 0 ≤
≤ e(pr(α)).
So, in each case,
e(pr(α)) =
= RIe(dσ, dσ,m) ∗ CIe(dσ,m) =
= sup
d∈∆Ie
{RIe(dσ, d) ∗ CIe(d)} =
= αIe .
2. If α = ∀R.C(a) and e(pr(α)) = e(pr(R(dσ, dσ,m) A C(dσ,m))), then,
by Definition 3.2.13 and inductive hypothesis, we have that
e(pr(α)) = RIe(dσ, dσ,m)⇒ CIe(dσ,m).
Let d ∈ ∆Ie be any constant different from dσ,m, then either d is
associated to R, dσ or not.
In the first case, since e is quasi-witnessing and e(pr(α)) ⇒
e(pr(R(dσ, d) A C(d))) = 1, then
e(pr(α)) ≤ RIe(dσ, d)⇒ CIe(d).
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In the second case, by Definition 3.2.15,
RIe(dσ, d)⇒ CIe(d) =
= 0⇒ CIe(d) =
= 1 ≥
≥ e(pr(α)).
So, in each case,
e(pr(α)) =
= RIe(dσ, dσ,m)⇒ CIe(dσ,m) =
= inf
d∈∆Ie
{RIe(dσ, d)⇒ CIe(d)} =
= αIe .
3. If α = ∀R.C(a) and e(pr(α)) 6= e(pr(R(dσ, dσ,m) A C(dσ,m))), then,
since e is quasi-witnessing we have that 0 = e(pr(α)) and, by Def-
inition 3.2.13 and inductive hypothesis, we have that e(pr(α)) 6=
RIe(dσ, dσ,m) ⇒ CIe(dσ,m). Again since e is quasi-witnessing (look
at the set Y ) we have that
RIe(dσ, dσ,m)⇒ CIe(dσ,m) < 1
and, by the above assumptions, we have that
RIe(dσ, dσ,m)⇒ CIe(dσ,m) > 0.
Since, by Lemma 3.2.17, we have that, for each i ∈ N\{0},
RIe(dσ, diσ,m)⇒ CIe(diσ,m) = (RIe(dσ, dσ,m)⇒ CIe(dσ,m))i,
then
e(pr(α)) =
= 0 =
= inf
i∈N\{0}
{(RIe(dσ, dσ,m)⇒ CIe(dσ,m))i} =
= inf
i∈N\{0}
{RIe(dσ, diσ,m)⇒ CIe(diσ,m)} =
= inf
d∈∆Ie
{RIe(dσ, d)⇒ CIe(d)} =
= αIe .
The result is straightforward for propositional combinations of atomic con-
cepts and generalized atoms with nesting degree equal to k + 1.
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In particular, e(pr(C0(a0))) = C
Ie
0 (a0).
This finishes the last step in the proof of Proposition 3.2.8, and so the last
step in the proof of Theorem 3.2.1.
3.3 Concept subsumption and other problems
In this section we report further results that can be obtained exploiting the
methods proposed in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2. Moreover, exploiting the
reductions provided in Section 2.5.1 we obtain decidability of other notions of
satisfiability.
3.3.1 The case of [0, 1] L-ALC
The same procedures proposed in [Ha´j05], for the case of witnessed interpre-
tations and  Lukasiewicz semantics were used by Ha´jek to prove decidability of
concept 1-subsumption for language [0, 1] L-ALC. [Ha´j05] indeed deals with va-
lidity of formulas, but recall that a concept C is r-subsumed by a concept D if
and only if concept > is r-subsumed by concept C A D. So, it is straightforward
that, concept C A D is valid, if and only if > is 1-subsumed by C A D, if and
only if C is 1-subsumed by D. The 1-subsumption problem is reduced to the
propositional entailment problem. In [Ha´j05, Theorem 1] it is indeed stated that
a concept C0 is valid iff pr(PC0) entails pr(C0). This, clearly means that
concept C is 1-subsumed by concept D ⇐⇒ pr(TCAD) entails pr(C A D)
In [Ha´j05] is indeed proved the following result.
Theorem 3.3.1 ([Ha´j05],Theorem 1). Concept 1-subsumption is a decidable
problem in [0, 1] L-ALC.
Moreover, exploiting Proposition 2.5.3, we can obtain the following results
from Theorem 3.1.4 and Theorem 3.3.1.
Corollary 3.3.2. Concept (≥ r)-satisfiability and positive satisfiability are de-
cidable problems in [0, 1] L-ALC.
3.3.2 The case of [0, 1]Π-IALE
For the case of quasi-witnessed interpretations and product t-norm the procedure
proposed in Section 3.2 can be used as well. The reason is, again, that the
logical consequence problem is decidable for Product Logic and, as for positive
satisfiability, we can reduce the problem of deciding whether a concept C is
subsumed by concept D in degree 1, to the logical consequence problem in
propositional Product Logic. In fact, we have that
C v D ⇐⇒ pr(PCAD) entails pr((C A D)(d0)) ∨
∨
pr(YCAD)
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In Appendix A it is proven that quasi-witnessed validity and unrestricted
validity indeed coincide under the standard product semantics. Hence unre-
stricted validity is a decidable problem in [0, 1]Π. In this way, in [CEB10] has
been proven the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3.3. Concept 1-subsumption is a decidable problem in [0, 1]Π-
IALE.
Moreover, exploiting Proposition 2.5.4, we can obtain the following results
from Theorem 3.2.1 and Theorem 3.3.3.
Corollary 3.3.4. Concept (≥ r)-satisfiability positive satisfiability and positive
satisfiability are decidable problems in [0, 1]Π-IALE.
3.4 Knowledge base consistency in  Lukasiewicz
logic
The suspicion that general KB consistency was not a decidable problem with
an infinite (non-idempotent) set of truth values, began when in [BBS11] was
proved the failure of the finite model property for language IALCE based on
 Lukasiewicz and product t-norms. Its decidability kept being suspicious with
[BP11a]. Nevertheless, until then, there was no direct evidence that those prob-
lems were undecidable.
The first result on undecidability can be found in [BP11b] for language
IALCE based on product t-norm with respect to witnessed interpretations. The
proof in [BP11b] consists in a reduction of the Post Correspondence Problem
(PCP) to the general KB consistency for language IALCE based on product
t-norm. Subsequently, using the same methods as [BP11b] and [BP11f], this
author together with U. Straccia achieved an undecidability proof for language
IALCE based on  Lukasiewicz t-norm with respect to witnessed interpretations.
Our proof consists of a reduction of the reverse of the PCP and follows
conceptually the one in [BP11a, BP11b, BP11f]. PCP is well known to be
undecidable [Pos46], so is the reverse PCP, as shown next. Let s ∈ N \ {0, 1} be
fixed in the rest of Section 3.4.
Definition 3.4.1 (PCP). An instance ϕ of the Post Correspondence Problem
(PCP) is defined in the following way: let v1, . . . , vp and w1, . . . , wp be two finite
lists of words over an alphabet Σ = {1, . . . , s}. A solution to ϕ is a non-empty
sequence i1, i2, . . . , ik, with 1 ≤ ij ≤ p such that vi1vi2 . . . vik = wi1wi2 . . . wik .
The decision problem then is to decide, given ϕ, whether a solution to ϕ exists
or not.
For the sake of our purpose, we will rely on a variant of the PCP, which we
call Reverse PCP (RPCP). Essentially, words are concatenated from right to
left rather than from left to right.
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Definition 3.4.2 (RPCP). An instance ϕ of the Reverse Post Correspondence
Problem (RPCP) is defined in the following way: let v1, . . . , vp and w1, . . . , wp
be two finite lists of words over an alphabet Σ = {1, . . . , s}. A solution to ϕ is
a non-empty sequence i1, i2, . . . , ik, with 1 ≤ ij ≤ p such that vikvik−1 . . . vi1 =
wikwik−1 . . . wi1 . The decision problem then is to decide, given ϕ, whether a
solution to ϕ exists or not.
For a word µ = i1i2 . . . ik ∈ {1, . . . , p}∗ we will use vµ, wµ to denote the
words vikvik−1 . . . vi1 and wikwik−1 . . . wi1 . We denote the empty string as ε and
define vε as ε. The alphabet Σ consists of the first s positive integers. We can
thus view every word in Σ∗ as a natural number represented in base s + 1 in
which 0 never occurs. Using this intuition, we will use the number 0 to encode
the empty word.
Now we show that the reduction from PCP to RPCP is a very simple matter
and it can be done through the transformation of the instance lists to the lists
of their palindromes defined as follows: let Σ = {1, . . . , s} be an alphabet and
v = t1t2 . . . t|v| a word over Σ, with ti ∈ Σ, for 1 ≤ i ≤ |v|, then the function
pal : Σ∗ → Σ∗
is defined by
pal(v) = t|v|t|v|−1 . . . t1.
We will say that pal(v) is the palindrome of v.
Lemma 3.4.3. Let v1, . . . , vp and w1, . . . , wp be two finite lists of words over
an alphabet Σ = {1, . . . , s}. For every non-empty sequence i1, i2, . . . , ik, with
1 ≤ ij ≤ p it holds that
vi1vi2 . . . vik = wi1wi2 . . . wik
iff
pal(vik)pal(vik−1) . . . pal(vi1) = pal(wik)pal(wik−1) . . . pal(wi1) .
Proof. First we prove by induction on k, that, for every sequence v =
vi1vi2 . . . vik of words over Σ, it holds that pal(v) = pal(vik)pal(vik−1) . . . pal(vi1).
• The case k = 1 is straightforward.
• Let v = vi1vi2 . . . vik and suppose, by inductive hypothesis, that
pal(vi1vi2 . . . vik−1) = pal(vik−1)pal(vik−2) . . . pal(vi1). It follows that
pal(v) = pal(vi1vi2 . . . vik−1 , vik) = pal(vik)pal(vik−1) . . . pal(vi1).
Since the palindrome of a word is unique, we have that, if
vi1vi2 . . . vik = wi1wi2 . . . wik , then pal(vi1vi2 . . . vik) = pal(wi1wi2 . . . wik) and,
thus, pal(vik)pal(vik−1) . . . pal(vi1) = pal(wik) pal(wik−1). . . pal(wi1).
Corollary 3.4.4. RPCP is undecidable.
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Proof. The proof is based on the reduction of PCP to RPCP. For every instance
ϕ = (v1, w1), . . . , (vp, wp) of PCP, let f be the function
f(ϕ) = (pal(v1), pal(w1)), . . . , (pal(vp), pal(wp)) .
Clearly f is a computable function. Moreover, ϕ has a solution if and only
if there exists a non-empty sequence i1, i2, . . . , ik, with 1 ≤ ij ≤ p such that
vi1vi2 . . . vik = wi1wi2 . . . wik , that is, by Lemma 3.4.3,
pal(vik)pal(vik−1) . . . pal(vi1) = pal(wik)pal(wik−1) . . . pal(wi1)
i.e., f(ϕ) has a solution. Therefore, ϕ ∈ PCP has a solution if and only if
f(ϕ) ∈ RPCP has a solution.
3.4.1 Undecidability of general KB satisfiability
We show the undecidability of the KB satisfiability problem for language ALC
over [0, 1] L, by a reduction of RPCP to the cited problem.
Given an instance ϕ of RPCP, we will construct a Knowledge Base Oϕ that
is satisfiable iff ϕ has no solution.
In order to do this we will encode words v over the alphabet Σ as rational
numbers 0.v in [0, 1] in base s+1; the empty word will be encoded by the number
0.
So, let us define the following TBoxes:
T := { 〈V ≡ V1  V2 ≥ 1〉, 〈W ≡W1 W2 ≥ 1〉 }
and for 1 ≤ i ≤ p
T iϕ := { 〈> v ∃Ri.> ≥ 1〉,
〈V v (s+ 1)|vi| · ∀Ri.V1 ≥ 1〉,
〈(s+ 1)|vi| · ∃Ri.V1 v V ≥ 1〉,
〈W v (s+ 1)|wi| · ∀Ri.W1 ≥ 1〉,
〈(s+ 1)|wi| · ∃Ri.W1 vW ≥ 1〉
〈> v ∀Ri.V2 ≥ 0.vi〉,
〈> v ∀Ri.¬V2 ≥ 1− 0.vi〉,
〈> v ∀Ri.W2 ≥ 0.wi〉,
〈> v ∀Ri.¬W2 ≥ 1− 0.wi〉,
〈A v (s+ 1)max{|vi|,|wi|} · ∀Ri.A ≥ 1〉
〈(s+ 1)max{|vi|,|wi|} · ∃Ri.A v A ≥ 1〉 } .
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Now, let
Tϕ = T ∪
p⋃
i=1
T iϕ .
Further we define the ABox A as follows:
A := {〈¬V (a) ≥ 1〉, 〈¬W (a) ≥ 1〉, 〈A(a) ≥ 0.01〉, 〈¬A(a) ≥ 0.99〉} .
Finally, we define
Oϕ := (Tϕ,A) .
We now define the interpretation
Iϕ := (∆Iϕ , ·Iϕ)
as follows:
• ∆Iϕ = {1, . . . , p}∗
• aIϕ = ε
• V Iϕ(ε) = W Iϕ(ε) = 0,
• AIϕ(ε) = 0.01,
• V Iϕi (ε) = W Iϕi (ε) = 0, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2,
• for all µ, µ′ ∈ ∆Iϕ and 1 ≤ i ≤ p
R
Iϕ
i (µ, µ
′) =
{
1, if µ′ = µi
0, otherwise
• for every µ ∈ ∆Iϕ , where µ = i1i2 . . . ik 6= ε
– V Iϕ(µ) = 0.vµ,
– W Iϕ(µ) = 0.wµ
– AIϕ(µ) = 0.01 · (s+ 1)−
∑
j∈{i1,i2,...,ik}max{|vj |,|wj |}
– V
Iϕ
1 (µ) = 0.vµ¯ · (s+ 1)−|vik |, where µ¯ = i1i2 . . . ik−1 (last index ik is
dropped from µ, and we assume that 0.ε is 0),
– W
Iϕ
1 (µ) = 0.wµ¯ · (s + 1)−|wik |, where µ¯ = i1i2 . . . ik−1 (last index ik
is dropped from µ, and we assume that 0.ε is 0),
– V
Iϕ
2 (µ) = 0.vik ,
– W
Iϕ
2 (µ) = 0.wik .
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It is easy to see that Iϕ is a witnessed model of Oϕ (note that
e.g., (∀Ri.V1)Iϕ(µ) = V Iϕ1 (µi)). 1
Moreover, as in [BP11a] it is possible to prove that, for every witnessed model
I of Oϕ, there is a mapping g from Iϕ to I.
Lemma 3.4.5. Let I be a witnessed model of Oϕ. Then there exists a function
g : ∆Iϕ −→ ∆I such that, for every µ ∈ ∆Iϕ , CIϕ(µ) = CI(g(µ)) holds for
every concept name C and R
Iϕ
i (µ, µi) = R
I
i (g(µ), g(µi)) holds for every i, with
1 ≤ i ≤ p.
Proof. Let I be a witnessed model of Oϕ. We will build the function g induc-
tively on the length of µ.
(ε) Since I is a model of Oϕ, then there is an element δ ∈ ∆I such that aI = δ.
Since I is a model of Aϕ, setting g(ε) = δ, we have that
V Iϕ(ε) = 0 = V I(g(ε))
and the same holds for concept W . Moreover, since I is a model of Tϕ, we
have that V I(δ) = (V1  V2)I(δ) and, therefore
V
Iϕ
1 (ε) = 0 = V
I
1 (g(ε))
and the same holds for V2, W1 and W2. On the other hand, we have that
AIϕ(ε) = 0.01 = AI(g(ε)),
as well. So, g(ε) = δ satisfies the condition of the lemma.
(µi) Let now µ be such that g(µ) has already been defined. Now, since I is a
witnessed model and satisfies axiom 〈> v ∃Ri.> ≥ 1〉, then for all i, with
1 ≤ i ≤ p, there exists a γ ∈ ∆I such that RIi (g(µ), γ) = 1. So, setting
g(µi) = γ we get
1 = R
Iϕ
i (µ, µi) = R
I
i (g(µ), g(µi)).
Furthermore, by induction hypothesis, we can assume that
V I(g(µ)) = 0.vµ
and
W I(g(µ)) = 0.wµ.
1However, Iϕ is not a strongly witnessed model of Oϕ.
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Since I satisfies axiom 〈V v (s+ 1)|vi| · ∀Ri.V1 ≥ 1〉, then
0.vµ =
= V I(g(µ)) ≤ (s+ 1)|vi| · (∀Ri.V1)I(g(µ)) =
= (s+ 1)|vi| · inf
γ∈∆I
{RIi (g(µ), γ)⇒ V I1 (γ)} ≤
≤ (s+ 1)|vi| · (RIi (g(µ), µi)⇒ V I1 (µi)) =
= (s+ 1)|vi| · V I1 (g(µi)).
Since I satisfies axiom 〈(s+ 1)|vi| · ∃Ri.V1 v V ≥ 1〉, then
0.vµ =
= V I(g(µ)) ≥ (s+ 1)|vi| · (∃Ri.V1)I(g(µ)) =
= (s+ 1)|vi| · sup
γ∈∆I
{RIi (g(µ), γ) ∗ V I1 (γ)} ≥
≥ (s+ 1)|vi| · (RIi (g(µ), µi) ∗ V I1 (µi)) =
= (s+ 1)|vi| · V I1 (g(µi)).
Therefore,
(s+ 1)|vi| · V I1 (g(µi)) = 0.vµ
and
V I1 (g(µi)) = 0.vµ · (s+ 1)−|vi| = V Iϕ1 (µi).
Similarly, it can be shown that
W I1 (g(µi)) = 0.wµ · (s+ 1)−|wi| = W Iϕ1 (µi).
Since I satisfies axioms 〈> v ∀Ri.V2 ≥ 0.vi〉 and 〈> v ∀Ri.¬V2 ≥ 1−0.vi〉,
it follows that (∀Ri.V2)I(g(µ)) ≥ 0.vi and (∀Ri.¬V2)I(g(µ)) ≥ 1 − 0.vi.
Therefore, for RIi (g(µ), g(µi)) = 1 we have
V I2 (g(µi)) = 0.vi = V
Iϕ
2 (µi).
Similarly, it can be shown that
W
Iϕ
2 (µi) = 0.wi = W
I
2 (g(µi)).
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Now, since I satisfies axiom 〈V ≡ V1  V2 ≥ 1〉, then,
V I(g(µi)) =
= V I1 (g(µi)) + V
I
2 (g(µi)) =
= 0.vµ · (s+ 1)−|vi| + 0.vi =
= 0.vivµ =
= V Iϕ(µi).
Finally, by inductive hypothesis, assume that
AI(g(µ)) = AIϕ(µ) = 0.01 · (s+ 1)−
∑
j∈{i1,i2,...,ik}max{|vj |,|wj |} ,
where µ = i1i2 . . . ik.
Since I satisfies axioms 〈A v (s+1)max{|vi|,|wi|} ·∀Ri.A ≥ 1〉, we have that
AI(g(µ)) ≤
≤ (s+ 1)max{|vi|,|wi|} · (∀Ri.A)I(g(µ)) ≤
≤ (s+ 1)max{|vi|,|wi|} ·AI(g(µi)).
Likewise, since I satisfies axioms 〈(s+ 1)max{|vi|,|wi|} · ∃Ri.A v A ≥ 1〉, we
have that
AI(g(µ)) ≥
≥ (s+ 1)max{|vi|,|wi|} · (∃Ri.A)I(g(µ)) ≥
≥ (s+ 1)max{|vi|,|wi|} ·AI(g(µi))
and, thus,
AI(g(µ)) = (s+ 1)max{|vi|,|wi|} ·AI(g(µi)) .
Therefore,
AI(g(µi)) =
= (s+ 1)−max{|vi|,|wi|} ·AI(g(µ)) =
= (s+ 1)−max{|vi|,|wi|} ·AIϕ(µ) =
= (s+ 1)−max{|vi|,|wi|} · 0.01 · (s+ 1)−
∑
j∈{i1,i2,...,ik}max{|vj |,|wj |} =
= 0.01 · (s+ 1)−(max{|vi|,|wi|}+
∑
j∈{i1,i2,...,ik}max{|vj |,|wj |}) =
= 0.01 · (s+ 1)−
∑
j∈{i1,i2,...,ik,i}max{|vj |,|wj |} =
= AIϕ(µi) ,
which completes the proof.
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From Lemma 3.4.5 it follows that if the RPCP instance ϕ has a solution µ,
for some µ ∈ {1, . . . , p}+, then vµ = wµ and, thus, 0.vµ = 0.wµ. Therefore,
every witnessed model I of Oϕ contains an element δ = g(µ) such that
V I(δ) = V Iϕ(µ) = 0.vµ = 0.wµ = W Iϕ(µ) = W I(δ).
Conversely, from the definition of Iϕ, if ϕ has no solution, then there is no
µ such that 0.vµ = 0.wµ, i.e., for every µ it holds that
V Iϕ(µ) 6= W Iϕ(µ).
However, as Oϕ is always satisfiable, it does not yet help us to decide the
RPCP. We next extend Oϕ to O′ϕ in such a way that an instance ϕ of the RPCP
has a solution iff the ontology O′ϕ is not witnessed satisfiable and, thus, establish
that the KB satisfiability problem is undecidable. To this end, consider
O′ϕ := (T ′ϕ,A) ,
where
T ′ϕ := Tϕ ∪
⋃
1≤i≤p
{〈> v ∀Ri.(¬(V ↔W ) ¬A) ≥ 1〉} .
The intuition here is the following. If there is a solution for RPCP then, as
a consequence of Lemma 3.4.5, there is a point δ in which the value of V and
W coincide under I. That is, the value of ¬(V ↔ W ) is 0 and, thus, the value
of ¬(V ↔ W )  ¬A is less than 1. So, I cannot satisfy the new GCI in T ′ϕ
and, thus, O′ϕ is not satisfiable. On the other hand, if there is no solution to
the RPCP then in Iϕ there is no point in which V and W coincide and, thus,
¬(V ↔ W ) > 0. Moreover, we will show that the value of ¬(V ↔ W ) in all
points is strictly greater than A and, as A¬A is 1, so also ¬(V ↔W )¬A will
be 1 in any point. Hence, Iφ is a model of the additional axiom in T ′ϕ, i.e., O′ϕ
is satisfiable.
Proposition 3.4.6. The instance ϕ of the RPCP has a solution iff the ontology
O′ϕ is not witnessed satisfiable.
Proof. Assume first that ϕ has a solution µ = i1 . . . ik and let I be a witnessed
model of Oϕ. Let µ¯ = i1i2 . . . ik−1 (last index ik is dropped from µ). Then
by Lemma 3.4.5 it follows that there are nodes δ, δ′ ∈ ∆I such that δ = g(µ),
δ′ = g(µ¯), with V I(δ) = V Iϕ(µ) = W Iϕ(µ) = W I(δ) and RIik(δ
′, δ) = 1. Then
(V ↔W )I(δ) = 1. Since (¬A)I(δ) < 1, then (¬(V ↔W )¬A)I(δ) < 1. Hence
there is i, with 1 ≤ i ≤ p, such that
(∀Ri.(¬(V ↔W ) ¬A))I(δ′) < 1.
So, axiom 〈> v ∀Ri.(¬(V ↔ W ) ¬A) ≥ 1〉 is not satisfied and, therefore,
O′ϕ is not satisfiable.
For the converse, assume that ϕ has no solution. On the one hand we know
that Iϕ is a model of Oϕ. On the other hand, since ϕ has no solution, then
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there is no µ = i1 . . . ik such that vµ = wµ (i.e., 0.vµ = 0.wµ) and, therefore,
there is no µ ∈ ∆Iϕ such that V Iϕ(µ) = W Iϕ(µ). Consider µ ∈ ∆Iϕ and i,
with 1 ≤ i ≤ p and assume, without loss of generality, that V Iϕ(µi) < W Iϕ(µi).
Then
(V ↔W )Iϕ(µi) =
= (V Iϕ(µi)⇒W Iϕ(µi)) ∗ (W Iϕ(µi)⇒ V Iϕ(µi)) =
= 1 ∗ (W Iϕ(µi)⇒ V Iϕ(µi)) =
= W Iϕ(µi)⇒ V Iϕ(µi) =
= 1−W Iϕ(µi) + V Iϕ(µi) =
= 1− (W Iϕ(µi)− V Iϕ(µi)) =
= 1− (0.wµi − 0.vµi) ≤
≤ 1− 0.01 · (s+ 1)−max{|vµi|,|wµi|} ≤
≤ 1− 0.01 · (s+ 1)−
∑
j∈{i1,i2,...,ik,i}max{|vj |,|wj |} =
= (¬A)Iϕ(µi) .
Therefore, (¬(V ↔ W ))Iϕ(µi) ≥ AIϕ(µi). As AIϕ(µi) Y (¬A)Iϕ(µi) = 1, it
follows that for every µ ∈ ∆Iϕ and i, with 1 ≤ i ≤ p, it holds that (∀Ri.(¬(V ↔
W ) ¬A))Iϕ(µ) = 1 and, therefore, Iϕ is a witnessed model of O′ϕ.
By Proposition 3.4.6, we have a reduction of a RPCP to a KB satisfiability
problem. Note that all roles are crisp.
Theorem 3.4.7. The knowledge base satisfiability problem is undecidable for
[0, 1] L-ALC with GCIs. The result also holds if crisp roles are assumed.
3.4.2 Knowledge Base consistency w.r.t. finite interpreta-
tions
In this section we address a sub problem of the previous one. That is, deciding
whether a KB has a finite interpretation.
In [BP11b] it is provided a proof of undecidability for language [0, 1]Π-IALCE
respect to strongly witnessed interpretations. Using the same methods as in
[BP11b] and [BP11f], we will prove that KB satisfiability with respect to finite
interpretations for language [0, 1] L-ALC is undecidable.
As in [BP11b], given an instance ϕ of RPCP, we provide an ontology O˜ϕ and
prove that it has a finite model iff ϕ has a solution. We now define a TBox T˜
as follows:
T˜ := { 〈V ≡ V1  V2 ≥ 1〉, 〈W ≡W1 W2 ≥ 1〉,
〈¬(V ↔W ) v C1 unionsq . . . unionsq Cp ≥ 1〉 } ,
and TBoxes T˜ iϕ as follows:
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T˜ iϕ := { 〈Ci ≡ ∃Ri.> ≥ 1〉,
〈> v Ci unionsq ¬Ci ≥ 1〉,
〈(Ci A V ) v (s+ 1)|vi| · ∀Ri.V1 ≥ 1〉,
〈(s+ 1)|vi| · ∃Ri.V1 v (Ci A V ) ≥ 1〉,
〈(Ci AW ) v (s+ 1)|wi| · ∀Ri.W1 ≥ 1〉,
〈(s+ 1)|wi| · ∃Ri.W1 v (Ci AW ) ≥ 1〉,
〈> v ∀Ri.V2 ≥ 0.vi〉,
〈> v ∀Ri.¬V2 ≥ 1− 0.vi〉,
〈> v ∀Ri.W2 ≥ 0.wi〉,
〈> v ∀Ri.¬W2 ≥ 1− 0.wi〉 }
Now, let
T˜ϕ = T˜ ∪
p⋃
i=1
T˜ iϕ .
Further we define the ABox A˜ϕ as follows:
A˜ϕ := {〈¬V (a) ≥ 1〉, 〈¬W (a) ≥ 1〉, 〈(C1 unionsq . . . unionsq Cp)(a) ≥ 1〉} .
Finally,
O˜ϕ := (T˜ϕ, A˜ϕ) .
Proposition 3.4.8. The instance ϕ of the RPCP has a solution iff the [0, 1] L-
ALC ontology O˜ϕ has a finite model.
Proof. (⇒) Let µ = i1 . . . ik be a solution of ϕ and let suf(µ) be the set of all
suffixes of µ 2. We build the finite interpretation I˜ϕ as follows:
• ∆I˜ϕ := suf(µ),
• aI˜ϕ = ε,
• V I˜ϕ(ε) = W I˜ϕ(ε) = 0,
• V I˜ϕi (ε) = W I˜ϕi (ε) = 0, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2,
• for all ν ∈ ∆I˜ϕ , V I˜ϕ(ν) = 0.vν and W I˜ϕ(ν) = 0.wν
2 A suffix of a string t1t2 . . . tn is a string tn−m+1 . . . tn (0 ≤ m ≤ n), which is the empty
string ε for m = 0.
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• for all ν, ν′ ∈ ∆I˜ϕ and 1 ≤ i ≤ p
R
I˜ϕ
i (ν, ν
′) =
{
1, if ν′ = iν
0, otherwise
• for all ν ∈ ∆I˜ϕ and 1 ≤ i ≤ p,
C
I˜ϕ
i (ν) =
{
1, if iν ∈ suf(µ)
0, otherwise
• for all ν ∈ ∆I˜ϕ and 1 ≤ i ≤ p such that iν ∈ suf(µ)
– V
I˜ϕ
1 (iν) = 0.vν · (s+ 1)−|vi|,
– W
I˜ϕ
1 (iν) = 0.wν · (s+ 1)−|wi|,
– V
I˜ϕ
2 (iν) = 0.vi,
– W
I˜ϕ
2 (iν) = 0.wi.
We show now that I˜ϕ is a model O˜ϕ. Since V I˜ϕ(ε) = 0.vε = 0 and
W I˜ϕ(ε) = 0.wε = 0, then the first two axioms in A˜ϕ are satisfied. Since
there is 1 ≤ i ≤ p such that iε = i ∈ suf(µ), then
C
I˜ϕ
i (ε) = 1
and, therefore, the third axiom in A˜ϕ is satisfied.
We now show that the axioms in T˜ and each T˜ iϕ, with 1 ≤ i ≤ p are
satisfied for every ν ∈ suf(µ). So, let ν ∈ suf(µ) \ {µ}. Then there is
1 ≤ i ≤ p such that iν ∈ suf(µ) and, therefore, by the definition of I˜ϕ,
C
I˜ϕ
i (ν) = 1 and R
I˜ϕ
i (ν, iν) = 1. Therefore,
(Ci A V )I˜ϕ(ν) = V I˜ϕ(ν)
from which it follows that every axiom in T˜ iϕ is satisfied by I˜ϕ (the proof
is the same as for Iϕ satisfying T iϕ). E.g., note that V I˜ϕ(ν) = 0.vν =
(s + 1)|vi| · V I˜ϕ1 (iν) and, thus, both 〈(Ci A V ) v (s + 1)|vi| · ∀Ri.V1 ≥ 1〉
and 〈(s+ 1)|vi| · ∃Ri.V1 v (Ci A V ) ≥ 1〉 are satisfied.
Moreover, for every j 6= i and ν′ ∈ suf(µ), it holds that C I˜ϕj (ν) = 0 and
R
I˜ϕ
j (ν, ν
′) = 0 and, therefore every axiom in T˜ jϕ is satisfied as well (note
that e.g., (∀Rj .V1)I˜ϕ(ν) = 1). This last argument holds for µ as well.
Finally, consider T˜ϕ. It is easy to check that the first two axioms are
satisfied in every ν ∈ suf(µ). For the third axiom, if ν ∈ suf(µ) \ {µ},
then there is 1 ≤ i ≤ p such that C I˜ϕi (ν) = 1 and, then, the axiom is
trivially satisfied. Otherwise, if ν = µ, since µ is a solution for ϕ, then
(¬(V ↔W ))I˜ϕ(µ) = 0 and, then, the axiom is trivially satisfied as well.
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(⇐) For the converse, suppose that ϕ has no solution and let I be a model of
O˜ϕ. By absurd, let us assume that I is finite and, thus, witnessed.
Now, since I is a model of axioms 〈¬V (a) ≥ 1〉 and 〈¬W (a) ≥ 1〉, then
there is a node aI = δ ∈ ∆I , such that V I(δ) = W I(δ) = 0.
Moreover, since I is a model of axioms 〈V ≡ V1  V2 ≥ 1〉 and W ≡
W1 W2, then
V I1 (δ) = V
I
2 (δ) = W
I
1 (δ) = W
I
2 (δ) = 0
as well.
Next, we prove by induction that for every n ∈ N there is an element
δin ∈ ∆I such that:
• V I(δin) = 0.vin . . . vi1 ,
• W I(δin) = 0.win . . . wi1 ,
and |{δ, δi1 , . . . , δin}| = n+1 (all elements are distinct). As a consequence,
∆I cannot be finite, contrary to the assumption that I is finite.
(1) Since I is a witnessed model, it satisfies axiom 〈(C1unionsq. . .unionsqCp)(a) ≥ 1〉.
So, there is i, such that CIi (δ) = 1. Let i1 = i. Since I satisfies axiom
〈Ci1 ≡ ∃Ri1 .> ≥ 1〉, then there is δ′ ∈ ∆I such that RIi1(δ, δ′) = 1.
Let δi1 = δ
′. Since I satisfies axiom 〈(s + 1)|vi1 | · ∃Ri1 .V1 v (Ci1 A
V ) ≥ 1〉, then
0 =
= (1⇒ 0) =
= (Ci1(δ)⇒ V )I(δ) ≥
≥ (s+ 1)|vi1 | · sup
δ′∈∆I
{RIi1(δ, δ′) ∗ V I1 (δ′)} ≥
≥ RIi1(δ, δi1) ∗ V I1 (δi1) =
= 1 ∗ V I1 (δi1) =
= V I1 (δi1).
Hence,
V I1 (δi1) = 0.
In the same way it can be proved that
W I1 (δi1) = 0.
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Since I satisfies axiom 〈> v ∀Ri1 .V2 ≥ 0.vi1〉, we have that
0.vi1 ≤
≤ (RIi1(δ, δi1)⇒ V I2 (δi1)) =
= (1⇒ V I2 (δi1)) =
= V I2 (δi1).
Since I satisfies axiom 〈> v ∀Ri1 .¬V2 ≥ 1− 0.vi1〉, it follows that
1− 0.vi1 ≤
≤ (RIi1(δ, δi1)⇒ ¬V I2 (δi1)) =
= (1⇒ ¬V I2 (δi1)) =
= ¬V I2 (δi1) =
= 1− V I2 (δi1)
and therefore,
V I2 (δi1) ≤ 0.vi1 .
So,
V I2 (δi1) = 0.vi1 .
In the same way it can be proved that
W I2 (δi1) = 0.wi1 .
Finally, since I satisfies axiom 〈V ≡ V1  V2 ≥ 1〉, then
V I(δi1) = V
I
1 (δi1) Y V I2 (δi1) = 0 Y 0.vi1 = 0.vi1 .
In the same way it can be proved that
W I(δi1) = 0.wi1 .
Moreover, since V I(δ) = 0 6= 0.vi1 = V I(δi1), then δ 6= δi1 and, thus,
|{δ, δi1}| = 2,
which completes the case.
(n+1) Let n > 1 and suppose, by inductive hypothesis, that, for every
j ≤ n, the above conditions hold.
Since ϕ has no solution, then vin . . . vi1 6= win . . . wi1 and, therefore,
by inductive hypothesis, V I(δin) = 0.vin . . . vi1 6= 0.win . . . wi1 =
W I(δin). Hence (V ↔ W )I(δin) < 1 and, therefore, ¬(V ↔
W )I(δin) > 0. So, since I satisfies axiom 〈¬(V ↔ W ) v C1 unionsq
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. . . unionsq Cp ≥ 1〉, we have that (C1 unionsq . . . unionsq Cp})I(δin) > 0 and, thus,
there is i such that CIi (δin) > 0. Therefore, as I satisfies axiom
〈> v Ci unionsq ¬Ci ≥ 1〉, we have that CIi (δin) = 1.
Now, let in+1 = i. Since I satisfies axiom 〈Cin+1 ≡ ∃Rin+1 .> ≥ 1〉,
then there is δ′ ∈ ∆I such that RIin+1(δin , δ′) = 1. So, let δin+1 = δ′.
Since I satisfies axiom 〈(Cin+1 A V ) v (s+ 1)|vin+1 | · ∀Rin+1 .V1 ≥ 1〉,
then
0.vin . . . vi1 =
= (1⇒ 0.vin . . . vi1) =
= (Cin ⇒ V )I(δin) ≤
≤ (s+ 1)|vin+1 | · inf
δ′∈∆I
{RIin+1(δin , δ′)⇒ V I1 (δ′)} ≤
≤ RIin+1(δin , δin+1)⇒ V I1 (δin+1) =
= V I1 (δin+1).
On the other hand, since I satisfies axiom 〈(s+1)|vin+1 | ·∃Rin+1 .V1 v
(Cin+1 A V ) ≥ 1〉, then
0.vin . . . vi1 =
= (1⇒ 0.vin . . . vi1) =
= (Cin ⇒ V )I(δin) ≥
≥ (s+ 1)|vin+1 | · sup
δ′∈∆I
{RIin+1(δin , δ′) ∗ V I1 (δ′)} ≥
≥ (s+ 1)|vin+1 | · (RIin+1(δin , δin+1) ∗ V I1 (δin+1)) =
= (s+ 1)|vin+1 | · V I1 (δin+1).
So, 0.vin . . . vi1 = (s+ 1)
|vin+1 | · V I1 (δin+1) and, thus,
V I1 (δin+1) = (s+ 1)
−|vin+1 | · 0.vin . . . vi1 .
In the same way it can be proved that
W I1 (δin+1) = 0.win . . . wi1 · (s+ 1)−|win+1 |.
Since I satisfies axiom 〈> v ∀Rin+1 .V2 ≥ 0.vin+1〉, we get
0.vin+1 ≤
≤ RIin+1(δin , δin+1)⇒ V I2 (δin+1) =
= 1⇒ V I2 (δin+1) =
= V I2 (δin+1).
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Similarly, since I satisfies axiom 〈> v ∀Rin+1 .¬V2 ≥ 1− 0.vin+1〉, we
get
1− 0.vin+1 ≤
≤ RIin+1(δin , δin+1)⇒ ¬V I2 (δin+1) =
= 1⇒ ¬V I2 (δin+1) =
= ¬V I2 (δin+1) =
= 1− V I2 (δin+1)
and therefore, V I2 (δin+1) ≤ 0.vin+1 . So,
V I2 (δin+1) = 0.vin+1 .
In the same way it can be proved that
W I2 (δin+1) = 0.win+1 .
Finally, since I satisfies axiom 〈V ≡ V1  V2 ≥ 1〉, then
V I(δin+1) =
= V I1 (δin+1) Y V I2 (δin+1) =
= ((s+ 1)−|vin+1 | · 0.vin . . . vi1) Y 0.vin+1 =
= 0.vin+1 . . . 0.vi1 .
In the same way it can be proved that
W I(δin+1) = 0.win+1 . . . 0.wi1 .
Moreover, since, by inductive hypothesis, for every j ≤ n,
V I(δij ) = 0.vij . . . vi1 6= 0.vin+1 . . . vij . . . vi1 = V I(δin+1),
then δij 6= δin+1 .
Furthermore, as
V I(δ) = 0 6= V I(δin+1),
then δ 6= δin+1 and, thus,
|{δ, δi1 , . . . , δin+1}| = n+ 2,
which completes the case.
So, O˜ϕ has no finite model.
By Proposition 3.4.8, we have a reduction of a RPCP to a finite satisfiability
problem. Again, note that all roles are crisp. Therefore,
Theorem 3.4.9. The knowledge base finite satisfiability problem is undecidable
for [0, 1] L-ALC with GCIs. The result also holds if crisp roles are assumed.
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3.4.3 Further consequences
Exploiting the reduction provided in Proposition 2.5.2, from Theorem 3.4.7 and
Theorem 3.4.9 it is easy to prove the following result.
Corollary 3.4.10. In language [0, 1] L-ALCT the following are undecidable prob-
lems:
• Concept r-satisfiability with respect to a KB.
• Concept ≥ r-satisfiability with respect to a KB.
• Concept positive satisfiability with respect to a KB.
• Entailment of an axiom by a KB.
3.5 Related work
Decidability has been a central matter since the beginning of the research in
FDL. As in the classical case, the first problem to be dealt with has been con-
cept subsumption. In order to deal with this problem a structural subsumption
based procedure has been employed. These kinds of algorithm perform a com-
parison in the syntactic structure of two given concept description after having
transformed them in a suitable normal form. The main examples of these re-
searches are [Yen91] and [TM98]. In [Yen91] it is proved the decidability for
the concept subsumption problem of a language denoted FT SL−, whose set of
concept constructor and underlying truth value algebra have been discussed in
Section 2.8. The main result in [TM98] is the decidability proof for the concept
subsumption problem of a language denoted ALCFM .
In [Str98] it is proved the decidability of the entailment problem with respect
to empty TBoxes of language ALC under Zadeh’s semantics. The procedure used
is based on the recursive production of a set of constraints until either a clash is
produced or the set of constraint is complete, in the sense that no further rule
can be applied to the existing set of constraints.
In [Str04a] it is proved the decidability of KB consistency of language ALC
with role hierarchies, over Zadeh’s semantics. The procedure used in [Str04a] is
a finite reduction of fuzzy ALC to classical ALC.
In [Str05a] it is used a procedure based on a reduction to the Mixed Integer
Linear Programming problem in order to prove decidability of language ALC
extended with concrete domains and fuzzy modifiers under Zadeh’s semantics.
Until [Ha´j05], the algebra of truth values considered is mainly the real unit
interval [0,1] with operations max, min, 1 − x and Kleene-Dienes implication
(what we call Zadeh’s semantics). [Ha´j05] is the first work that considers a t-
norm based semantics. The main result proved in [Ha´j05] is the decidability of
the satisfiability and subsumption problems for language ALC over a standard
algebra restricted to witnessed models. The result is achieved by means of a
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reduction to satisfiability and logical consequence of the corresponding proposi-
tional calculus. The details of this work are reported in Section 3.1.
In the last years there have been several works dealing with (un)decidability
FDLs over a BL-chain determined by a continuous t-norm.
In [BS10a] it is proved the decidability of KB consistency of language ALCE
with role hierarchies, over a finite t-norm. The result is achieved by means
of a computable reduction to classical DL. By means of the same procedure,
[BDGRS09] proves the decidability of KB witnessed consistency for a quite ex-
pressive FDL language over [0, 1]G. This is, currently, the only decidability
result for a reasoning task involving general fuzzy concept inclusions for an FDL
language over an infinite t-norm.
The paper [BBS11] proves that languages [0, 1] L-ALC and [0, 1]Π-IALCE
do not enjoy the finite model property when general TBoxes are considered.
Despite this work does not prove any undecidability result, it casts doubts on
the decidability of the previously considered algorithms.
The first actual undecidability result is given in [BP11a], where undecidabil-
ity of KB consistency for language [0, 1]Π-IALCE is proved. The method used
in this work as well as in the subsequent works on undecidability is a reduction
to PCP similar to the one explained in Section 3.4. However, since in this work,
in order to prove undecidability it is needed the use of axioms of type 2.3, the
authors think that the result is not enough to prove undecidability of the same
problem without this kind of axioms.
Nevertheless the full undecidability of KB consistency for language [0, 1]Π-
IALCE was proved soon later. The result is indeed proved a few time after
in [BP11b] and [BP11c]. Note that in these works the undecidability result is
proved for the cited problem when restricted both to witnessed interpretations
and to strongly witnessed interpretations.
In [BP11f] it is proved the undecidability of concept satisfiability with respect
to a KB for language ALC over a De Morgan chain containing the standard
 Lukasiewicz chain as a subalgebra. In the same paper [BP11f] it is also proved
that if the De Morgan lattice considered as underlying algebra of truth values is
finite, the same problem is indeed decidable. The result is achieved through a
recursive reduction to a decidable problem from automata theory.
It is worth briefly mentioning the following recent works. In [BDGRS12]
a quite expressive FDL over a set of operations that join Go¨del t-norm with
Zadeh’s operations is presented. In this paper the decidability of the KB con-
sistency problem is proved through a recursive reduction to classical DL when
the set of truth values is fixed in advance and finite. In [BP12c] a systematic
study of undecidability in FDL is undertaken. Moreover sufficient conditions for
proving undecidability in FDL are provided. In [BDP12] it is proved that KB
consistency for an FDL with role constructors and individuals over any t-norm
with Go¨del negation is linearly reducible to classical DL. In [BP12a] it is proved
undecidability of KB consistency with respect to unrestricted interpretations
for a really basic FDL over  Lukasiewicz t-norm. In [BP12b] different results
are provided for quite expressive FDLs over complete residuated De Morgan
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lattices. Among them there are the undecidability result of the infinite-valued
case and different decidability results for reasoning tasks over finite lattices. A
really interesting feature of this paper is the use of tableaux algorithms for the
decidability results.
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Chapter 4
Computational complexity
Until now, the works that faced the of computational complexity of FDLs have
been able only to deal with FDLs based on a finite chain T of truth values. This
is due to the fact that the reasoning tasks for FDLs based on infinite algebras
either have been proved to be undecidable problems, or the reductions considered
to prove the decidability are not in polynomial time. In this chapter we deal
with the problem of concept r-satisfiability with respect to empty knowledge
bases for language IALCEDT and prove that, when the algebra of truth values
T considered is a finite MTL-chain, the PSPACE bound that characterize the
same problem in classical ALC is preserved. Characterizing the exact complexity
requires a lower bound and an upper bound argument. Throughout the chapter
we provide full proofs for the upper bound arguments. The proofs of the lower
bound argument are only sketched.
The content of the present chapter is the following. In Section 4.1 we show
that the reductions reported in Chapter 3 in order to prove decidability of [0, 1] L-
ALC and [0, 1]Π-IALE are not polynomial. In Section 4.2 we prove that formula
r-satisfiability is PSPACE-complete for the minimal Modal Logic over  Ln-frames.
The procedure used in this case is a generalization of an already known proce-
dure used to prove PSPACE-completeness for the classical modal system K and
is particularly suited to prove the result for the finite-valued  Lukasiewicz case
because relies on the properties of involutive negation. The proof of the lower
bound argument is only sketched because it is the same proof as for the classical
case. In Section 4.3 we generalize the previous result and prove that concept
r-satisfiability with respect to empty knowledge bases is PSPACE-complete for
language IALCEDT over any finite MTL-chain T. The procedure used in this
case is novel and it is based on a PSPACE implementation of the reduction pro-
vided in Definition 3.1.2. The procedure provided in Section 4.3 is uniform in
the sense that it does not depend on the algebra of truth values T considered,
as long as it is a finite MTL-chain. We omit the argument for the lower bound
argument because it is based on the same idea as the former. The result pro-
vided in Section 4.2 is clearly a consequence of the result given in Section 4.3.
Nevertheless, I find that the former is worth to be reported because the proof is
111
based on a different procedure than the latter and it shows a way to generalize
procedures used in the framework of classical Modal Logic to the finite-valued
 Lukasiewicz case. It will be a matter of further investigation a confrontation
of the execution speed of both procedures that belong to PSPACE. Despite the
fact that concept satisfiability is a problem that has been proved to be decid-
able for languages ALC under infinite-valued  Lukasiewicz semantics and IALE
under infinite-valued product semantics, its complexity in both cases is still an
open problem. Finally, other results existing in the literature will be reported
in Section 4.4.
4.1 Some remarks on Ha´jek’s reduction
In [Ha´j05] it is proved the decidability of the concept satisfiability problem for
the language IALCEDT under infinite-valued  Lukasiewicz semantics. The proof
strategy, commented in Section 3.1, consists in reducing this problem, for a given
concept C, to the satisfiability in the infinite-valued  Lukasiewicz propositional
logic of the set of formulas PC already introduced in Definition 3.1.2. In this
section we stress that this reduction is indeed non-polynomial. Proving this fact
is a tedious task, but this is the actual explanation why the naive approach does
not help in identifying the complexity class. In the following sections we will
overcome this difficulty by using alternative algorithms to solve the problem.
The rest of the section is devoted to show that the cardinality of the set PC
grows at least factorially in the size of concept C. To this aim, we consider
the concepts that are obtained by applying the translation ρ(·) given in Section
2.7.1 to the modal formulas ϕB(m) (one for each m ∈ N) reported in [BdRV01,
p. 384]1. In other words, for every natural number m, the concept ρ(ϕB(m)) is
the one in the signature with atomic concepts {A1, A2, . . .} ∪ {B1, B2, . . .} and
atomic role R obtained as the conjunction of the following concepts:
(i) A0
(ii) ∀R(m).(Ai A (i 6=j¬Aj)) (0 ≤ i ≤ m)
(iii) C0  ∀R.C1  ∀R2.C2  ∀R3.C3  . . . ∀Rm−1.Cm−1
(iv) ∀R.D1  ∀R2.D1  ∀R3.D1  . . . ∀Rm−1.D1
 ∀R2.D2  ∀R3.D2  . . . ∀Rm−1.D2
 ∀R3.D2  . . . ∀Rm−1.D2
...
∀Rm−1.Dm−1
1In [BdRV01] these formulas are used to prove that classical Modal Logic lacks the polysize
model property.
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where
Ci := Ai A (∃R.(Ai+1 Bi+1) ∃R.(Ai+1  ¬Bi+1))
and
Di := (Bi A ∀R.Bi) (¬Bi A ¬∀R.Bi)
Here we have used the convention that ∀Ri.E is a shorthand for
i times︷ ︸︸ ︷
∀R. . . .∀R .E
and ∀R(m).E is a shorthand for E  ∀R.E  ∀R2.E  . . . ∀Rm.E.
Now, as pointed out in [BdRV01], the size of ρ(ϕB(m)) is quadratic in m.
If we apply the algorithm provided in [Ha´j05] or the one explained in Section
3.2, the cardinality of the set Pρ(ϕB(m)) of sentences that are produced by the
algorithm at some step can be bounded by means of the following observations.
Let us denote by |i| the number of generalized atoms of ρ(ϕB(m)) whose label
has cardinality i.
1. In the first step we have that, for each generalized atom E(d) (with l(E) =
∅) of ρ(ϕB(m)) the algorithm deterministically produces a new constant
da and a sentence which says that da is a witness for such E(d). So, for
each generalized atom, we have a new element in Pρ(ϕB(m)).
2. In the second step, for each new produced constant db which is not a
witness for E, the algorithm deterministically produces a new sentence
which says that db is not a witness for E. Since db turns out to be the
witness of a generalized atom E′(d) of Pρ(ϕB(m)) which share the same
label with E, another sentence will be produced which says that da is not
a witness for E′(d). So, we have that |0|2 new elements are in Pρ(ϕB(m)).
3. After steps 1 and 2 the algorithm has produced:
(a) an amount of |0| new constants d1, . . . , d|0|,
(b) an amount of |1| new generalized atoms for each new constant da,
with 1 ≤ a ≤ |0|.
Hence, since each set of generalized atoms identified by the same new
constant is processed by the algorithm as in step 2, and this does not
happen when two generalized atoms do not share the same new constant,
an amount of |0| · |1|2 is added to Pρ(ϕB(m)).
4. Again, after step 3 the algorithm has produced:
(a) an amount of |0| · |1| new constants d1,1, . . . , d1,|1|, d2,1, . . . , d2,|1|, . . . ,
d|0|,1, . . . , d|0|,|1|,
(b) an amount of |2| new generalized atoms for each new constant da,
with 1 ≤ a ≤ |0| · |1|.
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Hence, applying again the idea in item 3, we obtain that an amount of
|0| · |1| · |2|2 is added to Pρ(ϕB(m)),
5. Repeat the same idea until the algorithm processes the whole concept
ρ(ϕB(m)).
So, at the end of the process, when no more generalized atoms are produced to
be further processed, the cardinal of the resulting propositional theory Pρ(ϕB(m))
can be described by function f(m) : N −→ N:
f(m) :=
( m∑
i=1
i
)2
+
( m∑
i=1
i
)
·
(( m∑
i=1
i
)
− 2
)2
+
( m∑
i=1
i
)
·
(( m∑
i=1
i
)
− 2
)
·
(( m∑
i=1
i
)
− 2− 3
)2
+
...( m∑
i=1
i
)
·
(( m∑
i=1
i
)
− 2
)
· . . . ·
(
. . .
( m∑
i=1
i
)
− 2− 3 . . .−m
)2
which can be shown to be strictly greater than function m!, for each m. We will
prove this by induction on m:
1. Consider, as base cases, m = 2 and m = 3. In the first case we have that
m! = 2 · 1 = 2, while f(m) = (1 + 2)2 + (1 + 2) · ((1 + 2)− 2)2 = 12. In the
second case we have that m! = 3 ·2 ·1 = 6, while f(m) = (1+2+3)2 +(1+
2+3) ·((1+2+3)−3)2 +(1+2+3) ·((1+2+3)−3) ·((1+2+3)−3−2)2 =
36 + 54 + 18 = 108.
2. Suppose, by induction hypothesis, that m > 3 and f(m) > m!, we have to
show that f(m+ 1) > (m+ 1)!. We know that each summand in f(m) is
a product of a finite number of factors. Let us denote by Ff(m) the set of
factors in the last addend in f(m), then the function g(j) : {1, . . . ,m} −→
Ff(m), defined by:
g(j) =
{∑m
i=1 i, if j = m,
. . .
(∑m
i=1 i
)
− 2 . . .− ((m+ 1)− j), if j < m
is a bijection between the factors in m! and the factors in Ff(m). Since
for every 1 < j ≤ m we have that j < g(j) and, for j = 1, we have that
j = g(j), then
∏
Ff(m) =
∏m
j=1 g(j) > m!.
Using that
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∑m
i=1 i =
m·(m+1)
2
and that, since m > 3,(∑m
i=1 i
)
− 2 > 2 · (m− 1),
then
g(m) · g(m− 1) =
=
m∑
i=1
i ·
(( m∑
i=1
i
)
− 2
)
>
>
m · (m+ 1)
2
· 2 · (m− 1) =
= m · (m+ 1) · (m− 1) >
> m ·m · (m− 1)
Then,
∏
Ff(m) =
(∏m−2
j=1 g(j)
)
·
(∏m
j=m−1 g(j)
)
> m! ·m
and, thus, by induction hypothesis,
f(m+ 1) >
> f(m) +
∏
Ff(m) >
> m! +m! ·m =
= m! · (m+ 1) =
= (m+ 1)!
This finishes the proof that the reduction considered grows faster than fac-
torial function, in particular it is non-polynomial.
4.2 Modal Logic over  Ln
A first step towards understanding the complexity of the concept r-satisfiability
problem in finite-valued fuzzy description logics is the work presented in this
section, (published in [BCE11]). Throughout this Section 4.2 we assume that
the algebra T of truth values is a finite  Lukasiewics chain and the language used
is that of Modal Logic with only one modality, with the Delta operator 4 and a
truth constant r for each r ∈ T. Since, as proved in Section 2.7, there is a close
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connection between the expressive powers of the minimal n-valued  Lukasiewicz
Modal Logic and the one of the description logic  Ln-ALC without knowledge
base, the result here reported can be translated to our framework. The result
we are going to prove in this section is the following.
Theorem 4.2.1. For every n ∈ N and every r ∈ Ln,
• the set of r-satisfiable formulas over Kripke  Ln-models is PSPACE-
complete,
• the set of valid formulas over Kripke  Ln-models is PSPACE-complete.
The same complexity result is attained when we add the Delta operator and/or
the canonical truth constants. And also we get the same complexity when we
only deal with crisp Kripke models.
In the rest of this section we prove this last theorem. Since
• ϕ is modally valid iff ϕ∨ s is not modally s-satisfiable (where s is the
penultimate element of  Ln, i.e., s =
n−2
n−1 ), and
• ϕ is modally r-satisfiable iff r ↔ ϕ is modally satisfiable,
it will be enough to prove PSPACE-completeness of the modal satisfiability
problems. It may seem that this trick needs the use of canonical constants
in the language, but by McNaughton theorem (see [CDM00, Corollary 3.2.8],
we can also reduce r-satisfiability to satisfiability without the help of canonical
constants; for example, we notice that
• ϕ is modally 0.75-satisfiable, iff
• ϕ2 ↔ ¬(ϕ2) is modally satisfiable,
Thus, by the inclusion relationships among the sets of modally satisfiable for-
mulas it will be enough to prove that
1. Sat1(Fr,  L
Ln
n,4) and Sat1(CFr,  L
Ln
n,4) are in PSPACE,
2. Sat1(Fr,  Ln) and Sat1(CFr,  Ln) are PSPACE-hard.
We remind that, in Section 1.1.2, we defined
• Sat1(Fr,  Ln) as the set of all 1-satisfiable formulas in the logic of all Kripke
frames valued over the n-valued  Lukasiewicz chain,
• Sat1(CFr,  Ln) as the set of all 1-satisfiable formulas in the logic of all crisp
Kripke frames valued over the n-valued  Lukasiewicz chain.
Following the same pattern, we have considered in the above statements.
• Sat1(Fr,  LLnn,4) as the set of all 1-satisfiable formulas in the logic of all
Kripke frames valued over the n-valued  Lukasiewicz chain with delta op-
erator and a truth constant r for each r ∈ Ln,
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• Sat1(CFr,  LLnn,4) as the set of all 1-satisfiable formulas in the logic of all
crisp Kripke frames valued over the n-valued  Lukasiewicz chain with delta
operator and a truth constant r for each r ∈ Ln.
The next two subsections are devoted to prove each one of the above com-
plexity statements.
4.2.1 PSPACE upper bound
We start giving a PSPACE algorithm for solving Sat1(Fr,  L
Ln
n,4), and later we
will see that this algorithm can be slightly modified to compute Sat1(CFr,  L
Ln
n,4).
Our algorithm follows a similar approach to the one given in [BdRV01, p. 383–
388]. We remind the fact that all formulas considered in this section may contain
the Delta operator and truth constants.
Definition 4.2.2. Let Γ be a set of modal formulas, and Sub(Γ) be the set of
its subformulas. We define the closure of Γ, in symbols Cl(Γ), as the set
(Sub(Γ) ∪ {2¬σ : 3σ ∈ Sub(Γ)} ∪ {3¬σ : 2σ ∈ Sub(Γ)})+,
where the superscript + refers to the process of deleting all occurrences of two
consecutive negation symbols (i.e., ¬¬). When Cl(Γ) = Γ we will say that Γ is
closed.
Note that if Γ is finite, then so is Cl(Γ).
Definition 4.2.3. Let Γ be a closed set of modal formulas. We define the
sequence (Γ0,Γ1, . . . ,Γnest(Γ)) by the recurrence
• Γ0 := Γ,
• Γd+1 := {ψ : 3ψ ∈ Γd} ∪ {ψ : 2ψ ∈ Γd}.
The family of modal levels of Γ is the set Γ◦ := {Γ0,Γ1, . . . ,Γnest(Γ)}.
Note that, for every d ∈ {0, . . . nest(Γ)}, nest(Γd) ≤ nest(Γ)− d. In partic-
ular nest(Γnest(Γ)) = 0.
Definition 4.2.4. Let Γ be a closed set of formulas. A Hintikka function over
some Γd ∈ Γ◦ is a mapping H : Γd −→ Ln such that
1. H is a homomorphism of non modal connectives (which includes the Delta
operator and truth constants),
2. H(3ψ) = ¬H(2¬ψ), for each 3ψ ∈ Γd,
3. H(2ψ) = ¬H(3¬ψ), for each 2ψ ∈ Γd.
It is said that H is an atom if there exists a Kripke model M = 〈W,R, V 〉 and a
world w ∈W such that, for each formula ψ ∈ Γ, it holds that H(ψ) = V (ψ,w).
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Lemma 4.2.5. Let H : Γd −→ Ln and H ′ : Γd+1 −→ Ln be two Hintikka
functions, then:
min{H ′(ψ)⇒ H(3ψ) : 3ψ ∈ Γd} =
= min{H(2ϑ)⇒ H ′(ϑ) : 2ϑ ∈ Γd}.
Proof. For every formula 3ψ ∈ Γd it is obvious that
H ′(ψ)⇒ H(3ψ) =
= ¬H(3ψ)⇒ ¬H ′(ψ) =
= H(¬3ψ)⇒ H ′(¬ψ) =
= H(2¬ψ)⇒ H ′(¬ψ).
Then, using that 3ψ ∈ Γd iff 2¬ψ ∈ Γd (by Definition 4.2.2), we get that
min{H ′(ψ)⇒ H(3ψ) : 3ψ ∈ Γd} = min{H(2¬ψ)⇒ H ′(¬ψ) : 2¬ψ ∈ Γd}.
From this fact, it easily follows that
min{H ′(ψ)⇒ H(3ψ) : 3ψ ∈ Γd} = min{H(2ϑ)⇒ H ′(ϑ) : 2ϑ ∈ Γd}.
Definition 4.2.6. Let H : Γd −→ Ln be a Hintikka function, k ∈ Ln and
3ψ ∈ Γd. We say that a Hintikka function H ′ : Γd+1 −→ Ln is induced by 3ψ
and r-related to H (in symbols, H ′ ∈ H3ψ,r) if the following conditions hold:
• H(3ψ) = r ∗H ′(ψ),
• for each 2ϑ ∈ Γd, it holds that H(2ϑ) ≤ r ⇒ H ′(ϑ).
Lemma 4.2.7. Let Γ be a closed set of formulas, Γd ∈ Γ◦ and H a Hintikka
function over Γd. If H is an atom, then for every 3ψ ∈ Γd, there is some r ∈ Ln
and some H ′ ∈ H3ψ,r such that H ′ is an atom.
Proof. Let H be an atom over Γd and 3ψ ∈ Γd. Then, by Definition 4.2.4, there
exist a Kripke model M = 〈W,R, V 〉 and w ∈W such that
V (3ψ,w) = H(3ψ).
Hence there exists w′ ∈W such that
V (3ψ,w) = R(w,w′) ∗ V (ψ,w′).
Let H ′ : Γd+1 −→ Ln be the Hintikka function defined by H ′(ϕ) = V (ϕ,w′),
for every formula ϕ ∈ Γd+1. It is obvious that H ′ is an atom. Take r = R(w,w′),
then
H(3ψ) = V (3ψ,w) = R(w,w′) ∗ V (ψ,w′) = r ∗H ′(ψ)
i.e., H and H ′ satisfy the first condition of Definition 4.2.6. On the other hand,
for each 2ϑ ∈ Γd, we have that
118
V (2ϑ,w) = min{R(w,w′′)⇒ V (ϑ,w′′) : w′′ ∈W},
and hence
H(2ϑ) = V (2ϑ,w) ≤ R(w,w′)⇒ V (ϑ,w′) = r ⇒ H ′(ϑ).
So, there is r ∈ Ln such that H ′ ∈ H3ψ,r.
Definition 4.2.8. Let Γ be a finite closed set of formulas, H be a Hintikka
function over Γ0, and H be a family of Hintikka functions with domains (denoted
by dom) belonging to Γ◦. We say that H is a witness set generated by H on Γ
when
1. H ∈ H,
2. if I ∈ H and 3ψ ∈ dom(I), then there is some r ∈ Ln and some J ∈ I3ψ,r
such that J ∈ H,
3. if J ∈ H and J 6= H, then there are I0, . . . , Ir ∈ H satisfying:
• I0 = H,
• Ir = J ,
• for each 0 ≤ i < r, there are a formula 3ψ ∈ dom(Ii) and an element
r ∈ Ln such that Ii+1 ∈ Ii3ψ,r.
Lemma 4.2.9. Let Γ be a finite closed set of formulas, and H be a Hintikka
function over Γ0 (i.e., Γ). Then, H is an atom iff there is a witness set generated
by H on Γ.
Proof. Let Γ be a finite closed set of formulas, and H a Hintikka function over
Γ0.
(⇒) We proceed by induction on the nesting degree of the set dom(H).
(0) If nest(Γd) = 0 and H is an atom, then H = {H} is a witness set
generated by H on Γ0.
(d) Let nest(Γd) = d and H be an atom over Γd. Suppose, by inductive
hypothesis, that, for each Γs ∈ Γ◦ such that nest(Γs) < d and each
Hintikka function H ′ over Γs, it holds that, if H ′ is an atom, then
there is a witness set generated by H ′ on Γs. Since H is an atom over
Γd, then, by Lemma 4.2.7, for each 3ψ ∈ Γd there exist r ∈ Ln and
an atom Iψ ∈ H3ψ,r over Γd+1. Since the degree of Γd+1 < d, then,
by inductive hypothesis, each atom Iψ generates a witness set Iψ on
Γd+1. So, the set
H = {H} ∪
⋃
3ψ∈Γd
Iψ
is a witness set generated by H on Γ.
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(⇐) Suppose now that there is a witness set H generated by H on Γ, then we
have to show that there exists a model which satisfies H. So, define the
model M = 〈W,R, V 〉, where:
– W = H,
– R(I, I ′) =

min{I ′(χ)⇒ I(3χ) : 3χ ∈ dom(I)},
if I ′ ∈ I3ψ,r for some r ∈ Ln and
some 3ψ ∈ dom(I)
0, otherwise,
– for each variable p ∈ At and I ∈ H, let V (p, I) = I(p).
On the one hand, since for each I ∈ H, dom(I) contains a finite number
of formulas of the form 3ψ, then, by Definition 4.2.8, each element of the
model has a finite number of R-successors. On the other hand, whenever
I ′ ∈ I3ψ,r, then nest(dom(I ′)) < nest(dom(I)) and, therefore, the depth
of the model is finite as well (it is indeed equal to nest(Γ)).
To end the proof, we have to show that, for every formula ϕ ∈ Γ, it holds
that V (ϕ,H) = H(ϕ). In order to obtain this result we will prove by
induction that for each I ∈W , it holds that V (ϕ, I) = I(ϕ). So, let I ∈W
and ϕ ∈ dom(I), then:
– If ϕ = p is a propositional variable, then, by definition of V , we have
that V (p, I) = I(p).
– If ϕ is a propositional combination of variables or modal formulas,
since H is a Hintikka function, by Definition 4.2.4 it holds that
V (ϕ,H) = H(ϕ).
– Let ϕ = 3ψ and suppose, by inductive hypothesis, that for each
J ∈W such that nest(dom(J)) < nest(dom(I)) and for each formula
χ, it holds that V (χ, J) = J(χ). By Definitions 4.2.6 and 4.2.8, we
have that there exists J ∈ I3ψ,r, for a r ∈ Ln, such that, for each
2ϑ ∈ dom(I), we have that I(2ϑ) ≤ r ⇒ J(ϑ), then, by residuation,
r ≤ I(2ϑ)⇒ J(ϑ), for each 2ϑ ∈ dom(I) and, therefore, by Lemma
4.2.5 and the construction of M,
r ≤
≤ min{I(2ϑ)⇒ J(ϑ) : 2ϑ ∈ dom(I)} =
= min{J(χ)⇒ I(3χ) : 3χ ∈ dom(I)} =
= R(I, J).
So, by Definition 4.2.6 and the inductive hypothesis,
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I(3ψ) =
= r ∗ J(ψ) ≤
≤ R(I, J) ∗ J(ψ) =
= R(I, J) ∗ V (ψ, J) ≤
≤ max{R(I, I ′) ∗ V (ψ, I ′) : I ′ ∈W} =
= V (3ψ, I).
On the other hand, let I ′ ∈ W be such that I ′ ∈ I3χ,r′ for a 3χ ∈
dom(I) and r′ ∈ Ln, then, by the construction of M and inductive
hypothesis,
I(3ψ) ≥
≥ I(3ψ) ∧ I ′(ψ) =
= (I ′(ψ)⇒ I(3ψ)) ∗ I ′(ψ) ≥
≥ min{I ′(ϑ)⇒ I(3ϑ) : 3ϑ ∈ dom(I)} ∗ I ′(ψ) =
= R(I, I ′) ∗ V (ψ, I ′).
Hence
I(3ψ) ≥
≥ max{R(I, I ′) ∗ V (ψ, I ′) : I ′ ∈W} =
= V (3ψ, I).
So, V (3ψ, I) = I(ψ).
So, for each formula ϕ, V (ϕ,H) = H(ϕ) and, then, H is an atom over
Γ.
Next we consider the algorithm Witness(H,Γ) given in Figure 4.1. This
algorithm returns a boolean, and is very close to the one given in [BdRV01] for
the minimal classical modal logic.
Lemma 4.2.10. Let Γ be a finite closed set of formulas, and H : Γ −→ Ln.
Then, Witness(H,Γ) returns true if and only if H is a Hintikka function over
Γ that generates a witness set in Γ. Otherwize it returns false.
Proof. Let Γ be a finite closed set of formulas, and H : Γ −→ Ln.
(⇒) Suppose that Witness(H,Γ) returns true, we proceed by induction on the
degree of Γ.
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if H is a Hintikka function and Γ = dom(H)
and for each subformula 3ψ ∈ dom(H) there are
r ∈ Ln and a Hintikka function I ∈ H3ψ,r such that
Witness(I, dom(I))
then
return true
else
return false
end if
Figure 4.1: The Algorithm Witness(H,Γ)
(0) If nest(Γ) = 0 and Witness(H,Γ) returns true then, H is a Hintikka
function over Γ, and hence H = {H} is a witness set generated by H
on Γ.
(d) Let nest(Γ) = d and suppose, by inductive hypothesis, that for each
set Γ′ of formulas such that Γ′ ⊆ Γ and nest(Γ′) < d and each function
H ′ : Γ′ −→ Ln, it holds that, if Witness(H ′,Γ′) returns true, then
H ′ is a Hintikka function over Γ′ that generates a witness set in Γ′. If
Witness(H,Γ) returns true then, on the one hand, H is a Hintikka
function over Γ. On the other hand, for each formula 3ψ ∈ Γ, there
are r ∈ Ln and I ∈ H3ψ,r such that Witness(I,Γ′), where Γ′ ∈ Γ◦ is
such that nest(Γ′) = d − 1. Since nest(Γ′) < d, and Witness(I,Γ′)
returns true, then, by inductive hypothesis, I is a Hintikka function
over Γ′ that generates a witness set Iψ in Γ′. So, the set
H = {H} ∪
⋃
3ψ∈Γ
Iψ
is a witness set generated by H on Γ.
(⇐) Suppose that H is a Hintikka function over Γ that generates a witness set
in Γ, we proceed by induction on the degree of Γ.
(0) If nest(Γ) = 0 then it is enough that H is a Hintikka function over Γ
for Witness(H,Γ) to return true.
(d) Let nest(Γ) = d and suppose, by inductive hypothesis, that for each
set Γ′ of formulas such that Γ′ ( Γ and nest(Γ′) < d and each function
H ′ : Γ′ −→ Ln, it holds that, if H ′ is a Hintikka function over Γ′ that
generates a witness set in Γ′, then Witness(H ′,Γ′) returns true. So,
if H is a Hintikka function over Γ that generates a witness set H in
Γ, then, by Definition 4.2.8, we have that, for each formula 3ψ ∈ Γ
there are r ∈ Ln and I ∈ H3ψ,r ∩ H. Then we have that I is a
Hintikka function over Γ′ that generates a witness set in Γ′, where
Γ′ ∈ Γ◦ is such that nest(Γ′) = d − 1. Hence, since nest(Γ′) <
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d, then, by inductive hypothesis, Witness(I,Γ′) returns true. So,
Witness(H,Γ) returns true.
Theorem 4.2.11. Sat1(Fr,  L
Ln
n,4) is in PSPACE.
Proof. Let ϕ be a modal formula. By Lemmas 4.2.9 and 4.2.10, we have that ϕ is
r-satisfiable iff there is a Hintikka function H : Cl(ϕ) −→ Ln such that H(ϕ) = r
and Witness(H,Cl(ϕ)) returns true. Thus we need to provide a PSPACE
implementation of Witness. Consider a non-deterministic Turing machine
that guesses a Hintikka function H over Cl(ϕ) and runs Witness(H,Cl(ϕ)).
Then, using Savitch’s Theorem it is enough to provide a machine that runs in
NPSPACE in order to obtain the desired result. The key points of the imple-
mentation are the following:
1. As pointed out in [BdRV01], encoding a subset Γ of Cl(ϕ) requires space
O(|ϕ|) (here |ϕ| refers to the length of the encoding of ϕ). On the one
hand, each element of a function H : Γ −→ Ln can be represented as an
ordered pair 〈ψ, i〉 ∈ Γ × Ln and, on the other hand, |H| = |Γ|. Hence, if
j = max{|r| : r ∈ Ln}, then encoding a Hintikka function requires space
bounded above by |ϕ|+ j · |ϕ|, that is space O(|ϕ|).
2. For each subformula 3ψ ∈ dom(H), whether there are r ∈ Ln and a Hin-
tikka function I ∈ H3ψ,r, can be checked separately. Given a subformula
3ψ ∈ dom(H), the value r ∈ Ln and the Hintikka function I ∈ H3ψ,r to be
checked can be selected by non-deterministic choice. Note that, although
the size of the set H3ψ,r can be in O(n|3ψ|), for a given function I, we do
not need to check every element of H3ψ,r to see whether I ∈ H3ψ,r, since
we only need to test if I satisfies the conditions of Definition 4.2.6 and this
can be done within space linear on the size of I.
Hence, by the previous points, every time that algorithm Witness is applied
to a function H and its domain Cl(ϕ), a subformula 3ψ ∈ dom(H) is selected
and a r ∈ Ln and I ∈ H3ψ,r are non-deterministically chosen, the space needed is
in O(|ϕ|). So, since nest(ϕ) recursive calls are needed until we meet a Hintikka
function I whose domain contains no modal formula and nest(ϕ) ≤ |ϕ|, the
amount of space required to run the algorithm is O(|ϕ|2). Moreover, to keep
track of the subformulas that have been checked by the algorithm, it is enough
to implement two kinds of pointers to the modal operators occurring in the
representation of ϕ: one pointer to indicate that, for a given subformula 3ψ ∈
dom(H) it has been fully checked whether there is r ∈ Ln and a Hintikka function
I ∈ H3ψ,r such that Witness(I, dom(I)), and the other pointer when the same
has not yet been fully checked.
Theorem 4.2.12. Sat1(CFr,  L
Ln
n,4) is in PSPACE.
Proof. It is easy to see that the same algorithm given in Figure 4.1, but replacing
k ∈ Ln with k ∈ {0, 1}, computes Sat1(CFr,  LLnn,4).
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4.2.2 PSPACE hardness
Here we will prove that the concept r-satisfiability is PSPACE-hard. Since the
case of the crisp frames is more simple than the case of the unrestricted ones, we
will explain firstly how to obtain hardness for the modal logic of crisp frames.
The PSPACE-hardness of the set Sat1(CFr,  Ln) is proved by using a polyno-
mial reduction into the problem of satisifiability for classical Kripre models.
Theorem 4.2.13. Sat1(CFr,  Ln) is PSPACE-hard.
Proof. Let us consider the mapping tr from classical modal formulas into our
modal formulas defined by
• tr(p) = p⊗ (n−1). . . ⊗p, if p is a propositional variable,
• tr(⊥) = ⊥,
• tr(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = tr(ϕ1) ∧ tr(ϕ2),
• tr(ϕ1 → ϕ2) = tr(ϕ1)→ tr(ϕ2),
• tr(3ϕ) = 3 tr(ϕ).
This translation is clearly polynomial (because essentially we are only replacing
variables and because Ln is fixed), and by induction on formulas it is easy to
check that for all modal formulas ϕ, it holds that
• ϕ is modally satisfiable in a classical Kripke model, iff
• tr(ϕ) is modally satisfiable in a crisp Kripke model.
By the PSPACE-hardness of classical modal logic ([Lad77]) the proof finishes.
Unfortunately, for the case of the set Sat1(Fr,  Ln), the authors do not know
how to get the PSPACE-hardness by a reduction from the classical case. One
reduction can be obtained by the mapping tr′ defined like tr except for the
condition
• tr′(3ϕ) = (3 tr′(ϕ))n−1,
but this reduction is not polynomial. Thus, in order to prove our next theorem
we need to go into the details of codifying Quantified Boolean Formulas QBF (it
is well known that validity of QBF is PSPACE-complete). Since we essentially
use the same ideas that are used in the classical modal case (see the proof given
in [BdRV01, Theorem 6.50]), we will not go into all the details of the proof.
Theorem 4.2.14. Sat1(Fr,  Ln) is PSPACE-hard.
Proof. Let us consider β a QBF formula. We define a modal formula f(β) in the
same way as in [BdRV01, p. 390]. It is well known from [BdRV01, Theorem 6.50]
that
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• β is valid, iff
• f(β) is modally satisfiable in a classical Kripke model.
It is quite straightforward to check that for the formulas of the form f(β) it
happens that
• f(β) is modally satisfiable in a classical Kripke model, iff
• f(β) is modally satisfiable in a Kripke  Ln-model.
This fact is based on the properties stated at the end of Section 1.1.2.
To finish this section let us point out that when our language has the Delta
operator, this last proof can be simplified quite a lot just by realizing that the
reduction tr′ can be somehow converted into one that is polynomial; this is so
because
4ϕ↔ ϕn−1
is a valid formula. In this simplification it is crucial that the length of 4ϕ is
much shorter than the length of ϕn−1.
4.3 Concept satisfiability in the general case of
finite-valued FDLs
The proof given in Section 4.2 can not be straightforwardly generalized to the
case of every finite-valued IALCEDT , because some steps relies on the good
behavior of  Lukasiewicz negation with respect to the quantifiers. So, in this
section we will consider directly the satisfiability problem in the general setting
of finite-valued IALCEDT . This gives us also the possibility of proposing a new
procedure based on the one presented in Definition 3.1.2.
In the rest of the present section, instead of talking about r-satisfiability we
will use the terminology “modally r-satisfiable” (see Definition 4.3.1) because we
will keep the terminology r-satisfiable for the case that we consider propositional
assignations. We just introduce this notion in a FDL environment, since, in the
previous section, its meaning was clear from the context.
Definition 4.3.1. (Modal r-satisfiability in IALCEDT ) A concept C is said to
be modally r-satisfiable in case that there is an interpretation I and an object
a ∈ ∆I such that CI(a) = r.
Next we define the main computational problem we deal with in this section,
together with its parametrized versions. It is worth saying that we are not only
considering a different computational problem for every finite MTL-chain T,
we also consider one computational problem which can be understood as the
uniform version of the ones parametrized by T.
Definition 4.3.2. The computational problem Satisf is the following one:
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Input: (T, C, r) where T is a finite MTL-chain, C is a concept of IALCEDT
and r ∈ T .
Output: Yes/No depending whether C is modally r-satisfiable or not.
Moreover, for every finite MTL-chain T, the computational problem SatisfT is
the one obtained by fixing the finite MTL-chain in the previous problem.
We can think on the elements of T as truth values. Our interest in the present
section is on finite MTL chains, and so we will always assume that the lattice
part of T is fixed in the sense that T is the set {0, 1n−1 , . . . , n−2n−1 , 1} (for some
natural number n ≥ 2) and that 0 < 1n−1 < . . . < n−2n−1 < 1. In particular, n will
always refer to the cardinal of T .
The assumption on the lattice part of T that we have adopted above makes
that the input T, in the uniform problem, is codified by its cardinal n and the
tables of the t-norm and its residuum.
Notice that the Satisf problem we deal with in this section is a more general
problem than SatisfT. The main statement about Satisf on the present section
is the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3.3. Satisf is PSPACE-complete.
The rest of the section is devoted to give the proof of the membership
in PSPACE. The proof that concept modal r-satisfiability for finite-valued
IALCEDT is PSPACE hard is the same proof we provided for Theorem 4.2.13
for the case of IALCEDT based on  Ln. So, we will not repeat it here. In other
words, we only need to prove the PSPACE membership.
Notation. For the sake of clarification sometimes we will use · to mean the
concatenation of strings, but in most cases we will just juxtapose the symbols
we want to concatenate.
4.3.1 PSPACE upper bound
In this section we are going to prove that Satisf is in PSPACE. In particular,
this implies that each one of the parametrized satisfiability problems by a finite
MTL-chain T also belongs to PSPACE. In order to achieve this result, we will
give a PSPACE algorithm inspired by [Ha´j05]. Our proof follows the same
pattern as the proofs in [BdRV01] and [BCE11], but here we do not make use
of Hintikka sets or functions, like in the cited papers or in Section 4.2.
Preliminary definitions
Several technical definitions will be needed later to prove PSPACE membership.
We state these definitions now.
Definition 4.3.4.
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An occurrence of a subconcept D in C is determined by the occurrence of
a constructor or of an atomic concept. We will use to mark the occurrence
considered.
It is worth noticing that every concept is equivalent to a propositional com-
bination of atoms (i.e., generalized atoms and atomic concepts). Here by propo-
sitional combination we allow the use of all constructors except ∀R and ∃R.
The labeling function provided in Definition 3.2.2 does not bring enough
information in order to cut up the propositional theory P into polynomial slices.
For this reason we have to enhance that first version of the labeling function by
means of a more general version.
In the next definition we provide a labeling system that is a modification
of the one given in Definition 3.2.2. It is crucial for the proof to give such a
modification because this modification allows to recursively define the domain
of the interpretation that possibly satisfies a given concept. Given a concept C,
our labeling system assigns each occurrence of a subconcept of C a number that
gives an account of the syntactic structure of C. It is closely related to what in
[SSS91] is called the skeleton of a constraint system, and it is worth emphasizing
that the labelling is defined on occurrences (not on subconcepts).
Definition 4.3.5 (Labeling (general version)). Let C be a concept. A labelling
function (label for short) lC(·) is the function which associates to every occur-
rence D of a subconcept in C a string of symbols in NR ∪ N defined by the
conditions:
1. lC(C) is the empty sequence ε,
2. if D is a propositional combination of concepts D1, . . . , Dj , then lC(Di) :=
lC(D) for every i ≤ j.
3. if D is ∀R.D′ or ∃R.D′, then lC(D′) is the concatenated sequence lC(D) ·
Ri, where i is the minimum non-zero number j such that the sequence
lC(D) ·Rj has not been used to label any occurrence in C.
We will denote by ΛC the set of labels of all occurrences in C. Given λ ∈ ΛC ,
we define path (λ) as the finite sequence of symbols in NR obtained by deleting
in the sequence λ the symbols from N, and we will refer to it as the role path of
λ. We define the length of λ, in symbols |λ|, as the number of symbols in the
sequence path (λ).
For every atomic role R ∈ NR, we introduce the binary relation ≺R among labels
by the condition:
λ ≺R λ′ if and only if path (λ′) = path (λ) ·R.
And the relation ≺ is defined as ⋃{≺R: R ∈ NR}.
It is worth saying that for every concept C, there are labellings lC . For the
sake of simplicity, whenever in the future we have a fixed concept C, we will
write l instead of lC .
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Example 4.3.6. Let us consider, as an example, the concept
∃S.(∃R.A→ ∃R.(∀R.A ∃S.A)).
Then, we have the following labels:
l
(
∃S.(∃R.A→ ∃R.(∀R.A ∃S.A))) = ε
l
(
∃S.(∃R.A→ ∃R.(∀R.A ∃S.A))) = S0
l
(
∃S.(∃R.A→ ∃R.(∀R.A ∃S.A))) = S0R0
l
(
∃S.(∃R.A→ ∃R.(∀R.A ∃S.A))) = S0R1
l
(
∃S.(∃R.A→ ∃R.(∀R.A ∃S.A))) = S0R1R0
l
(
∃S.(∃R.A→ ∃R.(∀R.A ∃S.A))) = S0R1S0.
We remind the reader that we follow the above convention to use to denote
occurrences.
From the above introduced labeling system, we are going to define the set
of individuals employed to build an interpretation for a given concept C. Thus,
from now on we assume that C and a labelling l are fixed. The individuals we
have talked about are the ones introduced in the following definition.
Definition 4.3.7. The set ΣC is defined as the set
ΣC := {λ1 · . . . · λs : s ∈ N, λ1 ≺ λ2 ≺ . . . ≺ λs}
formed by sequences of labels. For the case s = 0 we have that ε ∈ ΣC . Given
σ = λ1 · . . . ·λs ∈ ΣC , we define the length of σ, in symbols |σ|, as the number s.
And we define its role path path (σ) as path (λs). Following the same pattern,
we will write σ ≺R σ′ and σ ≺ σ′ when the corresponding relation holds between
λs and λ
′
s′ .
It is straightforward that |σ| = |λs|. In the rest of this section we will
sometimes refer to the elements of ΣC as constants. The underlying idea is
that the set ΣC of constants is indeed the domain of an interpretation that
modally satisfies the concept C. Unfortunately, the cardinality of ΣC might be
not polynomial on the size of concept C.
The next definition is very similar to one stated in [Ha´j05] and reported
here as Definition 3.1.2. It gives an account of how to make a partition of the
theory obtained by applying Ha´jek’s reduction to a given concept. The theory
we consider now is a propositional one (non-modal) over the set At of variables
and is defined as
{B(σ) : B occurrence of an atom in C and σ ∈ ΣC} ∪
{R(σ, σ′) : R ∈ NR, σ, σ′ ∈ ΣC and σ ≺R σ′}.
We will use the name of assertion to denote expressions B(σ) where B is an
occurrence of an atom in C and σ ∈ ΣC . For every formula ϕ obtained from the
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set At of variables using propositional operators (i.e., non-modal) we define Atϕ
as the set of variables appearing in ϕ. Analogously, we can consider AtΦ for any
set of such formulas.
Definition 4.3.8. Let B(σ) be an assertion such that B is the occurrence of a
generalized atom in C. Then the Ha´jek set HC(B(σ)) is defined distinguishing
the following two cases.
(∀) if B = ∀R.D, then HC(∀R.D(σ)) is the following set of formulas:
– ∀R.D(σ) ≡ (R(σ, σ · l(D)) A D(σ · l(D))),
– ∀R.D(σ) A (R(σ, σ · l(E)) A D(σ · l(E))), for each occurrence E of a
generalized atom occurring in C such that path (l(E)) = path (l(D));
(∃) if B = ∃R.D, then HC(∃R.D(σ)) is the following set of formulas:
– ∃R.D(σ) ≡ (R(σ, σ · l(D))D(σ · l(D))),
–
(
R(σ, σ · l(E))D(σ · l(E))) A ∃R.D(σ), for each occurrence E of a
generalized atom occurring in C such that path (l(E)) = path (l(D)).
The formula in HC(B(σ)) having the connective ≡ as main connective will be
called the main formula of HC(B(σ)). The formula B(σ) will be called the head
of each one of the elements in HC(B(σ)); and we will give the name of body to
the formula lying on the opposite side of the head.
Definition 4.3.9. Let C be a concept and σ ∈ ΣC . Then, the Ha´jek theory
HC(σ) of σ is the set:
HC(σ) :=
⋃
{HC(D(σ)) : path (σ) = path (l(D)),
D occurrence of a generalized atom}
Recall Definition 3.2.6, for the sake of simplicity, for every subconcept D and
σ ∈ ΣC , throughout this section, we will denote pr(D(σ)) by D(σ) and the set
{p : p occurs in pr(HC(σ))} by AtHC(σ).
The next definition will be heavily used in the future in order to give to each
Ha´jek theory of a given concept C a self-standing status as well as to make a
bridge between the model that is claimed to satisfy concept C and the algorithm
which says that there exists one.
Definition 4.3.10. Let e : AtHC(σ) −→ T and e′ : AtHC(σ′) −→ T be mappings
for some σ, σ′ ∈ ΣC . Then, we say that e and e′ are mutually consistent if they
assign the same value to common elements, that is, for every p ∈ AtHC(σ) ∩
AtHC(σ′), it holds that
e(p) = e′(p).
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Witness sets and satisfiability
We now define what is a Witness set in the new framework. Following [BdRV01],
this structure is used as a bridge structure between a model that is supposed to
satisfy a given concept C and a procedure that decides whether such a model
exists. We will use again the name used in Definition 4.2.8, but adapting the
notion to the new framework.
Definition 4.3.11. Let C be a concept, let σ ∈ ΣC , let e : AtHC(σ) −→ T be a
mapping such that e(HC(σ)) = 1 and let
W ⊆ ⋃{Func(AtHC(σ′), T) : σ′ ∈ ΣC}
where Func(A,B) refers to the mappings from A into B. We say that W is a
witness set generated by e if:
1. e ∈ W,
2. for every e′ ∈ W with e′ : AtHC(σ′) −→ T , if a generalized atom E appears
in the body of a formula in HC(σ′), then there is a mapping e′′ ∈ W such
that
• e′′ : At(HC(σ′ · l(E))) −→ T ,
• e′′HC(σ′ · l(E))) = 1,
• e′ and e′′ are mutually consistent.
3. for every e′ ∈ W with e′ : AtHC(σ′) −→ T , there are e0, . . . , ek ∈ W such
that:
• e0 = e,
• ek = e′ and k = |σ′|,
• for every 0 < i ≤ k, ei is mutually consistent with ei−1,
• for every 0 < i ≤ n, there is σi ∈ ΣC , such that
– ei : AtHC(σi) → T , σi−1 ≺ σi,
– ei(HC(σi)) = 1 (here we consider σ0 := ε).
We will say that e generates a witness set in the case that there is some W
such that W is a witness set generated by e.
The next lemma will allow us to show that the concept C is satisfiable if and
only if there exists a mapping e which generates a witness set on it.
Lemma 4.3.12. Let C be a concept. For every σ ∈ ΣC , every D1, . . . , Di
occurrences in C, and every r1, . . . , ri ∈ T , if path (σ) = path (l(D1)) = . . . =
path (l(Di)) then the following statements are equivalent:
1. there is an interpretation I and an individual a ∈ ∆I such that
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DI1 (a) = r1, . . . , D
I
i (a) = ri,
2. there is a mapping e : AtHC(σ)∪{D1(σ),...,Di(σ)} −→ T , such that
• e(D1(σ)) = r1, . . . , e(Di(σ)) = ri and
• e generates a witness set.
Proof. (1 ⇒ 2) : Suppose that there is an interpretation I and an individual
a ∈ ∆I such that
DI1 (a) = r1, . . . , D
I
i (a) = ri.
Define the propositional evaluation e : AtHC(σ)∪{D1(σ),...,Di(σ)} −→ T such
that, for every D(σ) appearing in HC(σ) ∪ {D1(σ), . . . , Di(σ)}:
e(D(σ)) = DI(a).
It is clear that the propositional evaluation e satisfies the first condition of
the statement. Now we have to prove that e generates a witness set. In order to
do this, we inductively define the witness set W.
• The first step is obviously obtained by setting e := a.
• Suppose that e′ : AtHC(σ′) −→ T has been already defined as
e′(D(σ′)) := DI(b)
for b ∈ ∆I and D(σ′) appearing in AtHC(σ′). Since I is a model of C,
we have that for every generalized atom QR.E appearing in the head of a
formula in HC(σ′), there is c ∈ ∆I such that
QR.EI(b) ≡ (RI(b, c)2EI(c)) = 1
for 2 ∈ {,A}. Hence, by setting
– e′(F (σ′ · l(F ))) = e′′(F (σ′ · l(F ))) := F I(c)
– e′(R(σ′, σ′ · l(F ))) := RI(b, c)
for every F (σ′ · l(F )) and R(σ′, σ′ · l(F )) appearing in AtHC(σ′), we obtain
that
– e′(HC(σ′)) = 1,
– e′ and e′′ are mutually consistent.
Repeating the process for every σ′ ∈ ΣC , we obtain that for every e′ ∈ W
with e′ : AtHC(σ′) −→ T , there are e0, . . . , ek ∈ W such that:
– e0 = e,
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– ek = e
′ and k = |σ′|,
– for every 0 < i ≤ k, ei is mutually consistent with ei−1,
– for every 0 < i ≤ n, there is σi ∈ ΣC , such that
∗ ei : AtHC(σi) → T , σi−1 ≺ σi,
∗ ei(HC(σi)) = 1.
(2⇒ 1) : Suppose that there is a mapping e : AtHC(σ)∪{D1(σ),...,Di(σ)} −→ T ,
such that e(D1(σ)) = r1, . . . , e(Di(σ)) = ri, and e generates a witness set.
Then we have to show that there exists an interpretation I and an individual
a ∈ ∆I such that DI1 (a) = r1, . . . , DIi (a) = ri. So, define the interpretation
I = (∆I , ·I), where:
• ∆I = ΣC ,
• RI(σ, σ′) =
{
eσ(R(σ, σ
′)), if R(σ, σ′) occurs in HC(σ)
0, otherwise
• for every atomic concept A and σ ∈ ΣC , define AI(σ) = eσ(A(σ)), if A(σ)
occurs in HC(σ) and AI(σ) = 0, otherwise.
Now we have to show by induction on concepts, that, for every occurrence
E of a subconcept of C and every σ ∈ ∆I , EI(σ) = eσ(E(σ)).
• If E is either an atomic or a constant concept, it holds by definition of I.
• If E is a propositional combination of concepts, this is trivial.
• Let E = ∀R.F and suppose that F I(σ) = eσ(F (σ)) and RI(σ, σ · l(F )) =
eσ(R(σ, σ ·l(F )). On the one hand, by Definition 4.2.8 and Definition 4.3.8,
it holds that eσ(HC(σ)) = 1 and
eσ(∀R.F (σ)) =
= eσ(R(σ, σ · l(F )))⇒ eσ(F (σ · l(F ))) =
= eσ(R(σ, σ · l(F )))⇒ eσ·l(F )(F (σ · l(F ))) =
= RI(σ, σ · l(F ))⇒ F I(σ · l(F )).
On the other hand, again by Definition 4.2.8 and Definition 4.3.8, it holds
that, for every generalized atom G such that path (l(G)) = path (l(F )),
eσ(∀R.F (σ)) ≤
≤ eσ(R(σ, σ · l(G)))⇒ eσ(F (σ · l(G))) =
= eσ(R(σ, σ · l(G)))⇒ eσ·l(G)(F (σ · l(G))) =
= RI(σ, σ · l(G))⇒ F I(σ · l(G))
So, eσ(∀R.F (σ)) = minx∈∆I{RI(σ, x)⇒ F I(x)} = (∀R.F )I(σ).
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• Let E = ∃R.F and suppose that F I(σ) = eσ(F (σ)) and RI(σ, σ · l(F )) =
eσ(R(σ, σ ·l(F )). On the one hand, by Definition 4.2.8 and Definition 4.3.8,
it holds that eσ(HD(σ)) = 1 and
eσ(∃R.F (σ)) =
= eσ(R(σ, σ · l(F )))) ∗ eσ(F (σ · l(F ))) =
= eσ(R(σ, σ · l(F ))) ∗ eσ·l(F )(F (σ · l(F ))) =
= RI(σ, σ · l(F )) ∗ F I(σ · l(F ))
On the other hand, again by Definition 4.2.8 and Definition 4.3.8, it holds
that, for every generalized atom G such that path (l(G)) = path (l(F )),
eσ(∃R.F (σ)) ≥
≥ eσ(R(σ, σ · l(G))) ∗ eσ(F (σ · l(G))) =
= eσ(R(σ, σ · l(G))) ∗ eσ·l(G)(F (σ · l(G))) =
= RI(σ, σ · l(G)) ∗ F I(σ · l(G))
So, eσ(∃R.F (σ)) = maxx∈∆I{RI(σ, x) ∗ F I(x)} = (∃R.F )I(σ).
Hence, for every concept E and every σ ∈ ∆I , it holds that EI(σ) = eσ(E(σ)).
Using the occurrence C itself and the constant ε we get the following corollary.
Corollary 4.3.13. Let C be a concept and r ∈ T . The following statements are
equivalent.
1. C is modally r-satisfiable,
2. there is a mapping e : AtHC(ε) −→ T such that e(C(ε)) = r and e generates
a witness set on C.
Witness sets and procedures
Let us now consider the procedure NodeC(σ, 〈D1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Di, ri〉) given in Fig-
ure 4.2. This procedure takes as admissible inputs strings made by
• an element σ ∈ ΣC and
• a set of pairs 〈D1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Di, ri〉, where, for 1 ≤ j ≤ i, Dj is the occur-
rence of a concept in C and rj is a truth value,
and has three possible outputs:
• true,
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Write down HC(σ) ∪ {D1(σ), . . . , Di(σ)}.
if there is a mapping eσ : AtHC(σ)∪{Dj(σ) : 1≤j≤i} −→ T such that eσ(Dj(σ)) =
rj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ i and eσ(HC(σ)) = 1 then
if for every j ≤ i it holds that nest(Dj) = 0 then
return true
else
return the following list of strings
(σ · l(E1), 〈E1, r11〉, . . . , 〈Ek, r1k〉),
...
(σ · l(Ek), 〈E1, rk1〉, . . . , 〈Ek, rkk〉),
where {E1, . . . , Ek} are the occurrences in the body of HC(σ) and,
for every 1 ≤ h,m ≤ k, eσ(Em(σ · l(Eh))) = rhm .
end if
else
return false
end if
Figure 4.2: Algorithm NodeC(σ, 〈D1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Di, ri〉)
• false
• a list of strings
(σ · l(E1), 〈E1, r11〉, . . . , 〈Ek, r1k〉),
...
(σ · l(Ek), 〈E1, rk1〉, . . . , 〈Ek, rkk〉),
each one of these strings being an admissible input2.
What it is crucial is that in case that path (σ) = path (l(D1)) = . . . =
path (l(Di)), also the strings obtained as output satisfy this equality requirement.
This procedure will be later used as a subroutine by the algorithm
WitnessC(σ, 〈D1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Di, ri〉) (see Figure 4.3) in order to check for the r-
satisfiability of a given concept C. For this reason it is parametrized with a
concept C which does not appear within the input string.
Now we check that the time needed by algorithm
NodeC(σ, 〈D1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Di, ri〉) to reach an answer is non-deterministically
polynomial on the length of the input.
Lemma 4.3.14. Algorithm NodeC(σ, 〈D1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Di, ri〉) is in NPTIME.
Proof. Let C be a concept, σ ∈ ΣC , D1 . . . , Di occurrences of subconcepts of
C such that path(l(Dj)) = path(l(Dj+1)) = path(σ), for 1 ≤ j < i and let us
2Note that here, with the notation (〈E1, r11 〉, . . . , 〈Ek, r1k 〉) we mean that the pairs of
concept and truth values appearing in the output are among 〈E1, r11 〉, . . . , 〈Ek, r1k 〉, even if
they are not all indeed present.
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denote, for short, the input σ, 〈D1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Di, ri〉 by ϕ. First of all we need
to see which is the size of HC(σ) with respect to the size of the input. As
we can see from Definition 4.3.8, given a generalized atom E(a), the size of a
single formula appearing in a Ha´jek theory HC(E(a)) is at most 2 · |E| (here
|E| refers to the length of the encoding of E). Since, for every generalized atom
E appearing in the input ϕ, it holds that |E| ≤ |ϕ|, then the time needed
to write down a single formula appearing in HC(E(a)) is in O(|ϕ|). Again
Definition 4.3.8 says us that, for every generalized atom QR.E, with Q ∈ {∀,∃},
appearing in the input ϕ, such that |l(QR.E)| = |σ|, the number of formulas in
HC(QR.E(σ)), is the number of all the generalized atoms QP.F appearing in
the input ϕ, such that path(l(QP.F )) = path(σ) and P = R, which is less than
|ϕ|. Hence, for every generalized atom QR.E appearing in the input ϕ, such
that path(l(QR.E)) = path(σ), the number of formulas in HC(QR.E(σ)), the
time needed to write HC(QR.E(σ)) is in O(|ϕ|2). By Definition 4.3.9, we have
that, in order to calculate the size of HC(σ), we need to sum the sizes of theories
HC(E(σ)), of generalized atoms E appearing in the input such that |l(E)| = |σ|.
Since the number of such generalized atoms is less that |ϕ|, then the time needed
to write down HC(σ) is in O(|ϕ|3).
Furthermore, it is easy to see that the size of eσ(HC(σ)∪{Dj(σ) : 1 ≤ j ≤ i})
is constant on the size of HC(σ) ∪ {Dj(σ) : 1 ≤ j ≤ i} (the constant factor
depending on the encoding of the mapping eσ(·)). Since, as we have seen, the
size of HC(σ) ∪ {Dj(σ) : 1 ≤ j ≤ i} is in O(|ϕ|3), so is the size of eσ(HC(σ) ∪
{Dj(σ) : 1 ≤ j ≤ i}).
It is well-known (see [Ha¨h01]) that satisfiability for propositional finite-valued
logics is an NP-complete problem. Hence, answering whether for a given map-
ping eσ from AtHC(σ)∪{Dj(σ) : 1≤j≤i} to T it holds that eσ(Dj(σ)) = rj , for
1 ≤ j ≤ i and eσ(HC(σ)) = 1 is a task that can be accomplished in an amount
of time that is polynomial on the cardinality of the set AtHC(σ)∪{Dj(σ) : 1≤j≤i}.
Therefore, the time needed to accomplish this task is still polynomial on the
size of ϕ. Moreover, we will need to write down a possible solution to the
above problem in the form eσ(E1(σ1)) = r1, . . . , eσ(Em(σm)) = rm, where
E1(σ1), . . . , Em(σm) ∈ AtHC(σ)∪{Dj(σ) : 1≤j≤i} and r1, . . . , rm ∈ T . It is easy
to see that the time needed to write down such a solution is constant in the size
of AtHC(σ)∪{Dj(σ) : 1≤j≤i} (the constant factor depending on the encoding of the
truth values).
Finally, when the output is not simply a boolean, it is just part of
the above mentioned solution re-written in a different form. Since the
size of eσ(E1(σ1)) = r1, . . . , eσ(Em(σm)) = rm, coincides with the size
of (σ1, 〈E1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Em, rm〉), . . . , (σm, 〈E1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Em, rm〉), then the time
needed to write down the output of algorithm NodeC is also polynomial on
the size of ϕ.
Next we consider the algorithm WitnessC(σ, 〈D1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Di, ri〉) given in
Figure 4.3.
Lemma 4.3.15. Let C be a concept. For every σ ∈ ΣC , every D1, . . . , Di
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if NodeC(σ, 〈D1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Di, ri〉) returns true then
return true
end if
if NodeC(σ, 〈D1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Di, ri〉) returns a list of strings and for each
string σ ·l(Em), 〈E1, rm1〉, . . . , 〈Ek, rmk〉 in this list, it holds that WitnessC(σ ·
l(Em), 〈E1, rm1〉, . . . , 〈Ek, rmk〉) returns true then
return true
else
return false
end if
Figure 4.3: Algorithm WitnessC(σ, 〈D1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Di, ri〉)
occurrences in C, and every r1, . . . , ri ∈ T , if path (σ) = path (l(D1)) = . . . =
path (l(Di)) then the following statements are equivalent.
1. WitnessC(σ, 〈D1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Di, ri〉) returns true,
2. there is a mapping e : AtHC(σ)∪{D1(σ),...,Di(σ)} −→ T , such that
e(D1(σ)) = r1, . . . , e(Di(σ)) = ri and e generates a witness set.
Proof. The proof of each one of the directions is done by induction (but decreas-
ing the step): first of all we consider the case that |σ| = nest(C), and then we
show that if we know the statement for all σ′ with |σ′| = d + 1 then we also
know it for the case that |σ| = d.
(1 ⇒ 2): Suppose that WitnessC(σ, 〈D1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Di, ri〉) returns true, we
proceed by induction on the degree of C.
(0) If nest(Dj) = 0, for 1 ≤ j ≤ i, then HC(σ) is empty. Since
WitnessC(σ, 〈D1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Di, ri〉) returns true, then e is a mapping
over {Dj(σ) : 1 ≤ j ≤ i} such that e(Dj(σ)) = rj and W = {e} is a
witness set generated by e on {Dj(σ) : 1 ≤ j ≤ i}.
(d) Let nest(Dj) > 0, for at least one j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ i and suppose,
by inductive hypothesis, that,
– for each occurrences E1, . . . , Ek of concepts occurring in C such
that there exist R ∈ NR and n ∈ N with l(E1) = . . . = l(Ek) =
l(Dj) ·Rn,
– for each σ′ ∈ ΣC , such that there exists 1 ≤ m ≤ k with σ′ =
σ · l(Em),
– for each r1, . . . , rk ∈ T ,
it holds that, if
WitnessC(σ
′, 〈E1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Ek, rk〉) returns true,
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then there is a mapping eσ′ : AtHC(σ′)∪{Eh(σ′) : 1≤m≤k} −→ T such
that
– eσ′(Em(σ
′)) = rm, for 1 ≤ m ≤ k,
– eσ′(HC(σ′)) = 1,
– eσ′ generates a witness set Wσ′ on E1, . . . , Ek.
Now, suppose that WitnessC(σ, 〈D1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Di, ri〉) returns true,
then:
1. NodeC(σ, 〈D1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Di, ri〉) returns a list of strings {σ ·
l(Em), 〈E1, rm1〉, . . . , 〈Ek, rmk〉 : 1 ≤ m ≤ k} (remember that
nest(Dj) > 0 by hypothesis) and, therefore (see Figure 4.2),
there is a mapping e : AtHC(σ)∪{D1(σ),...,Di(σ)} −→ T , such that
e(D1(σ)) = r1, . . . , e(Di(σ)) = ri
2. For each string σ · l(Em), 〈E1, rm1〉, . . . , 〈Ek, rmk〉 in the output
of NodeC(σ, 〈D1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Di, ri〉), it holds that WitnessC(σ ·
l(Em), 〈E1, rm1〉, . . . , 〈Ek, rmk〉) returns true.
Hence, by inductive hypothesis, for each occurrence Em appearing
in the output of NodeC(σ, 〈D1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Di, ri〉), there is a mapping
eσ′ : AtHC(σ′)∪{Eh(σ′) : 1≤m≤k} −→ T such that
– eσ′(Em(σ
′)) = rm, for 1 ≤ m ≤ k,
– eσ′(HC(σ′)) = 1,
– eσ′ generates a witness set Wσ′ on E1, . . . , Ek.
Moreover, since the truth values r11 , . . . , rkk are those appearing in
the output of NodeC(σ, 〈D1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Di, ri〉), then eσ overlaps with
each eσ′ . So, the set:
W = {eσ} ∪
⋃{Weσ′ : σ′ = σ · l(Em) with 1 ≤ m ≤ k}
is a witness set generated by eσ.
(2 ⇐ 1): Suppose that eσ : AtHC(σ)∪{D1(σ),...,Di(σ)} −→ T is a mapping such
that eσ(D1(σ)) = r1, . . . , eσ(Di(σ)) = ri and eσ generates a witness set.
(0) If nest(Dj) = 0, for every 1 ≤ j ≤ i then it is
enough that eσ be a mapping such that eσ(Dj(σ)) = rj , for
WitnessC(σ, 〈D1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Di, ri〉) to return true.
(d) Let nest(Dj) > 0 for at least one 1 ≤ j ≤ i and suppose, by inductive
hypothesis, that
– for each occurrences E1, . . . , Ek of concepts occurring in C such
that there exist R ∈ NR and n ∈ N with l(E1) = . . . = l(Ek) =
l(Dj) ·Rn,
– for each σ′ ∈ ΣC , such that there exists 1 ≤ m ≤ k with σ′ =
σ · l(Em),
– for each r1, . . . , rk ∈ T ,
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it holds that, if there is a mapping eσ′ : AtHC(σ′)∪{Eh(σ′) : 1≤m≤k} −→
T such that
– eσ′(Em(σ
′)) = rm, for 1 ≤ m ≤ k,
– eσ′(HC(σ′)) = 1,
– eσ′ generates a witness set Wσ′ on E1, . . . , Ek.
then
WitnessC(σ
′, 〈E1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Ek, rk〉) returns true,
Now, if eσ is a mapping which generates a witness set Weσ on
{D1, . . . , Di}, then, by Definition 4.2.8, for each occurrence of a gen-
eralized atom E appearing in the body of a formula in HC(σ) there
is a mapping eσ′ ∈ W such that
– eσ′(HC(σ′)) = 1,
– eσ and eσ′ are mutually consistent.
We consider the overlapping relation ol to be the transitive closure of
the mutually consistent relation between mappings. Then the set
{e′ ∈ W : eσ ol e′}
is a witness set generated by eσ on {D1, . . . , Di}. Hence, by inductive
hypothesis,
– for each occurrences E1, . . . , Ek of concepts occurring in C such
that there exist R ∈ NR and n ∈ N with l(E1) = . . . = l(Ek) =
l(Dj) ·Rn,
– for each σ′ ∈ ΣC , such that there exists 1 ≤ m ≤ k with σ′ =
σ · l(Em),
– for each r1, . . . , rk ∈ T ,
there is a mapping eσ′ : AtHC(σ′) −→ T such that
WitnessC(σ
′, 〈E1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Ek, rk〉) returns true.
Hence (see Figure 4.3), it holds that
WitnessC(σ, 〈D1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Di, ri〉) returns true,
In particular, we have that the statement holds for ε, C and r.
Corollary 4.3.16. Let C be a concept and r ∈ T . Then WitnessC(ε, 〈C, r〉)
returns true if and only if there is a mapping e : HC(ε) ∪ {C(ε)} −→ T such
that e(C(ε)) = r that generates a witness set.
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Main result
Combining Corollaries 4.3.13 and 4.3.16 we can now prove the main result.
Theorem 4.3.3 Satisf is in PSPACE.
Proof. Corollaries 4.3.13 and 4.3.16 tell us that the algorithm in Figure 4.3 does
what we want. It only remains to see that this algorithm belongs to PSPACE.
Let C be an IALCEDT concept. By Lemma 4.3.12 and Lemma 4.3.15 we
have that C is r-satisfiable if and only if there is a partial propositional evaluation
e : pr(HC(ε)) −→ T such that Witness(ε, 〈C, r〉) returns true. Hence we need
to prove that Witness can be given a PSPACE implementation. Consider a non-
deterministic Turing machine that guesses a strings σ, 〈D1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Di, ri〉 and
runs Witness(σ, 〈D1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Di, ri〉), then we need to prove that this machine
runs in NPSPACE and, by an appeal to Savitch’s Theorem, we will achieve the
desired result.
Algorithm Witness is a recursive algorithm and, at every recursive call,
subroutine NodeC is triggered over one of the strings σ, 〈D1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Di, ri〉
obtained from a previous triggering of NodeC . The choice of the string to be
processed by NodeC at every successive step can be done by non-deterministic
guess.
Due to the overlapping of mappings eσ, for σ ∈ ΣC , at every appli-
cation of subroutine NodeC on a string σ, 〈D1, r1〉, . . . , 〈Di, ri〉, the only in-
formation needed is the output obtained by subroutine NodeC on strings
σ′, 〈D′1, r′1〉, . . . , 〈D′i, r′i〉, for every σ′ that is a prefix of σ. So, at each step,
the remaining information can be deleted.
Intuitively, ΣC can be represented as a tree and the only information that
is needed at each step is the one lying in the path from the root to the present
step. At every successive recursive call the modal degrees of concepts D1, . . . , Di
is strictly less than the modal degrees of concepts processed at the previous
call and at most nest(C) recursive calls are needed until we meet a Ha´jek set
without generalized atoms in the bodies of formulas. So, the maximum amount
of information to be retained in memory is the output of subroutine NodeC
multiplied by nest(C). On the one hand, nest(C) is at most lineal on the size of
C and, therefore, of the input. On the other hand, by Lemma 4.3.14 the space
needed to run subroutine NodeC and to write down its input is polynomial on
the size of the input. Hence the amount of space needed by algorithm Witness
is polynomial on the size of the input.
4.4 Related work
Computational complexity is a problem that has been addressed only in recent
years by researchers on FDL. Besides the results reported in this chapter, some
work has been undertaken on problems that consider the presence of a knowledge
base.
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In [BP11d] it is proved that concept witnessed r-satisfiability with respect to
a general TBox for language ALC over (not necessarily linear) finite De Morgan
lattices is EXPTIME-complete. The result is proved by means of a reduction
to automata theory. Notice that in [BP11d] the truth function considered for
concept constructors are min and max for conjunction and disjunction respec-
tively, a unary function that satisfies the De Morgan laws for the negation and
Kleene-Dienes implication. This implies that the implication constructor and
the existential quantifier are definable like in Zadeh’s semantics.
In [BP11f] the result of [BP11d] is enhanced by adding a finite t-norm to
the operations of the De Morgan lattice and using its residuum in the seman-
tics of the value restriction and of inclusion axioms. With such semantics, the
existential quantifier is no more definable as in the De Morgan lattices consid-
ered in [BP11d]. So, the language considered in [BP11f] is ALCE . Nevertheless,
concept satisfiability with respect to general knowledge bases is proved to be
EXPTIME-complete. Again, the result is proved by means of a reduction to
automata theory.
The semantics considered in [BP11e] is the same as in [BP11f] and the lan-
guage is ALCE with inverse roles, that are not been considered in this disserta-
tion. By means of a reduction to automata theory it is proved that entailment
of lower bound inclusion axioms3 by general knowledge bases is EXPTIME-
complete. The same problem is proved to be PSPACE-complete if the TBox is
acyclic. Moreover it is proved that concept satisfiability with respect to acyclic
TBoxes is PSPACE-complete as well. Again, the proof is based on a recur-
sive reduction to automata theory. The result in [BP11e] generalizes the one in
[BP11f], not only because the language considered is more expressive, but also
because the concept subsumption problem is considered, that was not consid-
ered in [BP11f]. Moreover the problem of concept satisfiability with respect to
acyclic TBoxes is considered.
3In [BP11e] this problem is indeed called concept subsumption with respect to knowledge
bases.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and future
work
In the first part of this chapter we summarize the main contributions of the
dissertation. In a second part we sketch future lines of research taking into
account the framework of FDLs already presented in the introduction.
5.1 Main contributions
The idea of this dissertation is a re-thinking FDL strongly relying on MFL. The
main contributions of the present dissertation to the realization of this idea are
the following:
Fuzzy Description Languages In this dissertation we have considered a
general framework to deal with Fuzzy Description Logic over a semantics based
on Mathematical Fuzzy Logic. Following Ha´jek we have proposed FDL languages
having two constructors for conjunction, two constructors for disjunction (called
in both cases strong and weak), one or two constructors for complementation
(depending whether the residuated negation of the underlying logic is involutive
or not), a constructor for implication (not definable as in the classical case
except for the  Lukasiewicz case) and finally having some optional constructors
like truth constants and Delta operator. This implies the use of a novel notation
for constructors that expands the one traditionally used in classical DL and in
the earlier works in FDL. As part of this task, we have proposed a description
language enriched with novel concept constructors that are the FDL versions
of the logical operators used in the framework of MFL. So, we have considered
a language enriched with concept constructors for strong conjunction , strong
disjunction, implicationA, complementation∼, Monteiro-Baaz Delta operator
4 and a suitable set of truth constants r. The semantics is defined using t-norms
and their residua either defined over [0, 1] or over a finite chain.
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Once set up the new languages, we have considered the consequences of
assuming a semantics based on t-norms. So, we have systematically studied the
hierarchies of FDL languages depending both the constructors allowed in each
language and the t-norm used and their differences with respect to the classical
ALC languages hierarchy. Finally in this FDL languages we have defined fuzzy
KBs following the tradition of FDL. About fuzzy axioms, we have studied the
simplifications that can be performed on the types of axioms in order to narrow
the symbology used to build up fuzzy knowledge bases. About reasoning tasks,
we have studied the reductions that can be performed between them, depending
on the languages and t-norms considered.
Relations to other formalisms The fact of relying on MFL allows to de-
scribe the relations of FDL to other logical formalisms such as Fuzzy First Order
Logic and Fuzzy Multi-modal Logic. Our proposal tries to relate FDL and MFL
so, in the dissertation these relations are studied in deep giving the translations
from FDL concepts and axioms to first order and multi-modal formulas (in the
case of multi-modal we have also provided a translation from multi-modal to
FDL). In both cases we have proved that the translations are meaningful by
means of a translation between the respective semantics. This is a very impor-
tant topic that has been well studied in the classical DLs, but that has not yet
been systematically developed in traditional FDL. Roughly speaking we can say
that these translations justify the fact that these FDLs defined in this disserta-
tion are the description languages associated to Fuzzy Logics studied in MFL.
We point out that the study of the relations of FDL to other formalisms allows
to easily transfer the results on decidability and complexity obtained from one
formalism to others, as we have already seen in Section 4.2.
(Un)decidability and complexity This dissertation also provides some
(un)decidability results that have been proved by the author during his doctoral
studies. The decidability result obtained is limited to concept satisfiability and
subsumption without a knowledge base for language IALE over product t-norm.
The prove is rather interesting because it considers quasi-witnessed interpreta-
tions. For this reasons it has to take into account the problem of dealing with
infinite interpretations, differently from previous results that limits to witnessed
interpretations which provides finite model property for the concept satisfiability
problem in IALCE language. The decidability results are restricted to validity
and positive satisfiability but it is still an open problem for 1-satisfiability.
The undecidability result is really general because, having been proved for a
rather basic language (ALC), it ensures undecidability for a quite wide family
of description languages over the infinite  Lukasiewicz t-norm.
Under a computational complexity point of view the dissertations provides
the following results:
1. Satisfiability and validity of formulas are PSPACE-complete for the Multi-
modal Logic of all Kripke  Ln-frames.
142
2. Concept r-satisfiability and 1-subsumption are PSPACE-complete for lan-
guage IALCEDS , over any finite MTL-chain.
Study of algorithms Besides the results achieved under a computational
point of view, the author thinks that a valuable contribution of this dissertation
is the study of the algorithms applied to reasoning tasks in FDLs. The practical
aspects of FDL, in fact, involves that they have to be thought also with the aim
of designing future real programs and not only as plain results on the possibility
of their application. For this reason, the proved results as well as the procedures
used to prove them are explained in full (and often boring) details.
In Section 4.2 a generalization of the procedure based on Hintikka sets to the
case of Multi-modal Logic of all Kripke  Ln-frames is studied. The result proved
through this procedure is a particular case of the result in Section 4.3. The
aim of the investigation on procedures is the reason for which this procedure is
investigated even though a more general result is provided in the dissertation: the
former section has indeed to be seen as an investigation on a different procedure
used, more than on the result provided.
The novel PSPACE procedure provided in Section 4.3 to prove PSPACE
upper bound for the case of the FDL language IALCEDS , over any finite MTL-
chain is based on Ha´jek’s reduction for  Lukasiewicz. In fact the algorithm re-
ducing concept satisfiability to satisfiability of a set of propositional formulas
remains valid for any FDL language IALCE over a finite MTL-chain since all
models over a finite chain are witnessed. Moreover, this general uniform reduc-
tion provided in [Ha´j05] is investigated, throughout the dissertation, under other
points of view such as
1. its generalization to the quasi-witnessed satisfiability problem in Section
3.2,
2. the fact that it is not polynomial in Section 4.1.
5.2 Open problems and future work
Besides the results achieved in this dissertation, some problems have been left
open. In particular, we outline the following:
• The decidability of the concept 1-satisfiability problem for language [0, 1]Π-
IALE with respect to unrestricted (that is, not only quasi-witnessed) in-
terpretations (see Appendix A, for details).
• Characterizing computational complexity of these algorithms is still an
open problem in the case of an infinite set of truth values.
As future work we could give a long list of problems to deal with, either on
the theoretical side or on the applications. As we have said in the Preface, we
consider FDLs proposed here as a kernel of what has to be a Fuzzy Description
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Logic. The agenda of FDLs contains many concepts and subjects that are not
addressed here, like fuzzy modifiers, fuzzy quantifiers and problems like how to
deal with uncertainty in this framework. We know that these are hard topics,
very important. They have been already addressed in several papers in fuzzy
logic in the wider sense and need to be studied deeper in order to be incorpo-
rated in the framework of FDLs presented here. Nevertheless we restrict the list
to some interesting problems to be studied in the framework proposed in this
dissertation because there is a lot of work to do in this setting.
• A study of more expressive FDLs languages over a finite (MTL) BL-chains.
• a systematic study of the intractability sources for IALCE FDL languages,
• the study of the computational complexity of more expressive FDLs based
on finite t-norms,
• the design of novel procedures for more expressive FDLs based on finite
t-norms,
• a confrontation between the algorithms for FDLs based on finite t-norms,
under the point of view of the execution speed; in particular the ones based
on Hintikka sets, on Ha´jek sets, on Automata Theory, on completion forests
and on a reduction to classical DLs,
• the design of working programs based on the algorithms provided in this
dissertation.
This could be an interesting work-program both since we can study how
complexity changes when going from two valued to n-valued logics and since,
from the applications point of view, it seems that the FDLs that are applicable
in a near future are those valued on a finite chain.
Moreover, there are further issues to be faced in the case of an infinite set of
truth values, such as the decidability of the satisfiability problem in languages
richer than IALCE and of the KB consistency problem with restricted forms of
knowledge bases (like e.g. acyclic ones).
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Appendix A
Quasi-witnessed
completeness of first order
Product Logic with
standard semantics
In this appendix we prove that the first order [0, 1]Π-tautologies coincides with
the first order tautologies with respect to the one generated subalgebra. In
particular this imply that first order [0, 1]Π-tautologies and [0, 1]Π-positive sat-
isfiable formulas coincide with the same sets of formulas restricted to quasi-
witnessed models over [0, 1]Π, a result needed in the first part of Chapter 3 to
prove decidability of validity and positive satisfiability for concepts in FDLs over
product logic.
Recall that an one-generated subalgebra of [0, 1]Π is the subalgebra of [0, 1]Π
whose domain is {a0, a1, a2, . . .} ∪ {0}, for a ∈ (0, 1).
In [Ha´j98c, Theorem 5.4.30] the author proves that [0, 1] L-tautologies coin-
cide with the common  Ln-tautologies for n ≥ 2, i.e., coincide with the common
tautologies of the finite subalgebras of [0, 1] L. In [EGN10] the authors prove
that the result is not valid for a logic of a t-norm different from  Lukasiewicz.
But Ha´jek’s result can be read in another way since  Ln are the one-generated
subalgebras of [0, 1] L whose generator is a rational number. What we prove in
this appendix is that this reading of Ha´jek’s result can be generalized to First
Order Product Logic.
In order to prove this result we first prove some lemmas and provide some
definitions. Firstly we prove the following lemma that uses only residuation
condition, and thus it is also true for any MTL-chain (prelinear residuated chain).
Lemma A.0.1. In any Π-chain the following inequalities hold:
1. (x⇔ x′) ∗ (y ⇔ y′) ≤ (x⇒ y)⇔ (x′ ⇒ y′),
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2. (x⇔ x′) ∗ (y ⇔ y′) ≤ (x ∗ y)⇔ (x′ ∗ y′),
3. infi∈I{xi ⇔ yi} ≤ infi∈I{xi} ⇔ infi∈I{yi},
4. infi∈I{xi ⇔ yi} ≤ supi∈I{xi} ⇔ supi∈I{yi}.
Proof. The proofs are easy consequences of residuation property
x ∗ y ≤ z iff x ≤ y ⇒ z. (res)
In particular we point out that x ∗ (x⇒ y) ≤ y. Next we prove each one of the
items.
1. By symmetry it is enough to prove that (x′ ⇒ x) ∗ (y ⇒ y′) ≤ (x⇒ y)⇒
(x′ ⇒ y′); and this is a consequence of residuation.
2. By symmetry it is enough to prove that (x ⇒ x′) ∗ (y ⇒ y′) ≤ (x ∗ y) ⇒
(x′ ∗ y′); and this is a consequence of residuation.
3. Since we are considering a chain, we can suppose, without loss of gen-
erality, that infi∈I{yi} ≤ infi∈I{xi}. Thus, infi∈I{xi} ⇔ infi∈I{yi} =
infi∈I{xi} ⇒ infi∈I{yi}. It is obvious that it is enough to prove that
inf
i∈I
{xi ⇒ yi} ≤ inf
i∈I
{xi} ⇒ inf
i∈I
{yi},
and this is an easy consequence of residuation because for every i ∈ I,
inf
i∈I
{xi ⇒ yi} ∗ inf
i∈I
{xi} ≤ (xi ⇒ yi) ∗ xi ≤ yi.
4. Without loss of generality we can assume that supi∈I{yi} ≤ supi∈I{xi}.
Thus, supi∈I{xi} ⇔ supi∈I{yi} = supi∈I{xi} ⇒ supi∈I{yi}. It is obvious
that it is enough to prove that
inf
i∈I
{xi ⇒ yi} ≤ sup
i∈I
{xi} ⇒ sup
i∈I
{yi}.
This is true because if a = infi∈I{xi ⇒ yi}, then for every i ∈ I,
a ∗ xi ≤ yi;
and hence,
a ∗ sup
i∈I
{xi} = sup
i∈I
{a ∗ xi} ≤ sup
i∈I
{yi}.
The proof we give for Theorem A.0.5 is based on a continuity argument, and
resembles the one given in [Ha´j98c, Theorem 5.4.30]. The main difference is that
while Ha´jek introduces a distance between models on the same domain, in this
argument we consider a dual notion, which we call similarity and denote by S. In
the case of  Lukasiewicz, since the duality, there is no essential difference between
considering a distance or a similarity, but this is not the case for Product Logic,
where it is crucial to consider a similarity.
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Definition A.0.2 (Similarity). Let Γ be a predicate language with a finite
number of predicate symbols P1, . . . , Pn, and let M,M
′ be two models over
[0, 1]Π on the same domain M such that rPi and r
′
Pi
are the interpretations of
the predicate symbols in M and M′ respectively.
1. For each predicate symbol P ∈ Γ with arity ar(P ), we define
S(rP , r
′
P ) := inf
a∈Mar(P )
{rP (a)⇔ r′P (a)} =
= inf
a∈Mar(P )
{min{rP (a), r′P (a)}
max{rP (a), r′P (a)}
}
2. Moreover, we define
S(M,M′) := S(rP1 , r
′
P1) ∗ . . . ∗ S(rPn , r′Pn).
Definition A.0.3. We define the complexity τ(ϕ) of a formula ϕ as follows:
1. τ(ϕ) = 0, if ϕ is atomic or ⊥,
2. τ(ϕ ∗ ψ) = 1 +max{τ(ϕ), τ(ψ)}, if ? ∈ {→,⊗},
3. τ(Qx ϕ) = τ(ϕ), if Q ∈ {∀,∃}.
This complexity captures the number of nested propositional connectives in the
formula.
Lemma A.0.4. Assume Γ is a predicate language with n predicate symbols. Let
M and M′ be two first order structures over [0, 1]Π on the same domain M , and
let ϕ be a first order formula. Then, for all ε ∈ [0, 1),
if S(M,M′) > n·2τ(ϕ)
√
ε, then,
for each evaluation v, (‖ϕ‖M,v ⇔ ‖ϕ‖M′,v) ≥ ε.
Proof. It is enough to prove that if M differs from M′ only by the interpretation
of one predicate symbol P , then
(Cϕ) for all ε ∈ [0, 1), if S(M,M′) > 2τ(ϕ)
√
ε, then,
for each evaluation v, (‖ϕ‖M,v ⇔ ‖ϕ‖M′,v) ≥ ε.
We show that this condition (Cϕ) holds by induction on the length of the formula
ϕ.
• If ϕ is either atomic or ⊥, then it is obvious.
• Let us suppose ϕ = ψ?χ with ? ∈ {→,⊗}, and S(M,M′) > 2τ(ϕ)√ε. Then,
S(M,M′) > max{ 2τ(ψ)
√√
ε, 2
τ(χ)
√√
ε}. Using the inductive hypothesis for√
ε, we get that
(‖ψ‖M,v ⇔ ‖ψ‖M′,v) ≥
√
ε,
(‖χ‖M,v ⇔ ‖χ‖M′,v) ≥
√
ε.
Hence, by the first two items in Lemma A.0.1 we get that
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(‖ϕ‖M,v ⇔ ‖ϕ‖M′,v) ≥
√
ε ∗ √ε = ε.
• Let us suppose that ϕ = Qxψ, with Q ∈ {∀,∃}, and S(M,M′) > 2τ(ϕ)√ε.
Then, S(M,M′) > 2τ(ψ)
√
ε. By the inductive hypothesis we get that
(‖ψ‖M,v ⇔ ‖ψ‖M′,v) ≥ ε for each evaluation v. Hence,
infv{‖ψ‖M,v ⇔ ‖ψ‖M′,v} ≥ ε.
By the last two items in Lemma A.0.1 it follows that
(‖ϕ‖M,v ⇔ ‖ϕ‖M′,v) ≥ ε.
Hence, the lemma is proved.
We are now ready to prove the main result of the present Appendix.
Theorem A.0.5. A first-order formula ϕ is a [0, 1]Π-tautology if and only if it
is a tautology in any one-generated subalgebra of [0, 1]Π.
Proof. The result is an obvious consequence of the previous lemma. Suppose
that ϕ is not a [0, 1]Π-tautology, then there is a structure M and an evaluation
v such that ‖ϕ‖M,v < ε for some ε < 1. Take s ∈ (0, 1) such that sn > n·2τ(ϕ)
√
ε,
and denote by 〈s〉 the subalgebra of [0, 1] generated by s. For every predicate
symbol P , let r′P (a) be min{t ∈ 〈s〉 : t ≥ rP (a)}. Now we define the structure
M′ = (M, r′P1 , . . . , r
′
Pn
) over the algebra 〈s〉. An easy computation shows that
S(rP , r
′
P ) ≥ s for every predicate symbol P ; hence, S(M,M′) ≥ sn > n·2τ(ϕ)
√
ε.
By Lemma A.0.4, (‖ϕ‖M,v ⇔ ‖ϕ‖M′,v) ≥ ε. This together with the fact that
‖ϕ‖M,v < ε implies that ‖ϕ‖M′,v 6= 1. This finishes the proof.
Corollary A.0.6. A first-order formula ϕ is positively satisfiable w.r.t models
over [0, 1]Π iff it is a positively satisfiable w.r.t models in any one-generated
subalgebra of [0, 1]Π iff it is positively satisfiable w.r.t quasi-witnessed models
over [0, 1]Π.
But the theorem is unknown to be true for 1-satisfiability since if a formula
ϕ is 1-satisfiable the similarity between models does not allow us to prove that
there is a model over the one generated algebra (therefore a quasi-witnessed
model) where ϕ is evaluated 1 as well. In general this means that our argument
does not allow to prove that 1-satisfiability and 1-satisfiabilityQ coincide.
As a consequence, the following question arises:
Open problem Is positive satisfiability equivalent to 1-satisfiability in product
logic?
Two are the known facts about this open problem:
1. The equivalence is true for propositional logic since if ϕ is positively
satisfiable by the evaluation v, then take the evaluation e defined by
e(p) = ¬¬v(p) and an easy computation shows that e(ϕ) = 1.
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2. The conjecture is equivalent to the validity of the following restricted
deduction-detachment theorem (restricted DDT) for standard semantics:
ϕ |= 0¯ iff |= ϕ→ 0¯,
The proof of the point 2 is obvious. Suppose first that formulas 1-satisfiable
coincide with positively satisfiable formulas. Since ϕ |= 0¯ means that ϕ is not a
1-satisfiable formula and thus it is not a positively satisfiable formula. Then in
all first order models ϕ is evaluated as 0 and the result is obvious.
Suppose now that the restricted DDT is true. If ϕ is not 1-satisfiable, then
ϕ |= 0¯ and by the supposition, |= ϕ → 0¯ which implies that ϕ is evaluated as 0
in all first order models. Therefore ϕ is not positively satisfiable.
Remarks about expansions with truth-constants and/or an involutive
negation
Expansions with truth constants Let Π∀c the expansion of Π∀ with
rational truth constants, i.e., with adding one truth constant r¯ for each r ∈
(0, 1) ∪ Q and the canonical interpretation of them (each truth constants r¯ is
interpreted in [0, 1]Π as its value r). In this setting, obviously, the one generated
subalgebra has to contain at least the rationals and thus is very different of the
one generated subalgebra of Π∀. Nevertheless the following results hold:
1. In Π∀c with general semantics, formulas (C∃) and (ΠC∀) are tautologies
(the proof is completely analogous to the one given in Lemma 27, of [CE11],
see Lemma B.4.3 of Appendix B) and thus Π∀c with general semantics is
complete w.r.t. quasi-witnessed models. But for standard semantics we
can not generalize results in this appendix to the expansions with truth
constants and the problem if Π∀c with standard semanticsis complete w.r.t.
quasi-witnessed models remains open.
2. In Π∀c it is clear that positive satisfiability is different from 1-satisfiability
since for any r ∈ (0, 1) ∪ Q r is always positive satisfiability and not 1-
satisfiable. Therefore decidability for 1-satisfiability problem on FDLs over
product logic with truth constants is not settled by the method used by
us and it is still an open problem.
Expansions with an involutive negation Let Π∀∼ the expansion of Π∀
with adding a unary connective ∼ with the interpretaton of the new connective
given by ‖∼ ϕ‖M,v = 1− ‖ϕ‖M,v. In this setting the one-generated subalgebra
(subalgebra generated by an element a ∈ (0, 1)) contains not only the set {an |
n ∈ N} but also their negations {∼ an | n ∈ N}, their products and, so on.
Proposition A.0.7. The support of the subalgebra of [0, 1]Π,∼ generated by an
element a ∈ (0, 1) is a dense set on the real unit interval.
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Proof. Let 〈a〉 be the subalgebra of [0, 1]Π,∼ generated by a ∈ (0, 1) and suppose
that x, y ∈ 〈a〉 with x > y. Obviously 〈a〉 has to contain the elements of the
sequence a > a2 > ... > an > ... (with limit 0) and of the sequence ∼ a <∼ a2 <
... <∼ an < ... (with limit 1). Thus 〈a〉 has to contain also the elements of the
sequence x· ∼ a < x· ∼ a2 < ... < x· ∼ an < ... (with limit x). Thus there is
an n such that x > x· ∼ an > y and therefore the support of 〈a〉 is dense in the
real unit interval.
To finish this remark we will prove the following result
Theorem A.0.8. In Π∀∼, [0, 1]∗-tautologies do not coincide with [0, 1]∗-
tautologies restricted to quasi-witnessed models.
To prove the result we will use the following lemmas.
Lemma A.0.9. In Π∀∼ with standard semantics the formula
((∃x)P (x))↔ (∼ (∀x) ∼ P (x))
is a tautology.
Proof. The result is an easy consequence of the fact that any involutive negation
is strictly decreasing from [0, 1] to itself and thus satisfying infi∈I ai = supi∈I ∼
ai where ai is any sequence of elements of [0, 1].
Lemma A.0.10. If a ∈ [0, 1] and f : I → [0, 1] is a function, then
supi∈I(f(i)→ a) = 1 iff supi∈I(∼ a→∼ f(i)) = 1
Proof. Suppose supi∈I(f(i)→ a) = 1, then there are two possibilities:
• There exists i ∈ I such that f(i) ≤ a, then, being ∼ involutive, ∼ a ≤∼
f(i) and thus the result is obvious. In fact if a = 0 this is the only
possibility.
• For all i ∈ I, f(i) < a. Then 1 = supi∈I(f(i) → a) = supi∈I af(i) and so
infi∈I f(i) = a wich is equivalent to sup i ∈ I(∼ f(i)) =∼ a. Therefore
supi∈I(∼ a→∼ f(i)) =∼ a→ supi∈I ∼ f(i) = 1.
The other direction is proved analogously.
Lemma A.0.11. In Π∀∼ with standard semantics, quasi-witnessed models co-
incide with witnessed models.
Proof. By definition the formula
(∃x)((∃y)P (y)→ P (x))
is a [0, 1]∗-tautology for quasi-witnessed models. By lemma A.0.9 this implies
that the formula
(∃x)((∼ (∀y) ∼ P (y))→ P (x))
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is also a [0, 1]∗-tautology for quasi-witnessed models. And being ‖∼ (∀y) ∼
P (y)‖M,v a fixed element of [0, 1], applying the previous lemma, we have that
(∃x)(∼ P (x)→ (∀y) ∼ P (y))
is again a [0, 1]∗-tautology for quasi-witnessed models.. And being ∼ involutive,
the formula is equivalent to the axiom (C∀) of witnessed models and thus the
proposition is proved.
From the results of the previous lemmata, we can prove the theorem. We
have proved that Π(C∀) is a [0, 1]∗-tautology for quasi-witnessed models. But
this formula is not a [0, 1]∗-tautology for all first order models. Take the standard
model such that M = N and P I(n) = 1n for all n ∈ N. Then
‖(∃x)(P (x)→ (∀y)P (y))‖M,v = supn∈N{ 1n → infn∈N 1n} = supn∈N{ 1n → 0} = 0.
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Appendix B
Strict core fuzzy logics and
quasi-witnessed models
This appendix contains a copy of the contents published in the paper Strict core
fuzzy logics and quasi-witnessed models- It is included for the purpose of showing
the work of the author in quasi-witnessed models under general semantics.
B.1 Introduction
Fuzzy Logics (both propositional and first-order) as many-valued residuated log-
ics were defined by Petr Ha´jek in his celebrated book [Ha´j98c]. He defined, on the
one hand, propositional fuzzy logics as extensions of the Basic Fuzzy Logic BL
and, on the other hand, their algebraic counterpart, the variety of BL-algebras.
Moreover he proved that BL and all its axiomatic extensions are complete with
respect to evaluations over the BL-chains belonging to the corresponding vari-
ety. The fact that for each axiomatic extension of BL there is a corresponding
subvariety of BL-algebras is a consequence of the fact that BL and its extensions
are logics algebraizable in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi (see [GNE05]). Special
interest have the results in [Ha´j98b] and in [CEGT00], where it is proved that
BL is the logic of continuous t-norms and their residua. Well known axiomatic
extensions of BL are  Lukasiewicz, Go¨del and Product Logics (denoted as  L, G
and Π respectively). In his book, Ha´jek also defined the predicate logic corre-
sponding to BL and its axiomatic extensions (denoted adding ∀ after the name
of the propositional logic). Moreover he defined their semantics as first-order
safe structures taking values on BL-chains of the corresponding variety and
proved their completeness with respect to these models. Taking into account
that a t-norm has residuum if and only if it is left-continuous, Esteva and Godo
in [EG01] defined both propositional and first-order MTL (for Monoidal t-norm
based Logic) whose propositional logic is proved to be the logic of left-continuous
t-norms in [JM02]. In [EG01] it is also defined their algebraic counterpart, the
variety of MTL-algebras. The first-order versions of MTL and its axiomatic
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extensions are proved to be complete with respect to first-order structures eval-
uated over MTL-chains belonging to the corresponding variety. In recent times
first-order Fuzzy Logic has been deeply studied. Recall that generalizing the
classical case, the value of a universally (existentially) quantified formula is de-
fined as the infimum (supremum) of the values of the results of replacing the
quantified variable by the interpretation of a term of the language in a first-order
model. Notice that in the context of Classical Logic, as well as every finitely
valued logic, infima and suprema turn out to be minima and maxima, respec-
tively. However, when we move to infinitely valued logics, this is not the case,
the infimum or supremum of a set of values C may be an element c /∈ C, i.e., a
quantified formula may have no witness. Following these ideas, Ha´jek introduced
in [Ha´j07a], [Ha´j07b] the notion of witnessed model, i.e., a model in which each
quantified formula has a witness and proved that this is an important property
because it implies a limited form of finite model property for certain fragments
of predicate fuzzy logic (see [Ha´j05]). Moreover, Cintula and Ha´jek introduce in
[HC06] the so-called witnessed axioms that, added to any first-order core fuzzy
logic, give a logic complete with respect to witnessed models. Subsequently they
prove that these axioms are derivable in  Lukasiewicz first-order Logic, showing
that  L∀ is complete with respect to witnessed models (we will say that  L∀ has
the witnessed model property), but also that neither Go¨del, nor Product first-
order Logic share this property because witnessed axioms are not theorems of
these logics. In fact no other first-order logic of a continuous t-norm enjoys this
property, since it is related to continuity of the truth functions, a property that
only  Lukasiewicz logic has. Nevertheless, in [LM07] it is proved that Product
Predicate Logic enjoys a weaker property, what we call quasi-witnessed model
property. Quasi-witnessed models1 are models in which, whenever the value of
a universally quantified formula is strictly greater than 0, then it has a witness,
while existentially quantified formulas are always witnessed.
In this paper we introduce both the so-called strict core fuzzy logics and
quasi-witnessed axioms (generalizations of the witnessed axioms of Ha´jek-Cintula
to cope with quasi-witnessed models) and prove, following the style of [HC06]
that, if we add quasi-witnessed axioms to any first-order strict core fuzzy logic,
the resulting logic enjoys the quasi-witnessed model property. From this result,
the one in [LM07] about the completeness of Product first-order Logic with
respect to quasi-witnessed models, will follow as a corollary. Moreover, we prove
that quasi-witnessed axioms are theorems in no logic of a continuous t-norm
but Product and  Lukasiewicz predicate logics. Finally we study the expansion
of first-order strict core fuzzy logics by ∆ operator. We give the so-called ∆-
quasi-witnessed axioms and prove that adding these axioms to any strict ∆-core
fuzzy logic, we obtain a first-order fuzzy logic which is complete with respect to
quasi-witnessed models.
1These models are called “closed models” in [LM07] but we decided, after some discussions
with colleagues, to use the more informative name of “quasi-witnessed models”. We take into
account the fact that the name “closed” is used in mathematics and logic in different contexts
with different meanings and could induce some confusion.
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B.2 Preliminaries
B.2.1 Propositional logic
The logic MTL has been defined in [EG01] and has, as primitive binary con-
nectives, a strong conjunction , a weak conjunction ∧ and an implication →
and, as primitive 0-ary connective, the constant symbol ⊥. This logic has been
axiomatized with the following set of axioms:
(A1) (ϕ→ ψ)→ ((ψ → χ)→ (ϕ→ χ)),
(A2) (ϕ ψ)→ ϕ,
(A3) (ϕ ψ)→ (ψ  ϕ),
(A4) ϕ (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ ∧ ψ),
(A5) (ϕ ∧ ψ)→ ϕ,
(A6) (ϕ ∧ ψ)→ (ψ ∧ ϕ),
(A7a) (ϕ→ (ψ → χ))→ ((ϕ ψ)→ χ),
(A7b) ((ϕ ψ)→ χ)→ (ϕ→ (ψ → χ)),
(A8) ((ϕ→ ψ)→ χ)→ (((ψ → ϕ)→ χ)→ χ),
(A9) ⊥ → ϕ.
And its unique rule of inference is Modus Ponens (MP).
From the primitive connectives it is possible to define more, in particular:
ϕ ∨ ψ := ((ϕ→ ψ)→ ψ) ∧ ((ψ → ϕ)→ ϕ)
ϕ ≡ ψ := (ϕ→ ψ) (ψ → ϕ)
¬ϕ := ϕ→ ⊥
> := ⊥ → ⊥
The logic SMTL2 is defined in the literature as the axiomatic extension of
MTL by the axiom:
(S) ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ→ ⊥ (strictness)
In this paper we are going to deal with other important axiomatic extensions
of MTL. The logic BL is the axiomatic extension of MTL by the following axiom,
(D) ϕ ∧ ψ → ϕ (ϕ→ ψ) (divisibility)
The logic SBL is the axiomatic extension of BL by axiom (S), or, equivalently,
it is the axiomatic extension of SMTL by axiom (D).
Product logic has been defined in [HGE96] and it can be seen as the axiomatic
extension of SBL by the following axiom,
(Π) ¬¬χ→ (((ϕ χ)→ (ψ  χ))→ (ϕ→ ψ)) (simplification)
2SMTL means strict MTL in the sense that (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)↔ 0 is a theorem. Algebraically this
property is called “pseudo-complementation” and denoted as (PC) in some more algebraic
works like [GJKO07].
155
Hence Product Logic is the axiomatic extension of SMTL by axioms (D) and
(Π).
Go¨del logic is the axiomatic extension of BL (or either SBL or SMTL) by
the following axiom:
(Id) ϕ→ (ϕ ϕ) (idempotence)
Finally,  Lukasiewicz logic is the axiomatic extension of BL by the following
axiom:
(Inv) ¬¬ϕ→ ϕ (involutive negation)
Definition B.2.1. 1. An MTL-algebra A= 〈A,∩,∪, ∗,⇒, 0, 1〉 is a bounded
commutative integral residuated lattice which satisfies the equation:
(PL) (x⇒ y) ∪ (y ⇒ x) = 1 (pre-linearity)
2. An SMTL-algebra A= 〈A,∩,∪, ∗,⇒, 0, 1〉 is a MTL-algebra which satisfies
the equation:
(S) x ∩ (x⇒ 0) = 0 (strictness)
3. A BL-algebra A= 〈A,∩,∪, ∗,⇒, 0, 1〉 is an MTL-algebra which satisfies the
equation:
(D) x ∩ y = x ∗ (x⇒ y) (divisibility)
4. A Π-algebra A= 〈A,∩,∪, ∗,⇒, 0, 1〉 is an SMTL-algebra which satisfies the
equations (D) and:
(Π) ((z ⇒ 0)⇒ 0)⇒ (((x ∗ z)⇒ (y ∗ z))⇒ (x⇒ y)) = 1 (simplification)
5. A Go¨del-algebra A= 〈A,∩,∪, ∗,⇒, 0, 1〉 is a BL-algebra which satisfies the
equation:
(Id) x = x ∗ x (idempotence)
6. An MV-algebra A= 〈A,∩,∪, ∗,⇒, 0, 1〉 is a BL-algebra which satisfies the
equation:
(Inv) x = (x⇒ 0)⇒ 0 (involutive negation)
Moreover, if any of them is linearly ordered, we say that it is an MTL-chain
(respectively SMTL-chain, Π-chain and so on).
All the logics defined in these preliminaries are algebraizable in the sense
of Blok and Pigozzi (see [GNE05]) and its algebraic semantics is the variety of
the corresponding MTL-algebras. Moreover all of these logics are chain-complete
(what is called “semilinear” in [CN10]) in the sense that they are strong complete
for evaluations over the chains of the corresponding variety.
A natural semantics for the MTL logic and their axiomatic extensions are the
evaluations over the real unit interval, i.e. over the MTL-chains whose lattice
reduct is [0, 1] with the usual order. These chains, called standard chains are
related to a special kind of operation called “t-norms”.
Definition B.2.2. A t-norm is a binary operation ∗ on the real unit interval
[0, 1] that is associative, commutative, non-decreasing in both arguments and
having 1 as neutral (unit) element.
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Left continuity of a t-norm is characterized by the existence of an unique
binary operation⇒ satisfying for all a, b, c ∈ [0, 1] the following condition (called
residuation):
a ∗ b ≤ c if and only if a ≤ b⇒ c
The operator ⇒ is called the residuum of the t-norm ∗ and it is defined as
x⇒ y = max{z ∈ [0, 1] | x ∗ z ≤ y}
Using this residuum, the following result characterize standard chains.
Proposition B.2.3. A structure 〈[0, 1],∩,∪, ∗,⇒, 0, 1〉 is a standard MTL-
chain if and only if ∗ is a left-continuous t-norm and ⇒ is its residuum. This
structure will be denoted from now on as [0, 1]∗. Moreover a standard chain sat-
isfies divisibility (Hence it is a BL-chain) if and only if the t-norm is continuous.
In [JM02] it is proved that MTL are strong standard complete (strong com-
plete for evaluations over the standard chains), i.e. for any set of formulas Γ∪{ϕ}
and any evaluation e over a standard chain,
Γ `MTL ϕ iff e(ϕ) = 1 for any evaluation e such that e(γ) = 1 for all γ ∈ Γ.
This result is not automatically translatable to axiomatic extensions of MTL.
It is easily extended to SMTL and the standard SMTL-chains but not to BL
and the standard BL-chains (hence neither to its axiomatic extensions). If L is
either BL or SBL or  Lukasiewicz or Product or Go¨del logic only the finite strong
standard completeness results are valid, i.e. for any finite set of formulas Γ∪{ϕ}
and any evaluation e over a standard L-chain,
Γ `L ϕ iff e(ϕ) = 1 for any evaluation e such that e(γ) = 1 for all γ ∈ Γ,
An interesting result for  Lukasiewicz Product and Go¨del logics is that the
corresponding standard-chains are all isomorphic3. The most used representative
of standard chains of these three logics (unique up to isomorphisms), are the ones
defined by the so-called  Lukasiewicz, product and minimum t-norms and their
residua (collected in Table 1).
From the previous results seems natural the definition of the logic of a (con-
tinuous) t-norm.
Definition B.2.4. We say that a logic (called L(∗)) is the logic of a continuous
t-norm ∗ if it is an axiomatic extension of BL which is finite strong standard
complete with respect to evaluations over the standard chain [0, 1]∗, i.e. for any
finite set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} and any evaluation e over [0, 1]∗,
Γ `L(∗) ϕ iff e(ϕ) = 1 for any evaluation e such that e(γ) = 1 for all γ ∈ Γ.
3In fact for Go¨del logic there is only one standard chain while for  Lukasiewicz and Product
there are infinite different but isomorphic ones.
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∗ Minimum (Go¨del) Product (of real numbers)  Lukasiewicz
x ∗ y min(x, y) x · y max(0, x+ y − 1)
x→∗ y
{
1, if x ≤ y
y, otherwise
{
1, if x ≤ y
y/x, otherwise
min(1, 1− x+ y)
n∗
{
1, if x = 0
0, otherwise
{
1, if x = 0
0, otherwise
1− x
Table B.1: The three main continuous t-norms.
All the logics considered so far enjoy two important properties we need to
define the class of logics we are interested in.
Definition B.2.5. 1. We say that a logic L enjoys the Local Deduction The-
orem (LDT , for short) if for each theory T and formulas ϕ,ψ, it holds that
T, ϕ ` ψ iff there exists a natural number n such that T ` ϕn → ψ, where
ϕn = ϕ . . . ϕ, n times.
2. We say that a logic L enjoys Invariance under Substitution (Sub, for short)
if, for every formulas ϕ,ψ, χ it holds that ϕ ≡ ψ ` χ(ϕ) ≡ χ(ψ).
Next we recall the definition of core fuzzy logic given in [HC06] (a family of
logics that encompasses all logics considered so far) and we introduce the strict
core fuzzy logic we will deal with in this paper.
Definition B.2.6. 1. We say that a logic L is a core fuzzy logic if it is finitary,
enjoys LDT , Sub and expands MTL.
2. We say that a logic L is a strict core fuzzy logic if it is finitary, enjoys
LDT , Sub and expands SMTL.
Throughout this preliminary section, we will denote by L any core fuzzy
logic.
B.2.2 Predicate logic
In order to define what a predicate logic is, we have, previously, to define what
a predicate language is.
Definition B.2.7. A predicate language Γ is compound by a set of rela-
tion symbols P1, . . . , Pn, . . ., each one with arity ≥ 1, a set of function sym-
bols f1, . . . , fn, . . ., each one with its arity, and a set of constant symbols
c1, . . . , cn, . . ., that are 0-ary function symbols.
Terms and formulas of a predicate language are defined as usual in the
literature.
Following [Ha´j98c], given a propositional residuated logic L, we define the
first-order logic associated with L (denoted by L∀), as follows:
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Definition B.2.8. L∀ is the first-order logic such that:
1. its language is compound by a predicate language Γ and a set of logical
symbols obtained by adding, to the set of logical symbols of L, the two
“classical” quantifiers ∀ and ∃ and,
2. it is axiomatized by means of the following set of axiom schemata:
(P) the axioms resulting from the axioms of L after the substitution of
propositional variables by formulas of the new predicate language.
(∀1) (∀x)ϕ(x)→ ϕ(t), where t is substitutable for x in ϕ.
(∃1) ϕ(t)→ (∃x)ϕ(x), where t is substitutable for x in ϕ.
(∀2) (∀x)(χ→ ϕ)→ (χ→ (∀x)ϕ(x)), where x is not free in χ.
(∃2) (∀x)(ϕ→ χ)→ ((∃x)ϕ(x)→ χ), where x is not free in χ.
(∀3) (∀x)(χ ∨ ϕ)→ (χ ∨ (∀x)ϕ(x)), where x is not free in χ.
3. its rules of inference are Modus Ponens (MP) and generalization (G): From
ϕ infer (∀x)ϕ(x).
The following definitions are required to prove the main results given in
Section B.3. They are typical within the framework of Classical first-order Logic.
Their presentation in our context follows the generalization, due to [HC06],
necessary to adapt them to a many-valued framework.
Definition B.2.9. We say that a theory T ′ in a predicate language Γ′ is an
expansion of a theory T in a predicate language Γ, if Γ ⊆ Γ′ and, each formula
provable in T is provable in T ′. We say that T ′ is a conservative expansion of
T if T ′ is an expansion of T and each formula in the language of T , provable in
T ′, is provable in T .
Definition B.2.10. A theory T is linear if, for each pair of sentences ϕ,ψ, we
have T ` ϕ→ ψ or T ` ψ → ϕ.
Definition B.2.11. Let Γ and Γ′ be predicate languages such that Γ ⊆ Γ′ and
T a Γ′-theory. We say that T is ∀-Γ-Henkin if, for each Γ-sentence ϕ = (∀x)ψ(x)
such that T 0 ϕ, there is a constant c in Γ′ such that T 0 ψ(c).
We say that T is ∃-Γ-Henkin if, for each Γ-sentence ϕ = (∃x)ψ(x) such that
T ` ϕ, there is a constant c in Γ′ such that T ` ψ(c).
A theory is called Γ-Henkin if it is both ∀-Γ-Henkin and ∃-Γ-Henkin.
If Γ = Γ′, we say that T is ∀-Henkin (∃-Henkin, Henkin).
From a semantic point of view first-order models are compound of a set of
elements, an algebra of truth values and an assignation function.
Definition B.2.12. A first-order structure for a given predicate language Γ is a
pair (A,M), where A is an L-chain and M=(M, (PM)P∈Γ, (fM)f∈Γ, (cM)c∈Γ),
where:
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1. The set M , called domain, is a non-empty set,
2. for each predicate symbol P ∈ Γ of arity n, PM is an n-ary A-fuzzy relation
on M ,
3. for each function symbol f ∈ Γ of arity n, fM is an n-ary (crisp) function
on M and
4. for each constant symbol c ∈ Γ, cM is an element of M .
The truth value ‖ϕ‖A,Mv of a predicate formula ϕ in a given model v is defined
as follows.
Definition B.2.13. Let Γ be a predicate language, A an L-chain and (A,M)
a first-order structure, then a first-order assignation v is a homomorphism
v : V ar → M . As usual each assignation, defined on the set of individual
variables, extends univocally to a first-order assignation (that we will denote by
v as well) satisfying, for every terms t1, . . . , tn and each n-ary function f ∈ Γ,
that v(f(t1, . . . , tn)) = fM(v(t1), . . . , v(tn)).
Moreover, each assignation v, defined on the set of individual variables yields a
first-order model ‖·‖(A,M)v : FmL∀ → A such that:
1. for each n-tuple of terms t1, . . . , tn and each n-ary relation P ∈ Γ, it holds
that ‖P (t1, . . . , tn)‖(A,M)v = PM(v(t1), . . . , v(tn)) ∈ A,
2. if ϕ,ψ are formulas, ?L a binary logical connective and ?A its truth func-
tion, then ‖ϕ ?L ψ‖(A,M)v = ‖ϕ‖(A,M)v ?A ‖ψ‖(A,M)v .
3. if ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) is a formula with n free variables and v is a first-order
assignation such that v(xi) = ai and ai ∈M , for 1 < i ≤ n, then we have
that ‖(∀x1)ϕ(x1, x2, . . . , xn)‖(A,M)v = infa∈M{‖ϕ(a, a2, . . . , an)‖(A,M)},
4. if ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) is a formula with n free variables and v is a first-order
assignation such that v(xi) = ai and ai ∈M , for 1 < i ≤ n, then we have
that ‖(∃x1)ϕ(x1, x2, . . . , xn)‖(A,M)v = supa∈M{‖ϕ(a, a2, . . . , an)‖(A,M)}.
Clearly, depending on the model, the infimum and supremum of a set of
values of formulas do not necessarily exist and, in this case we will say that a
given quantified formula has an undefined truth value. Following [Ha´j98c], we
will say that if, for a given model v, both infima and suprema of sets of values
are defined for every formula, then v is a safe model. Moreover, if, for a given
first-order structure (A,M), each assignation v defined in it is safe, we will say
that (A,M) is a safe structure.
From now on and for simplicity, we will omit the name “safe” before the
first-order structures, i.e., when we speak about a first-order structure (A,M),
we implicitly mean a safe first-order structure (A,M).
The concepts of satisfiability and validity are defined in the usual way.
In [HC06], we find the following useful definitions and result, which we report
without proof. In what follows, we will denote by A any L-chain.
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Definition B.2.14. Let (A1,M1) and (A2,M2) be structures in the languages
Γ1 and Γ2 respectively and let Γ1 ⊆ Γ2. We say that a pair (f, g) is an elementary
embedding if:
1. the mapping f is an injection of M1 into M2,
2. the mapping g is an embedding of A1 into A2,
3. for each Γ1-formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) and elements a1, . . . , an ∈ M1, it holds
that g(‖ϕ(a1, . . . , an)‖(A1,M1)) = ‖ϕ(f(a1), . . . , f(an))‖(A2,M2).
Definition B.2.15. Let T be a theory. We define [ϕ]T = {ψ | T ` ϕ ≡ ψ}
and LT = {[ϕ]T | ϕ a formula }. The Lindenbaum algebra of the theory T
(LindT , in symbols) has domain LT and operations cLindT ([ϕ1]T , . . . , [ϕn]T ) =
[c(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)]T , for every n-ary propositional connective c.
Definition B.2.16. Let T be a linear Henkin theory, then the canonical model
of T is the structure (LindT ,CM(T )), where LindT is the Lindenbaum algebra
of theory T , the domain of CM(T ) consists of object constants cCM(T ) = c and
terms built without variables. Moreover for every predicate n-ary symbol P ∈ Γ,
PCM(T )(t1, . . . , tn) = [P (t1, . . . , tn)]T .
From here on, for simplicity, we will write CM(T ) to denote
(LindT ,CM(T )).
Definition B.2.17. For each structure (A,M), let Alg((A,M)) be the sub-
algebra of A whose domain is the set {‖ϕ‖A,Mv | ϕ, v} of truth degrees of
formulas under all M-assignation v of variables. Call (A,M) exhaustive if
A = Alg((A,M)).
The next lemma is a direct consequence of Lemma 4 in [HC06] and we will
not prove it here.
Lemma B.2.18. Let T1, T2 be L∀-theories. If T2 is a conservative expansion of
T1, then, for each exhaustive model (A,M) of T1, there exists a linear Henkin
L∀-theory T extending T2 such that (A,M) can be elementarily embedded into
CM(T ).
B.2.3 The witnessed model property
Witnessed models have been firstly defined in [Ha´j05] in the following way:
Definition B.2.19. For any structure (A,M), a formula (∀y)ϕ(y, x1, . . . , xn)
is A-witnessed in M if, for each assignation c1, . . . , cn ∈M , to x1, . . . , xn, there
is c ∈M such that ‖(∀y)ϕ(y, c1, . . . , cn)‖A,M = ‖ϕ(c, c1, . . . , cn)‖A,M. Similarly
for (∃y)ϕ(y, x1, . . . , xn). M is A-witnessed if all quantified formulas are A-
witnessed in M.
161
As said above, within the framework of classical predicate logic, where the
first-order structures are evaluated on a two element chain, there is no need of
making a difference between witnessed and non witnessed models, because every
model is indeed witnessed, and the same holds for every finite-valued logic. The
need of speaking about witnessed models arises when we move to infinite-valued
logics, since we can meet sets of truth values whose infima (resp. suprema) is
not an element of the set. Later on, in [HC06], Ha´jek and Cintula consider the
following couple of axioms (called witnessed axioms) already given by Baaz in
[Baa96]:
(C∃) (∃y)((∃x)ϕ(x)→ ϕ(y)),
(C∀) ((∃y)(ϕ(y)→ (∀x)ϕ(x))).
They prove that each first-order core fuzzy logic L∀, extended with this cou-
ple of axioms (denoted L∀w), is complete with respect to the witnessed models
evaluated over L-chains. Moreover, in [Ha´j07a] it is proved that  Lukasiewicz
predicate logic is the only logic of a continuous t-norm equivalent with its wit-
nessed axiomatic extension, i.e., (C∃) and (C∀) are theorems of  Lukasiewicz
predicate Logic. As a consequence of this fact  Lukasiewicz is the only logic of
a continuous t-norm which is complete with respect to witnessed models, i.e. it
satisfies the witnessed model property.
B.3 Completeness with respect to quasi-
witnessed models
In this section we will give the definitions of quasi-witnessed axioms and quasi-
witnessed models, which are a generalization of witnessed axioms and models.
We stress that in this paper the starting point are strict core fuzzy logics, because
the result is related with the behavior of Go¨del negation. Subsequently we will
state and prove the main result of this paper, i.e., that if we add quasi-witnessed
axioms to any predicate strict core fuzzy logic, we obtain a logic that is complete
with respect to quasi-witnessed models. In what follows L will denote a strict
core fuzzy logic.
Definition B.3.1. Let Γ be a predicate language and (A,M) a first-order struc-
ture, then we say that a Γ-formula ϕ(x, y1, . . . , yn) is A-quasi-witnessed in M
if:
1. For each tuple c1, . . . , cn of elements in M there exists an element a ∈ M
such that ‖(∃x)ϕ(x, c1, . . . , cn)‖(A,M) = ‖ϕ(a, c1, . . . , cn)‖(A,M).
2. For each tuple c1, . . . , cn of elements in M either
‖(∀x)ϕ(x, c1, . . . , cn)‖(A,M) = 0, or there exists an element b ∈ M
such that ‖(∀x)ϕ(x, c1, . . . , cn)‖(A,M) = ‖ϕ(b, c1, . . . , cn)‖(A,M).
162
We say that a first-order structure (A,M) is quasi-witnessed if for each
formula and for every assignation v of the variables on M the formula is quasi-
witnessed.
Definition B.3.2. Let L∀ be any strict core first-order logic, we denote by L∀qw
the axiomatic extension of L∀ by the following axiom schemata called, from now
on, “quasi-witnessed axioms”:
(C∃) (∃y)((∃x)ϕ(x)→ ϕ(y)),
(ΠC∀) ¬¬(∀x)ϕ(x)→ ((∃y)(ϕ(y)→ (∀x)ϕ(x))).
These quasi-witnessed axioms are a modification of the witnessed axioms
given above. The first one, (C∃), is a witnessed axiom and the second one says
that the witnessed axiom (C∀)(∃y)(ϕ(y) → (∀x)ϕ(x)) is valid in a structure
(A,M) only when the truth value of (∀x)ϕ(x) is different from 0, i.e., when
‖¬¬(∀x)ϕ(x)‖(A,M) = 1.
Next lemma proves the soundness of quasi-witnessed axioms with respect to
the above defined quasi-witnessed models.
Lemma B.3.3. If an L∀-structure (A,M) is quasi-witnessed, then it satisfies
(C∃) and (ΠC∀).
Proof. Let (A,M) be a quasi-witnessed L∀-structure and ϕ(x) a Γ formula with
one free variable, then:
1. Since, by the first condition of Definition B.3.1, there exists an element a ∈
M such that ‖ϕ(a)‖(A,M) = ‖(∃x)ϕ(x)‖(A,M), then (A,M) |= (∃x)ϕ(x)→
ϕ(a). So, by axiom (∃1) and (MP), (A,M) |= (∃y)((∃x)ϕ(x)→ ϕ(y)).
2. By the second condition of Definition B.3.1, there exists b ∈ M such
that either ‖ϕ(b)‖(A,M) = ‖(∀x)ϕ(x)‖(A,M), or ‖(∀x)ϕ(x)‖(A,M) = 0. If
‖(∀x)ϕ(x)‖(A,M) = 0, then, ‖¬¬(∀x)ϕ(x)‖(A,M) = 0 and, trivially we
have (A,M) |= ¬¬(∀x)ϕ(x) → ((∃y)(ϕ(y) → (∀x)ϕ(x))). If, on the other
hand, ‖ϕ(b)‖(A,M) = ‖(∀x)ϕ(x)‖(A,M), then (A,M) |= ϕ(b) → (∀x)ϕ(x),
and, by axiom (∃1) and (MP), (A,M) |= (∃y)(ϕ(y) → (∀x)ϕ(x)). So,
(A,M) |= ¬¬(∀x)ϕ(x)→ ((∃y)(ϕ(y)→ (∀x)ϕ(x))).
As for witnessed models, the converse of the last lemma does not hold as we
will see in Example B.4.4.
However, as in [HC06], it is possible to prove the next result.
Lemma B.3.4. Let Γ be a predicate language, and (A,M) an exhaustive model
of a Γ-theory T . Then (A,M) is an L∀qw-model of T iff it can be elementarily
embedded into a quasi-witnessed model of T .
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Proof. (⇒) Let (A,M) be an exhaustive L∀qw-model of T . By Lemma B.2.18,
there is a linear Henkin theory T ′ extending T , such that (A,M) can be
elementarily embedded into CM(T ′). Hence CM(T ′) is an L∀qw-model
of T and we have to show that CM(T ′) is quasi-witnessed.
Due to the construction of the canonical model, each element of the do-
main of CM(T ′) is a constant. Let ϕ(x) be a formula with one free
variable and suppose that ‖(∀x)ϕ(x)‖CM(T ′) > 0, then we have that
‖¬¬(∀x)ϕ(x)‖CM(T ′) = 1. Hence T ′ ` ¬¬(∀x)ϕ(x). By axiom (ΠC∀),
we have that T ′ ` ¬¬(∀x)ϕ(x) → ((∃y)(ϕ(y) → (∀x)ϕ(x))), then, by
(MP), T ′ ` (∃y)(ϕ(y) → (∀x)ϕ(x)). Since T ′ is ∃-Henkin, then there ex-
ists some c such that T ′ ` ϕ(c)→ (∀x)ϕ(x). So, by axiom (∀1), we obtain
that ‖ϕ(c)‖CM(T ′) = ‖(∀x)ϕ(x)‖CM(T ′). The proof of the other condition
is similar to Ha´jek’s and Cintula’s proof of Lemma 5 in [HC06] and we will
not repeat it here.
(⇐) Suppose now that (A,M) can be elementarily embedded into a quasi-
witnessed model of T , hence, (A,M) is an L∀-model of T . By Lemma
B.3.3, we have that (A,M) is an L∀-model of T ∪ {(C∃), (ΠC∀)}, which
is equivalent to say that (A,M) is an L∀qw model of T .
Theorem B.3.5. Let T be a theory and ϕ a formula in a given predicate lan-
guage, then T `L∀qw ϕ iff (A,M) |= ϕ for every quasi-witnessed model (A,M)
of the theory T .
Proof. The completeness of L∀ with respect to all (not only quasi-witnessed)
(A,M)-models is ensured by Theorem 5 of [HC06], so we will restrict ourselves
to the quasi-witnessed part.
(⇒) As a consequence of Theorem 5 of [HC06], we only have to check whether
a quasi-witnessed model satisfies axioms (C∃) and (ΠC∀), but this result
has been already shown in Lemma B.3.3.
(⇐) Suppose that T 0L∀qw ϕ, then there exists an L∀qw-model (A,M) of T ,
such that (A,M) 2 ϕ. Hence, by Lemma B.3.4, there exists a quasi-
witnessed model (A′,M′) of T such that (A′,M′) 2 ϕ.
B.4 The case of predicate Product Logic
In this section we will show that the axioms (C∃) and (ΠC∀) are provable in
Π∀, i.e., that the logics Π∀ and Π∀qw are equivalent. In order to do that, let
us recall that Π∀ is complete with respect to all models over a product chain
and any product chain is isomorphic to the negative cone of a linearly ordered
abelian group with an added bottom (See Theorem 2.5 in [CT00]).
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Definition B.4.1. Let G = 〈G,+,−,0〉 be a totally ordered abelian group,
then we denote by G− the negative part of G, i.e., G− = {x ∈ G | x ≤ 0}.
Moreover, we denote by P(G) the structure 〈G− ∪ {⊥},⊗,⇒,⊥〉, where ⊥ is
an element which does not belong to G, and ⊗, ⇒ are two binary operations
defined as follows:
x⊗ y =
{
x+ y if x, y ∈ G−,
⊥ otherwise,
and
x⇒ y =
 0 ∧ (y − x) if x, y ∈ G
−,
0 if x = ⊥,
⊥ if x ∈ G− and y = ⊥.
As a consequence of Theorem 2.5 and Remark 2.2 of [CT00] we have the
following useful result. pr Let A be a non-trivial Π-chain. There exists a linearly
ordered abelian group G, such that A ∼= P(G). Moreover, G is univocally
determined up to isomorphism. Notice that the isomorphism of the above
proposition maps the neutral element of the group onto the maximum element
of the product chain and the added bottom ⊥ to the minimum element of the
product chain.
Let G be a linearly ordered abelian group and a, {ai}i∈ω ∈ G: it is well
known that, on the one hand, if {ai}i∈ω is an increasing sequence and has limit
a, then {a − ai}i∈ω is a decreasing sequence and has limit 0. On the other
hand, if {ai}i∈ω is a decreasing sequence and has limit a, then {ai − a}i∈ω is a
decreasing sequence and has limit 0. So, since, by Definition B.4.1, the truncated
subtraction of the group is the interpretation of product implication and the
constant 0 of the group is the isomorphic image of the maximum element 1 of
the product chain, then, by means of Proposition B.4, we can infer the following
corollary.
Corollary B.4.2. Let A be a product chain and a, {ai}i∈ω ∈ A, then if {ai}i∈ω
is either an increasing or decreasing sequence with limit a, then {a⇒ ai}i∈ω is
an increasing sequence with limit 1.
With the help of the last corollary, we can prove the main result of this
section.
Lemma B.4.3. The quasi-witnessed axioms (C∃) and (ΠC∀) are theorems of
Π∀.
Proof. We will show it semantically. Since Π∀ is complete w.r.t. models over
linearly ordered product algebras, we have to prove that the quasi-witnessed
axioms are tautologies for these models. Let A be a product chain, then:
(C∃) Since ‖(∃y)((∃x)ϕ(x) → ϕ(y))‖(A,M) =
supy∈M{supx∈M{‖ϕ(x)‖(A,M)} ⇒ ‖ϕ(y)‖(A,M)} and variables x
and y range over the same values, then, by Corollary B.4.2,
‖(∃y)((∃x)ϕ(x) → ϕ(y))‖(A,M) = 1. So, axiom (C∃) is a theorem
of Π∀.
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(ΠC∀) We know by definition, that ‖¬¬(∀x)ϕ(x) → ((∃y)(ϕ(y) →
(∀x)ϕ(x)))‖(A,M) = ¬¬ infx∈M{‖ϕ(x)‖(A,M)} ⇒ supy∈M{‖ϕ(y)‖(A,M) ⇒
infx∈M{‖ϕ(x)‖(A,M)}}. If infx∈M{‖ϕ(x)‖(A,M)} = 0, the result is ob-
vious. Otherwise (being a Go¨del negation) ¬¬ infx∈M{‖ϕ(x)‖(A,M)} =
1 and, therefore, the value of the whole formula will be equal to
1 iff ‖(∃y)(ϕ(y) → (∀x)ϕ(x))‖(A,M) = supy∈M{‖ϕ(y)‖(A,M) ⇒
infx∈M{‖ϕ(x)‖(A,M)}} = 1, but this is a direct consequence of Corollary
B.4.2. So, axiom (ΠC∀) is a theorem of Π∀.
Next example shows that validity of quasi-witnessed axioms does not guar-
antee that models are quasi-witnessed (notice that last lemma ensures that all
models of first-order Product Logic satisfy the quasi-witnessed axioms).
Example B.4.4. Consider the first-order language with only one unary pred-
icate symbol P and a model over the standard product chain ([0, 1]Π, (ω, rP )),
where rP (n) =
1
m +
1
n+2 , for a fixed but arbitrary positive integer m > 1.
By Lemma B.4.3, this model satisfies the quasi-witnessed axioms but it is not
a quasi-witnessed model because, on the one hand, ‖(∀x)P (x)‖([0,1]Π,(ω,rP )) =
1
m > 0 and, on the other hand, for each n ∈ N , ‖P (n)‖([0,1]Π,(ω,rP )) > 1m =
‖(∀x)P (x)‖([0,1]Π,(ω,rP )). So, it does not respect condition 2 of Definition B.3.1.
This last result, together with Theorem B.3.5, is an alternative way to prove
the result in [LM07].
Corollary B.4.5. Let T be a theory and ϕ a formula in a given predicate lan-
guage, then T `Π∀ ϕ iff (A,M) |= ϕ for every quasi-witnessed model (A,M) of
the theory T .
However, we can not generalize the above result to the logic defined by an
arbitrary left-continuous t-norm. In order to prove this result we adapt and
generalize the result in [Ha´j07a]. Actually we can show that there is no other
logic of a continuous t-norm that is complete with respect to quasi-witnessed
models, but Product and  Lukasiewicz.
Lemma B.4.6. Let ∗ be a continuous t-norm. If L(∗)∀ proves both (C∃) and
(ΠC∀), then ∗ is isomorphic to either  Lukasiewicz or product t-norm.
Proof. In [Ha´j07a] it is already proved that (C∃) is only valid in L(∗)∀ if ∗ is iso-
morphic to either the Lukasiewicz or the product t-norm. Here we give a unified
proof. If the standard algebra induced by a continuous t-norm ∗ is not isomor-
phic to either [0, 1] L or [0, 1]Π , then it has at least one element a ∈ (0, 1) which
is idempotent. Let ([0, 1]∗, (ω, rP )) be a model of L(∗)∀ and {an}n∈ω a sequence
of elements of [0, 1], different from a. Let {an}n∈ω be a strictly increasing se-
quence of elements of [0, 1] such that sup{an}n∈ω = a. Consider the above given
structure in which, for each n ∈ ω, ‖rP (n))‖([0,1]∗,(ω,rP )) = an. In this struc-
ture, when ϕ(x) = P (x), we have that ‖(∃y)((∃x)ϕ(x) → ϕ(y))‖([0,1]∗,(ω,rP )) =
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supm∈ω{supn∈ω{an} ⇒ am} = supm∈ω{a ⇒ am} = supm∈ω{am} = a 6= 1. So,
(C∃) is not a theorem of L(∗)∀.
It is interesting to notice that (ΠC∀) is only valid in L(∗)∀ if [0, 1]∗ is iso-
morphic to either [0, 1] L, [0, 1]Π or the ordinal sum of two copies of  Lukasiewicz
t-norms [0, 1] L ⊕ [0, 1] L. Let {an}n∈ω be a strictly decreasing sequence of ele-
ments of [0, 1] such that inf{an}n∈ω = a, being a either the bottom of a non-
 Lukasiewicz component or of a  Lukasiewicz component whose top element is not
1. In both cases consider the above given structure in which, for each n ∈ ω,
‖rP (n))‖([0,1]∗,(ω,rP )) = an. In this structure, when we take ϕ(x) = P (x), an
easy computation shows that axiom (ΠC∀) is not sound. Moreover it is not
difficult to prove that (ΠC∀) is valid when ∗ is isomorphic to either  Lukasiewicz
or the ordinal sum of two copies of  Lukasiewicz t-norm.
Last Lemma allows us to prove the next general result.
pr Let ∗ be a continuous t-norm. Then L(∗)∀ proves both (C∃) and (ΠC∀)
iff [0, 1]∗ is isomorphic to either [0, 1] L or [0, 1]Π.
Proof. One direction is proven in Corollary B.4.5 for Product Logic and is a
consequence of witnessed completeness for  Lukasiewicz. The other direction is
a direct consequence of Lemma B.4.6.
B.5 ∆-strict fuzzy logics
In this section we deal with the expansion of a logic L with the new unary
connective ∆ (denoted L∆) and quasi-witnessed models. Logics L∆, were intro-
duced in [Ha´j98c] as the expansions of L with the unary connective ∆, satisfying
the necessitation inference rule (from ϕ deduce ∆ϕ) and the following axioms,
introduced in [Baa96] in the framework of Go¨del Logic:
(A∆1) ∆ϕ ∨ ¬∆ϕ,
(A∆2) ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ)→ (∆ϕ ∨∆ψ),
(A∆3) ∆ϕ→ ϕ,
(A∆4) ∆ϕ→ ∆∆ϕ,
(A∆5) ∆(ϕ→ ψ)→ (∆ϕ→ ∆ψ).
Semantically, the main feature of these expansions is that, in L∆-chains, it
holds that for each formula ϕ and each propositional evaluation e, e(∆ϕ) = 1,
if e(ϕ) = 1 and e(∆ϕ) = 0, if e(ϕ) < 1. Moreover, expansions of a logic by ∆
connective enjoy the following property.
Definition B.5.1. We say that a logic L enjoys Delta Deduction Theorem
(∆DT , for short) if, for each theory T and formulas ϕ,ψ, it holds that T, ϕ ` ψ
iff T ` ∆ϕ→ ψ.
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The last definition gives a way to define the class of logics we are interested
in throughout this section.
From [CEG+09], we report the next useful definition.
Definition B.5.2. We say that a logic L∆ is a ∆-core fuzzy logic if it enjoys
∆DT , Sub and expands MTL∆.
Throughout this section L∆ will denote the extension of a ∆-core fuzzy logic
by the strictness axiom (S).
As in [HC06], here also the failure of Lemma B.2.18 does not allow us to
prove a similar result as Theorem B.3.5 for a logic L∆∀. Nevertheless, it is
possible, also in this context, to prove a simpler result.
Definition B.5.3. We denote by L∆∀∆qw the axiomatic extension of L∆∀ by
the following axiom schemata called, from now on, “∆-quasi-witnessed axioms”:
(C∆∃) (∃y)∆((∃x)ϕ(x)→ ϕ(y)),
(ΠC∆∀) ¬¬(∀x)ϕ(x)→ ((∃y)∆(ϕ(y)→ (∀x)ϕ(x))).
We can prove, as in [HC06], that the extension of a logic L∆∀ by means
of these axioms, is complete with respect to quasi-witnessed models, but not
with respect to models that are embeddable into a quasi-witnessed model (like
the extension of a strict core fuzzy logic by the usual quasi-witnessed axioms).
So, it makes sense to say that these extensions are the logics of quasi-witnessed
models. The main result will follow easily after a couple of simple lemmas.
Lemma B.5.4. Axioms (C∆∃) and (ΠC∆∀) are true in every quasi-witnessed
model.
Proof. Let A be an L∆-chain, (A,M) be a first-order quasi-witnessed structure,
then:
1. Since (A,M) is a quasi-witnessed structure, then there exists a ∈ M
such that ‖ϕ(a)‖(A,M) = supb∈M{‖ϕ(b)‖(A,M)} = ‖(∃x)ϕ(x)‖(A,M)
and, therefore, we have that ‖(∃y)∆((∃x)ϕ(x) → ϕ(y))‖(A,M) =
supb∈M{‖∆((∃x)ϕ(x) → ϕ(b))‖(A,M)} = ‖∆((∃x)ϕ(x) → ϕ(a))‖(A,M) =
‖∆(1)‖(A,M) = 1.
2. Since (A,M) is a quasi-witnessed structure, then either
‖(∀x)ϕ(x)‖(A,M) = 0 or there exists a ∈ M such that
‖ϕ(a)‖(A,M) = infb∈M{‖ϕ(b)‖(A,M)} = ‖(∀x)ϕ(x)‖(A,M). In
the first case, trivially, ‖¬¬(∀x)ϕ(x)‖(A,M) = 0 and, therefore
‖¬¬(∀x)ϕ(x) → ((∃y)∆(ϕ(y) → (∀x)ϕ(x)))‖(A,M) = 1. In the second
case, by strictness, we have that ‖¬¬(∀x)ϕ(x)‖(A,M) = 1 and the axiom is
then valid since ‖(∃y)∆(ϕ(y) → (∀x)ϕ(x))‖(A,M) = supb∈M{‖∆(ϕ(b) →
(∀x)ϕ(x))‖(A,M)} = ‖∆(ϕ(a)→ (∀x)ϕ(x))‖(A,M) = ‖∆(1)‖(A,M) = 1.
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Lemma B.5.5. Axioms (C∆∃) and (ΠC∆∀) are false in every model that is not
quasi-witnessed.
Proof. We will prove it only for the second axiom, the proof for the first one
is almost the same. Let A be an L∆-chain, (A,M) a first-order structure that
is not quasi-witnessed. Then there exists a formula ϕ(x) such that both for
each a ∈M , ‖ϕ(a)‖(A,M) 6= ‖(∀x)ϕ(x)‖(A,M) and ‖(∀x)ϕ(x)‖(A,M) 6= 0. Hence
‖(∃y)∆(ϕ(y) → (∀x)ϕ(x))‖(A,M) = supb∈M{‖∆(ϕ(b) → (∀x)ϕ(x))‖(A,M)} =
supb∈M{0} = 0.
We are, now, ready to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem B.5.6. Let T be a theory and ϕ a formula in a given predicate lan-
guage, then T `L∆∀∆qw ϕ iff (A,M) |= ϕ for every quasi-witnessed model (A,M)
of the theory T .
Proof. The completeness of L∆∀ with respect to all (not only quasi-witnessed)
(A,M)-models is ensured by Theorem 10 of [HC06], so we will restrict ourselves
to the quasi-witnessed part.
(⇒) As a consequence of Theorem 10 of [HC06], we only have to check whether
a quasi-witnessed model satisfies axioms (C∆∃) and (ΠC∆∀), but this has
been proven in Lemma B.5.4.
(⇐) Suppose that T 0L∆∀∆qw ϕ, then there exists an L∆∀∆qw-structure (A,M)
of T , such that (A,M) 2 ϕ. By Lemma B.5.5, structure (A,M) is quasi-
witnessed and, moreover, ‖ϕ‖(A,M) < 1.
Unlike quasi-witnessed axioms of previous section, ∆-quasi-witnessed axioms
are not derivable in any logic. The argument to prove this result is the same as
in Lemma B.5.5 or in Example B.4.4.
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